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MATTlmw II0LLAND of Provo, lItah, is a junior
majoring in English and Political Sciellce. - During
the I !lHH P1l'dions M aUhew workt'd on t.he K B Y U
Ut.ah Colleges l·~xit. Poll. This summer he will be
working for t.he St..lte Deparlment. in Washinglon,
D.C. Ill' plans lo graduat.e in the winter or I un I.
MARK FREEMAN is currently a st'nior majoring ill
Polilical !:kience.
Ill' intends to graduate in lhe
spring of next year. After receiving his Bachelors
degree, he plans lo enter graduate studies in
Organizational Behavior at. BY U.
This summer
Mark will be getting married .
•JAMES U. MCLAREN ren'ived his Bachelors and
Masters in Public Policy fl"Om BY 1I and is cUlTenlly
a sccond-year law student at till' .1. Ihll'bl.'n Clark
Law School. .James is originally from S('otiand and
has worked for the British civil servin'. Ill.' plans
to work Ii,,' the govl.~rllment in a bw and policyrelated licld al'Ler wmpleLing his. law degree.
I{IF AlH;tISTINE is from Lafayette, Louisiana.
She is l'ulTl'ntly a graduate st.udcnt in International
HPiations at BY ll.
KH.lSTYN ALLRED is gradualing in Political Science
this spring.
She will he working in Asia this
sumlTll'r with her hushand.
She tlll'n plans to
r('turn 10 BYlI in tilt' fall to work on Ill'r Mast('rs
degree in Intl'J'Ilatiollal Iteiatiolls at the KCIlIll'dy
Ccnter.

INITIATIVES FAILI~D:
ELI~CTORAL TRENDS AND
TBE FEMALE VOTE

WilY

TBI~

Matthew Holland
Three things seemed likely to Utah voters in the
early summer of 1HHH: Michael Dukakis would be
t.heil' next Prcsident, Ted Wilson would be their next
Governor, and the 1!IHH Utah lax initiatives wOllld
puss wit.h overwhelming support. But on NovemlJl'r
R, 1HHR, I}ukakis was glad he had a job in Boston,
Wilson oncl'ed congratulations to a surprised Norm
Bangertel', and 11ll' initiatives wen' dd'eatl'd by the
sallle margin with which they were originally
favort'd to pass, Then~ has heen, and will continue
to be, considerahle discussion about the upsets of
I}ukakis and Wilson, but few are asking, "What
happened to the initiatives?" Some answers to that
qucstion can be dl'lt'nnined by analyzing the current
theOl'ics about the politil's of dired legislation,
considering some nl'W n~sl'ar('h on demographic
factors that influenced this year's initiative cledion,
and studying the various campaign tactics both sides
used on this isslle,
To place an initiative on the ballot, Utah Slate
law I'cquircs that a petition be submitted with a
number of signal ures equaling ten percent of I he
voLe fiJI' the last gubernatorial cll'l'Iion in I wo-thii'ds
of the count.ies. According 10 this formula, proposed
petitions for the 1!IHH ballot needed ahollt six ty
thousand signatures, Last spring Ihrl'e initiatives - A, n, and C -- wen' submilll'd wit h the necessary
endorscmel)ts. Initiativl' A was a tax and spending
limitatioll whidl would havc 10werl'd\limited property
Laxes. Initiative B ,would have n·dul't'd income taxes
and the Laxes Oil sail'S, motor flll·l. and tobalTo 10
I mHi levels.
Initiativl' C would have given tax
credit. to parents who want.ed 10 scnd tlwir childrcn
to private sdlOols.
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In .J line I !lHH a KS L\J)/,s..,.1'l NelliS poll ('(muuclt,d
by Dall .Jolles and Associatt's (lll'l'eal't.el' I'cli.~rreu t.o
as the .Jones poll) reported that. !)ti'~" of Utah
residents (not Ill'l'('ssal'ily I'egish~red votel'~) favol't'd
Initiative A, 2:~% opposl'd ii, and 21'/1, were
IIndt'ciued. An:ol'uing to Ihe .Jom's poll, Initiative B
h,\(J the hest chance of winning: !)H'~;, said they wel't~
in favor, :~·t% were OPllosl'd, and !t% were
IIIHIt'l'idmJ.
TIll' public sl't'lIll'd less t'lIthlisiast ic
ahout Initiatin' C, hut il was slill favoreu to pass,
with a margill of !) I'~;, for, II"" against, anu ~I%
undecided.
The qllestion as 10 why the initialives failed after
starting wilh sllch gl'eal support is further
complicated by an examination of the aUiludes of
the Utah electorate the day of the election.
Aceording t.o the KBY U Ulah Colleges Exit poll
(hereaflcr referred to as the K BY U poll) conduded
the day of the election by Drs. David Magleby and
lIoward Christensen of Brigham Yollng 1I niversity,
(i I % of vot.ing LJ tahns believed pl'opert.y taxes were
too high, only 2~1.!)% helieved taxes were about
right., and a smattering of others either 'cit they
were too low 01' did not have an opinion.
The KBY U poll indicated at least 40% of the
vot.ers in Utah lelt "tax cut.s were good 101' other
st.at.es," :uvv" disagl'eeu wit.h that. stat.ement. and 2H%
did not know.
Result.s of the poll also showed a
vast majorit.y of the voting public -- ~)2IYt, -- believed
there was at least "some" to a "great deal" of
wast.e in Ulah governmenl.
Probably the major
argument. of the groups support.ing the init.iatives
was thal I his legislal ion was needed because
burcaueI'ats were squandering public funds.
Some lIa ve tried t.o /~x plain t.he defeat of the
1I111lalive prol'ess. 1I0wevel', the KBYU poll seems
to disprove thal theory.
A question 011 t Ill' poll
(it'linl'd tlH' PI'OC!!SS as one when~ "cit.iZI'IlS call writl'
laws whieh volers can n·j(~t'I. 01' pass thus hypassing
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the legislature," alld asked votl~rs how they f'elt
ahoul. it.. A dl~ar majority -- li!i% of tilt' voters in
Ulah
felt the illitiative process W,\S a "good
lhing," only I~% thought it was a "had thing," H%
said it made "110 differellce" and I :1 11., said t hey "did
not know."
Despile these gelleral altitudes that the process
is good, t.axes are 1~10 high, there is waste in
government, and tax cut.s wcre good for other
stales, two-t.hirds of Utah voters cast ballots against.
the tax initiatives, To determine why the initiatives
failed in Ute midst of circumstances that seemed so
favorable to their passage IIIIl' should probably start
with a brief study of the current hypothesis about
voting behavior on direct legislation.
Dr. David
Magleby, professor of Politi(:al Seience and Public
Opinion at Brigham YOllng University, has done
extensive research and writing on t.he t.opic or direct
legislation. I will identify several determinants that
Dr. Mugleby suggests influem:e t he vole on ballot
propositions and show how lJtah's I HHH initiativc
election and campaign support his thesis.
Fit'st of all, "therc is a predidable movement
from general support for the propo::;it ion in t.he carly
campaign to its r~iection as the campaign procceds"
(Magleby I IlH·., 170). Profcssor M aglt·by 's reasoning
is that at. the start. of the campaign "mo::;t voters
at'e willing to state a prefl'n!Il('l~ for or against. a
proposition evcn if they know very lillie aboul it"
(I !lH4, 170). Thcrcfore an issuc that is currently
populut, -- like lax cuts -- has all early appcal but
in time as t.he campaign moves on and Ihe
short.comings and problcms of the initiative become
more and more evidcnl, suppo .... wanes. The I !)HH
init.iat.ives in Utah I'ollowl'd Ihal nalural trend of
carly appeal, followed by sleadily decreasing support
which is charadcrist ic or most initiatives.
Part. of the reason 1'01' sm:h a high frequcncy of
"lIlind-change" 011 tilt' issuc is hl~l',Hlse volers on
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proposit.ions telld to he "less SlIl'l' 01' their volin~
intentions, less knowledgealJle ahout. t Ill' proposition
eontl'sts, and probably 1lI0rl' suset'Jlt ihle 10 campaign
appeals" (Magleby ImH, 17'2).
As a result they
usually vote for the side "that spends the most
money" (Magleby 1 HK4, 145), is "endon;ed by the
media elite" (Magleby IUK4, 145), and "hest defines
the issue"(Maglehy I HH4, I (iR).
Mickey Gallavin,' an advertising consultant with
lIarris and Love Inc.\Advertisin~ hired by Tax
Payers for Utah (the group which mobiliZl'd to
defeat the init.iat.ives), estimat.es that approximately
$:I!)U,()()() was spent. 011 the campaign against the
initiatives. Mills C.'enshaw, a local .-adio talk show
host and leading member 01' the Tax Limitation
Coalition
(which
I'ought liJr
passage or the
initiatives), estimatl's theil' group probably spent
around $!)(),()()().
These ligures vary somewhat
depending on the SOlUTe of inlill'mation, but it is
safe to say that the anti-initiative group out.spent
the proponents 01' the initiatives by at least three to
one.
Tax Payers ('or Utah almost had a monopoly on
media and e1it.e endorsement.s. Ac{"ording to Mickey
Gallavin, t.he campaign st.rategy was that each week
a well known public figure in Utah representing a
particulat' OI'ganization
would
make a
public
announcement in opposition to the initiatives.
Republican Senator O .... in Ilatch, fonner Democratic
Governor Scott. Mat.heson, Salt. Lake County Slwrilf
Pete Hayward and a host 01' ot.her visible Utahns
discouraged other Utahns to vote li,r t.he initiatives.
The only noticeable public ligure ellliorsements ror
the initiatives were ('rom the ahove mentioned Mills
C"cnshaw and
MelTill Cook, Ihe Independent
candidale for Govprnol'. Neit.her ('(luld he ('onsiliered
two of t.he more conspicuous eilizl'ns of the slale.
The principal news media in till' stall' -- the SuLt
[,u/w '/'riblllw, lhe /).'s.!ld News, the ()Md.'/1 S((I//l/unl
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/':xamilla, KSL television and radio, and KlJTV
television -- all publidy took a positioll ill oppositioll
to the initiatives.
The only media publication to
come out. wit.h an edit.orial opinion in support. of the
initiatives, acconJing t.o Mickey Gallavin, was a
newspaper in Manti, Utah. The amount of money
spent, the quality and quantity of media opposition
and the number of elit.e endorsements were
undoubtedly keys to the success in defeat.ing t.he
initiatives.
According to findings from the KBYU poll, the
opponents of the initiatives also did a Let\.er job at
"defining the issue," and the side which can do that
"usually wins" (Magleby I !lH4, WR).
Seveml
themes from hoth sidl'S were publicized as a way of
defining the issue.
The Tax Limitation Coalition
group accused the government of wast.e and
mismanagement, which the KBYlJ poll showed most
people agreed with to some degree. Their cOl'OlIat,y
to this accusation was that because there is so
much wast.e, tax cuts would streamline the
government and improve the l'l'()JlOmy.
Tlwrl'fill'e
"prosperity follows tax cut.s."
According t.o the
KBYLJ exit poll, 4()% of the voters Lelil~ved that
idea but 471lhl did not.
Those fighting the initiatives realized that thl'
majority of the electorat.e fClt tax cuts in gl'lleral
were needed.
Deciding they could not. win by
sllggesting tax cut.s per se would be damaging t.o
Utah, t.hey pushed the theme that perhaps some
kind of t.ax cuts wt'rt' Ill'ct'ssary but thest' "artieular
init.iatives "go too ra..... TIll' KBY U poll illdi('ated
that. ():~(Ytl, of the volers lIl,lil'veti this Ihellw whilt'
:~ I % did not.
Perhaps ol'l'uuse or (or at least ill
addition to) their ability to outspend alld gathcr
",on' visible support thall their OPPOIll'lltS, those
working to dl'rl'at till' illitiativl's were ilion' drl'l'Iivc
ill convinl'ing the public or thcir poillt or vicw.
These theories, rads and ligures illllieale a few
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of the reasons the initiatives failed in I HHH.
Ilowever, results from the .Ioncs and KBYU polls
suggest that there were abo some important
demographic fadors which influenced this election,
the most. notahle of which was gender.
in .June
I HHH the .Jones poll showed that only I 7 (I/" of
women were planning to vot.e against Initiative A
while :w'y" of men indicated they would vote against
it.. Ilowevel', on NovemLwr 5, I !lHH, just three days
before the election, (iH% or women, a decisive
majority, said they would che(:k a "No" on the
initiatives and fl7% of men anticipat~~d they would
vote "No" as well. This means that women voting
against the initiatives increased by !)O% whereas
male ::HIpporl for the proposit.ions increased by 17%.
This pattern was consistent on all three initiatives,
hut it was more cvidcnt on A and B than it was
on
C.
The youngt~1'
voters (ages
I H-:H)
demonstrated a similar phenomenon comparcd to the
older age groups (although the rrequency or change
was not as substantial as it was ((II' women, it was
still significant),
It is also interesling to noll' Ihat the .Joncs poll
showed thai demographics like inCllme, party
affiliation, ideology and education
which are
usually the most importanl influelH:es on voting
hehavior -- did not make mUl'h difference on the
initiat.ive vote.
In 01 her words, in .J une I !lHR a
roughly equal majorit.y of' hoth Repuhlicans and
Democrats, conservatives and liherals, those who
madc over $liO,OO() a year and those who make
$20,(HIO, and college graduate:,; and Ihose with all
eighth grade (~ducation werc planning to vote fill'
the initiatives. In Noveml,cr I !IHH the samc gmups
we.·c cqually oppo:,;ed to thc h~gislation. Why sueh
a disparity, then, betwcI!n 1llt.'1! and wOlllcn on thi:,;
issue?
This qucst.ion delllonslra"~s t.he utility of
puhlic opillion polls. With data 1'1'1110 Ihe KBYLJ poll
it is possi""~ to ex amillc I hc similaritics alld
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differences or the influences on the voling Leha viol'
of Lolh men and women.
According lo lhe K BY LJ poll, (i4% of male voters
fell lhey paid a great deal of attention to lhe
initiatives and '(iti'Y" of women said they did as well.
Thus men and women were equally attentive to t.he
issue. An exad parity·· 4!1% -- of both male and
female voters, said they felt that the tax cuts woulo
make intrusions into state services.
Men and
women were fairly equal in how mud) they thought
about. the initiatives; 2H% of men saio they lhoughl
a great deal about the legislation and 2:l% or
women said they did too,
Bolh men and women
agreed thal lelevision and nl!WSpaper were their
most important SOlIITes of information on the
initiatives.
It lleems that neither sex was quicker
t~) make up their mind; nlughly an equal Illlmlll'r or
men and women madc up their minds on how tlll'Y
would vole on the initiatives a month before the
e1eelion.
Despite these many similarities, women differed
fnlln men on several ideological stances, on Ihe way
t.hey gat.hered information ami on the way Ihey
were influenced by t.he various themes of the
campaign.
According to t.he poll a greater
percentage of women would he willing t.o pay taxes
to help finance higher wages for teachers, Figures
show t.hal. 5 I % of women would support. a t.ax
inCl'ease for teachers' wages while just 42% of men
would favor' such an increase, It is possible -- ano
would be worth st.udying -- that. in LIlah more men
t.han women pay tlw taxes ('(II' their family and as
a result would tend to he more conservative in what
t.hey agree 1.0 raise laxes for. Perhaps women have
a stronger maternal\dollll'stic instind. ano issues like
eoucation for t.heir l'hildren are slightly ilion'
important. t.o t.hem than they are to mcn, Whatever
t.he motivation, till' idt'a or ('ulting boll'k on education
to save 1lI0W'y dot'S nol appt'al to WOlllt'1l as llIut'h
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as it dm's to nH'n,
()lIly 2!1'I" of wornl'n t hOIl~ht
that elllTl'nt fllnding for cdll!"al iOIl shollid Ite nIt or
stay the Hallle whereas ·lIi% or 1lll'1l felt slIch cuts
would he appropriate. AH far as a possihle illlTcase
in SPCIHlilig for education was ("olll'erned" (il% or
women would have HII\lporlcd it whilc only ,j 7% of
thc mall' votl' advocated Hudl a step.
Womt'll were slight Iy leHs t rllsting of the initiat.ive
pn)('eHH than ml'n. About. (i I % of women It,ll. that.
dire{'\, legislation was a good thing compared 1.0 HH%
or tnen who felt. it was a good thing.
It would
Heelll logical thaI. I.hoHe who diHtrust. t he initiative
pnlcess would tend io vot.e againHt. the initiatives.
If t.his is the case it would inlluenl'e morc women
than men.
While lhe majority of both men and women
claimed t.hat lelevision and nCWHpaperH were 1IICil'
beHt sources of infonnalion on the initiatives, onethird of the women polled said that their mOHt
important. source of jnlill'lllation was word of mouth
or some other source hesides television, radio,
newspaper, or voleI' pamphlet. Only I S% of men
said that word of mouth or another Hource was their
best SOUlTe of inlilrmation. The signilicanw of theHe
stat.istics becomes even more evident in light of the
campaign strategy of those opposing t.he initiatives.
As I mentioned belill'e, the side that. defines the
iSHue lhe best usually wins .. nd t.he, ant,i-initiatives
grouJl was the lIlost sUl'Cl'ssful in convincing the
puhlic of t.heir point of view. The KBYll poll shows
t.hat t.he t.hernes behind the campaign IiII' t.he
initiatives were less inlluent.ial than t.he themes their
opponents used; fw,thennore, t.he campaign lill' the
initiativeH was particularly illdledivl' with WlIIlll'n.
One of the themes the proponents of t.he
initiatives desperatl'ly t.ried to drive home was t.hat
"pnlsperity lill\ows tax clltS." This idea went. OVl~r
fairly well wit.h men, 47% or whom aglw,d lhat a
redul'l.ion in taxes would fud the economy.
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lIowever, only ~!I'Yt, of the WOIJH'n thal voted were
convinced proHperit.y would come from tax cutH and
1H% said they "did not know," whereas just H% of
men were undecided.
This is perhaps another
indidment against the eflccliveness of the initiative
campaign; they failed to eonvince a significant bloek
of undecided voLers of their posilion. On many of
the themes there is a highcr rat.e of indccision
among women than lIlen. Ill'. Magleby suggest t.hat
where doubt or decision lurk, t.here is a greater
tendency to vole against the initiatives and maintain
the st.atus quo (I HH4).
Another question on t.he KBYll poll asked lhe
voter if they felt Utah schools were doing a good
job. The advocates of the initiatives felt that if the
voters could be convinccd that Utah schools were
doing a good job t.hl'n cut.s in funding would not
seem so critical. Certainly few people would vote
fOl' cuts if they felt t.hal Utah schools were doing
a bad job and la{~ked the funds to improve. Almost
11% more men than women felt that Ut.ah schools
were doing a good joh. Both men and women were
about equal on the "don '(. know" response.
Anothe,' point the '!',IX Limitation Coalition t.ried
to put across was thal "t.ax cuts were good for
other states," believing that if t.hey could convince
the voLers of this the initiatives would pass. Again,
more men than wOlllen agreed with t.his idea by a
margin of 44% t.o :1:1% respeclively.
A message the Coalition probably should ha ve
used more ext.ensively, but for some reason did !lot,
was that "tax cuts send a message to governlllent.."
This would have bCl'n an errcclive argullll'nt because
it would have pulled debate away filnn whether or
not these particular init.iatives wen' good or bad and
moved it toward general l'OIHwnsus t.hat t.axes -particularly higlll'r laxes -- arl' unacceptable to the
vot.ing Jlublic.
Even wit.h till' meager attempts of
t.he Coalition to put this iill'a across 10 till' public,
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54 11., of men agreed with it.. WOlllen were not quit.e
so sure the cuts would send such a message; only
:17% thought that it would and 2 IIYt, (versus 10% of
the male vote) were undccitlcd.
The single most eflcl'i ive campaign slogail or t.his
campaign -- which happened to be generated by the
opposition -- was t.hat t.he initiatives "go too fa .... ;
():!ty', of the de('(orate agret~d wit h t.hat statemenL
This was also t he only theme that. womcn helieved
more t.han men hy a rate of (i5% to ()O%.
It is
also interest.ing t.hat. this was one of t.hc fcw issucs
whe .. e both men alld womell wen' well decided; vel'y
few of either scx checked the "don't know" response.
Compared to the proponents of the initiatives, t.he
opponents did a mm'h betler job at persuading the
puhlic -- and partkularly women -- from an opposing
01' unde('ided point. of view to t heir position.
These data from the KB Y U poll indicate that in
Utah, women seemed t~) have different attitudcs
from men about spending and education, oftcn
received their information from different sources than
men did, and were more convinced by the antiinitiatives I hemes and less convinced by the proinitiative t.hemes than men were. Why'!
According t.o consultant Mickey (;allavin, those
working to defeat the initiatives "f()cused their
campaign on wOlnen."
lie said that. lhe rcason f(u
doing so was because polls showed that "most people
defined this as an education issue more than
any thing dse, and that women were generally more
cOrleerned wilh education t.han men,"
Because at
the st.art of the campaign more WOIlll'n t.han men
w(~n~ voting f(II' t.he initiatives, and res(~arch showed
t his legi~:;\atiorl was hping illtcl'pl'l'Il'd as an education
isslle (which womell can'd aboul ilion' than men),
the opponents saw t.hat female vole as large and
o

winilabll~,

Tlw first stl'P in Iheir opposition H/,.all'~.Y,
according to (:allavin, was t.o g('1 ev('ry orgalli/.alioll

WHY TIII~ INITIATIVES FAILED"
that. woultl be al'('eded hy Ihese culs -- from Project
2()()() lo lhe Chamber of COllllnen:e -- to publicly
announce their opposition to the iniliatives and join
forces with Tax Payers of Utah to defeat them.
Three of the largest and most promillellt groups
they enlisled were the Parenl-Teaclwr Associalion
(PTA), lhe Utah Education Association (lJ EA), and
the League of Women Voters, all three of which arc
p.·edominanily female.
(~allavin said his research
showed that if tlleY could gel !)()l)'r, of their own
constituents, many of which were female, I hey could
defeat lhe initiatives. By striving to win the votes
of t.he members of these organizations t.hey were
focusing on female vot.ers.
The next big push, and according 10 Gallavin the
mosl effective, was the two-pronged ef'('ort of the
PTA. Their lirst project. was to hreak every city
up iniAl precinds and assign each member to a
certain precind, where they would visit every home
at Icast two or three times unlil Ihey spoke to
someone face to face.
Starting al Ihl' end of
August and coni inuing right up I hrough ('led ion day,
these PTA members, anned wilh pill'S or pamphlets
and the powers of persuasion, Ill'gan t.o visit each
home in their precincts to convince people of Ihe
damage they thought would he dOlle 10 educatioll in
Ut.ah if the initiat.ives passed. Though Ihis is not.
conclusive, it would seelll prohable Ihat. be("ausl~ the
majority of PTA IlwllIlH'rs arl' women alld because
womcn are gellCrally llIore fl'l'l' alld lll'xil,le during
t.he day, woml'1I would be goillg t.o hOllsl' 10 housl'
during Ilw dilY alld probahly speakillg 10 wOllwn
thai were home durillg till' ddY. This, howl'ver, is
only conjectllre.
The PTA's lH'xl t.adic was 10 dl'vole lIll'ir
regularly allolled pori ion of I illll' on "Back -To-School
Nighl'" t.o inli,nnal ion ahout the inil ial ivl's.
Each
PTA n'JlI'l·sent.alivl~ was illslrllcll'd nol 10 Iell
pan'nt.s how 10 vole 011 Ihl' illitialives hilt. 10 illform
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till' parcnts as al'l:uratcly as they l'ould how t.hat.
partil'ular school would Ill' alfet'h'd by t.hese lax
cuts. Support.crs or t.he init.iat ives wt'rt' givl'll -- anti
encouragl'd t.o t.ake -- equal tillle t.o present. t.heir
point. or view. Sotnetimes this led t.o very heat.ed
dehat.l', Lut. more oftcn t.han not., says - Mickey
Uallavill, t.he pro-illit.iative J)pople railed to make an
appearance or give an adequate argullll'nt at. t.hese
meetings.
Though st.atistics are 1I0t. availaLle, it
would prohahly be a sale anti important. assumption
10 say thai mon' woml'1I I hall ml'1I atl.t'nd the
"Baek-To-Sdwol Night" sponsored by t.he PTA each
rail.
The hypot.hesis that thesc effort.s direetly all'eeted
wotnpn more than tnl'n is pari ially supported by the
fact, as was tnenliOlll'd l'arlil'r, th,lt. according to the
KBY 1I poll womell wen' pt'rsll:Hlt'd by word ot'
tnouth or anotlll'r SOUITe mon' Ihan ml'll. Cl'rtainly
t.he efforts 01' till' PTA would fall umler eit.her of
those categories.
That t.he campaigning of t Ill' PTA h,I(1 a
significant. impa('t on volers IS powt'll'ully confirmed
by till' .Jont'S tra('king poll. .Ionl's's poll shows that
through most of the sumnwl· monl hs support Ii,.· t.he
init.iat.ives dcdincd, but it was a vcry, very gradual
dedinc.
Using Initiativc A as an example, in the
Lt'ginning of .June I !tHH flli% of the electorate
favol"l'd it and only 2:\% opposcd it. By tlw end of
August I !tHR support had only dipped to about. r,:\ly"
and opposition had only risen one or two points.
1I0wever, between the end of August and OdAILel·
I H, I !IHH (only seven or eighl wecks), support
sagged t.o 4(J1,Y" while opposition skyrocketed t.o 4!1%.
Though perhaps less dramat it-, I he vot ing hchaviOl·
on t he other two initialiv('s dt'lllonst rated similar
phellOmPlla (sel' Table A -- .Jont's poll).
In other
words, from t.he start t.he initial ivl's gradllally lost
support but something happellcd ill btl' August 0 ..
early September to begin 1.0 change dramatit'all.v tlil'

WilY 'I'1I14~ INITIATIVI·~S FAILED 1:1
aUit.ude of' Ut.ah voll'l~ ahoul. the lJIiliative~. It W.1S
t.he last week in August when Ute PTA started their
door-to-door campaigning and it was in the middle
of September wlll'n lIark -To-School Nights began.
An additional evidl'nct' that these initiatives were
most. effectively del"eall·d by the work of the PTA
is t.hat memllt'rs of the Tax Limitat.ion Coalit.ion who
sponsored t.he It'gislat ion dailTl I hat the PTA's ef"fi,,'ls
arc what did them ill. In a conversation wilh Mills
Crenshaw, he said, "We did 1I0t have the money or
t he resources the 0111\'1' group had hut. what really
killed liS were I hc Back-To-School Nights" (Deccmhl'r
Ifi, IHHH).
Undouhtedly the PTA's efforts had a
significant impact on the elcctorate.
In summary, it is dear the initiatives started
with considcrable support und, as with most
initiatives, support naturally declined. This decline
can partially be attrihuted to the eampaign efforts
of Tax Payers for l'tah who wt'l'e ahle t.o oUlspend
the Tax Limilation Coalition by at least threc t.o
one, were able hI securc a plethora of elite and
media endorsements, and were very effective in
defining the issue.
Women Wl'n~ pa.-t.icularly
affected by the elli,,-t.s of lhis group. The reason
fin' lhis may perhaps be that women have a st.rong
matenlal inst.inct. alld as a result. responded with
great.cr (~(lIlvidion - against legislal ion t.hey thought
might aned lheir ehildren's educat.ion negat.ively.
Another more provable reason is that the campaign
I~I dereal the init.iatives was stalled by organizations
which were primarily fi'male and concentrated on the
women vot...·... OIH' 01" I hese organizat.ions, t.he PTA,
was probably the most elli'dive at rea"y influencing
Ihe pUhlic to dlange t.lwir minds al,oul the
init.iat.ives, espl'l"ia"y alllollg WOIlll'II.
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INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR
PHOLIFgHATION AND 'l'1I1~ U.S.
HI~SPONSI~:
A POLICY PROPOSAL
Mark Frccman
In IH47 India gained indepcndencc from Grcat
Britain. As a condition of indcpcndclll:c thc nation
of Pakistan was ncated in an cffort. to rcsolvc a
ccnturics-old religious and social conllid bctwccn
India's Moslcms and IlilHlus.
Dcspite t.his drol"t,
Moslcm Pakist.an and lIindu India havc fought thrce
separate wars since 1~H 7, thc most recent in 1H7 I.
Following the 1B71 war, both nations embarked on
the development or a nudcar wcapons capability.
Today, there is a gcncral consensus that bot.h
nalions are nudcar-capablc.
This conscnslls was
voiccd by Ashok Kapur of the Univcrsity of
Waterloo:
"It must bc rccognizcd
that t.hc
nudearization of India and Pakistan has olTurrt'd;
the capabilit.y t.o make one or more nuclear bombs
exists, and has existcd fill" some timc" (Kapur in
DeWitt 1H87, 2()H).
lIowever, nudear capability
cannot be confuscd with deploymenl. Slates K'.lpur,
"The nudear post.ure and the nudear act.ivities of
hoth countries arc eilkulat.ed to keep nudear
Wl'apons options open, and yet. not 10 develop and
deploy nuclear arms. This adds up to the practice
of nuclear ambiguit.y" (Kapur in DeWitt I!IH7, 2()H).
Nucll~ar proliferation in South Asia is a serio LIS
problem.
I~ven though India and Pakistan Iwve
probably neitlll'r dl'vl'loped nor deployed nllck'ar
aI'senals I~) dale, t1ll'rt' is no guarantl'e Ihat till'
"practice
or nucleill"
amhiguit.y"
will
persist.
indefinitdy. If Wl'apons arl' evenlually deployed, the
potential fill' IIllclear hlllOl:allsl III South Asia is
r.-igt.t.ening.
As a Sllpl'rpOW('r alld OIH' (If I hl' kading nlldl',II"
ShIll'S
has
it
wt'apons
statt's,
IIII'
United
responsibilit.y III address lilt' proillem or Indo-
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Pakistani nu(·lear proliferation. Indeed, as Douglas
Makeig of the U.S. Department of Defense observes:
With the evolution of a quasi-alliance system
that pits India and the Soviet Union against
Pakistan, China, and the United States, and,
a I'egional arms I'ace t.hat could cscalate to thc
nuclcar Icvd, thc rivalry between India and
Pakistan has taken on inllnense significance in
thc global security cnvironmcnt. 01' the I BHUs
(UlH7, 27 I).
But in recent years, U.S. policy has eit Iwr ignored
or cxaccJ'bat.t~d thc problcm. Amcrican policy nccds
to bc adjusted to bcllcr managc thc problcms of'
South Asian proliferation in thc short tcrm, wit.h thc
goal of eliminat.ing thc thrcat of South Asian nuclcar
prolifcration in t hc long tcrrn.
Bd'on' an adjustcd
U.S. policy can bc rationally proposed, it is
neccssary to discuss hoth t.hc prlllifl'rat.ion problem
and past U.S. policy.

THE NUCLEAR CAPAfilLITlES OF
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Part of discussing t.hc pl'Oliferat ion problem
includes an analysis of the nueil'ar eapahilitics of
India and Pakist.an.
As considercd briefly above,
both count.ries probahly have thc capabilit.y t.o
dcvelop and deploy nuclcar wcapolH;.
It is
important t.o descrihe these capabilitics in morc
detail.
Nuclcar capability is a fundion of' foul'
diffcrcnt. fadors: acccss t.o fissilc wcapons material
(cit.lwr plutonium or cnridwd uranium), ability to
producc and dcploy a workabl(~ weapon, a capabilit.y
to deli vcr the weapon (missiles, warplanes, or
suhmarines), and thc political will and power to
exploit t.hesc capabilitics.

N UCLEAH PI{OLI FERA'I'JON

I!I

Imlia':.; Nuclear Capabilities
India has signilicant access to lissile weapons
material in its development of an l'xtensive
plutonium-ex lraction capabilily. Currently, there are
four facilities capahle of extrading weapons-grade
plutonium frolll spent uraniulll fuel: one in Trombay,
one in Tarapur, and I wo al Kalpakkam. CUlTently,
these faeililies have the capacity to reprocess ~fifi
met.ric tons of spent fuel per year (Spector I!lH 7,
!)7-H).
More signilicant is thal. since 1!IH:i, India's
Madras I reador at Kalpakkam has provided a
supply of spent fuel free from internalional
regulat.ion.
This means thai India can extract
plutonium from Madras I spent fuel "withoul the
risk of violating any internalional agreement"
(Spector I HH7, Hfi).
Not including plutoniulll from
.~he Madras I reactor, India has prohahly sl~lckpiled
approximat.ely :wn kilograms of weapons grade
plulonium since the inct~ption of its nuclear program
(Spector I H8 7, H5).
India clearly has lhe capallility to produce and
deploy a workable nuclear weapon. In 1!l7 4 India
exploded what il called a "peaceful nuclear device."
The bomb was similar to the U.S. atomic weapon
dropped on Nagasaki in World War II. Since 1!174,
India's Iluclear productioll capabilities seem to have
expanded.
The
Carnegie
EIIlJowment
for
International Peace concluded in I HH4 that India
"could make a thennonueiear device in thn'e years"
(Seth I !)88, 7 I H).
The newest n~port from I he
Canlegie I~ndowmenl estimates that India has I he
availallie materials to producc twpnly to lifty atolll
Lomlls of tilt' typl' lested in I !174 (L~M 17
Novemller I !IHH, :1 ~ l. By I !l!ll, India Illay he ahle
t.o produce ovpr I ut) (Spl'ctor and Stahl I HHH, :I~).
The 1!IH4 Canwgie Endowment n'port pn~dids,
"Expalltll'd reproces:.;ing ('''pability, which is already
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plalllled, alld Ihe illtl'lldlll'lillll IIr hl'avy wall'r p(lwel'
n'l\('ton; ill Ihis dl'{'ade alld Ih(' III'~d. cOllld ~ive Illdia
a warhead poll'lIlial of well 0\'1'1' 1,000 hy Ihe tllrll
of the n'lItmy" (Sl'Ih I !IHH, 71 H).
India has a
broad array of' dt'livery l:apabililies, There are a
varidy of Indian warplanes capable of delivering a
nuclear bomb--the Canherra, Ihe .Jaguar/Ult-I, I.he
Mit: 21, Ihe MiU-2:1 !IN, the Mirage 2000, and the
SlI-7BM_ III all, India POSSl'sses (lvl'r 270 of these
aircraft (Spe('\.()r I!)H 7, !1!I1. t\ It.hough not inlended
for lhe delivery
nudear Wl'apons, India also
possesses a nuclear powered sllbmarine, which it
leased from t.he Soviet Union in .Janllary lUH7. In
addit.ion to the planes and submarine, India
mHlIHIIlt'l'd in March I HHH IIll' dl'vdopment of a
ballistic missile capable of delivering alomic weapons.
Although India claims that t.11l' missile is only for
conventional purpmies, it is \.00 illaccurate to be a
useful conventional weapon,
Bu\. armed "with a
nuclear warhead it would be a serious weapon"
(.k'(,(lflom;st 2() March HIHH, :1 1-2),
Clearly, India has extensive lechnical capabilities
hI develop and deploy nuclear arms, but docs it
have the political will to exploit these capabilities'!
In I mw former Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi
said lhat India will "not hesilale frolll carrying out
nuclear explosions ... or whatever is necessary in t.he
national interest (WI' I" March I !IHO, I). Leonal'd
Spee\or of I he Ca l'Ilegie I';ndowmc nl fill' I ntel'll al iOllal
Peace suggl'sts thai. the reprocl'ssing of unregula\.ed
Madras I spent fuel pl'Ilvidcs "slron~ evidence that,
at a minimum, Rajiv Uantlhi Iindia's current. prime
minist.er! is laking s\.eps t.o enslll'l' \.hat India will
ha ve Lhe option 1.0 Ideploy nucll'al' weapons I rapidly
if circumstances require" (I !IH7, Hli),
<landhi
claimed in .'une I !IHfi \.hal his ('OII1l\.ry could dl'ploy
within "a few wpeks or a f('w mOlllhs (,../lIS/SA fi
.June I !IHfi, I'~ I).
011 August H, I ~)Hfi the ruling
Congress (I) party joinl'd thl' right-wing opposit.ioll

or
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calling fot' a finn response 10 Pakislan's nuclear
program (f.'IUS/SA H August IUHfi, 1':2).
K.
Subrahmanyam, director of the Indian Institute 1'0 ..
Defence Studies and Analyses, a .. gued in 1HH7 that
a nudea .. Pakistan is inevitable, and so India should
move ahead with its own nuclea.. arsenal (Seth
I U88, 720).
Although the pressu .. e to develop a
nlldeat' deterrent is strong, it has not yet had a
decisive eflccl on Indian nudear policy.
In fael,
S. P. Scl.h, directo.. of t.he Stratcgic Planning,
Research, Information & Consult.ancy Service in
Auslralia, reminds that "it would be wrong to
assume that the nuclear hawks rule the roost in
India ... India's ant.i~nudear lobby is fairly strong anJ
a .. ticulate" (I HHH, 721).
While the ..e is significanl politjeal will 10 maintain
a credible nuclea.. optioll in India, the full
exploitation of India's nudear capability t.hrough
deployment will probably be forcstalled, ba .... ing
significant changes in the South Asian security
environment. Probably I he tTlost signilit~ant inl1uence
(In this security ellvironment for India is Pakistan's
nudeat' ambiticlIls.

III

Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilities
Pakistan's access to fissile wt·;tpon's material has
been m()l'e problematic. Bccause France te .. minated
assistance in the construction of the Chashma
reprocessing plant in 1!J78, Pakistan has generally
pursued a much Illore I:oslly uranium cnrichmcnt
pl"ocess
to
acquire
weapons-graJe
material.
FlirlhennH ..e, a de 1(/1"/0
inte .. national nudea ..
tedlllology embargo has filn'pd Pakistan to PIll"SlW
unllliuIH en .. ichment technology covt· .. lly. In the past
decade Pakistan has been able t.o produce a
wo .. kable tm .. ichllwnt facility at I(ahula, East. of
Islamabad (Spl·t" to.. 1!lH7, 10 I).
U.S. inll·lligl'lH"e
SIllIl"n'S daim Ihal Ilw I<ahllia facility "has l'llridwd

~~

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

uranium 10 !)O%, suit ahle for I atOlnic\ weapons,"
Theru have also been reports of a second enrichment.
plant. under consiruct.ion al (loll''' (l'SM 14 Decemher
\B87, 7),
Overall, some e!;timates claim lhal t.he
Kahuta facility could produce a maximum of furt.ylive kilograms of weapons grade uranium a year
(C.-anslun I !)84, S 7!)O I),
Even though most ohservers believe t.hat. Pakistan
has produced wcaptlIls-gl'adc uranium, some experls
are skeptical. 1.1\, llsmani, tllP fonner chairman of
Pakistan's Atomic Energy COllllllh;sion, explains lhe
basis for this skeplicism:
It takes 7,000 cenlrifuges to wOI'k day and
night lill' one yeai' at velocity of :l~,()()() mph
t.o produce \0 kg, of u.'anium- ~;15 of !Hl, wy"
purit.y, required fill' pl'Otiueing one Hil"Oshimat.ype bomb, Even in Europe t.hey have only
heen ahle t.o achieve enrichment of 2,7%".
One day somehody is going to call OUl' bluff
(Selh I B88, 715),

Olher ex pert.s concur.
Dr. Haja Ramanna, (()I'mer
chairman of India's At.omic Energy Commission, does
not "t.hink Pakistan's exist.ing nuclear infrast.rucllll'c
qualifies it 10 make an atmn hmoh."
Dr. B,N.
Selima, Hamann,,'s pl'l'de~'essor, expressed a similar
vicw in I H8~ (Selh I !)88, 715),
Nevert.heless, even if Pakistan has failed t.o
produce weapons-grade uranium, lhey may have
recent.ly developed a pluloniulll extraction capahilily.
In
I !tHO
Pakistan started conslrudion' of a
clandestinc reprocessing facility al. Rawalpindi near
t.he Pak islan I nst ilul.t.' of SCil~IH'I~ and Technology,
If the facililY is oppralional, it. could be producing
apJll'Oximalely lilll!cn kilograms of weaJlolH;-grade
plut.oniulII a year (SI'III I !)8H, 7 I:\),
Because I'akistan has III'VI'I' I'(lIIdudcd a Illldl'ar
ksl, il is 1I0t 1~lltirply CI'rtaill I.hal it is ahle 10 use

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
its weapons-grade uralliulIl and plutonium in the
PI'otiuctioll of a nuclear weapon.
Ilowever, from
1HH2 to 1HH4 anonyrnow; sources were quoted in the
III'ess claiming that China had provided Pakistan
with nuclear design information, thus allowing
Pakistan to develop a workable atomic weapon
without testillg (WP 2H Jt'euruary InH~l, t; U.S.
Congress IHHH, 17). But China has denied aiding
the Pakistani atomic weapons program.
Vice
Premier Li Peng said in 1UHf) that nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan "is and will be conducted
for peaceful purpmws only and not for not-peacpful
()tll'poses" (Porter in DeWitt. 1!lH7, 141). Meanwhile,
a U.S. intelligence report in July 1!IH5 indicated that
Pakistan had successfully tested a triggering device
necessary to the production of a workable atomic
weapon (Spector 1!lH7, I ()7).
Pakistani leaders Sl~l'm to confirm thesc rcports.
Dr. A.Q, Khan, thp head of Pakistan's IlllCleal'
program, was quotcd in the March I, 1!IH7
ObsCI'IIt!r (London): "What the CIA has been saying
about our possessing the homb is correct and so is
the spenliation of so III I' foreign newspapers."
Dr.
Khan and the Pakistani government later dellied his
statement WI';/O;U I~ Marl'll I!lH7, a·i), But in the
same month, fonner Pakistani President Zia ul-Ilaq
told Timl!, "You can virtually write today that
Pakistan call huild a homb wlll'lIcvl'r it wishes.
W hat is difficult about a bomh'!
Onn' YOll have
acquired the tcchnology, which Pakistan has, you
can do whatever you likc" (:Itl March 1!IH7, 42).
But. these st.atl'llll'llts may simply he polit ieal
pm;t.uring, not. rcality. Thus, a dcgrec of uncertainty
still Slll'l'Ollllds Pakistani nudear l:apahility.
Notwit.hstanding t his uncertainty, Spel'lol' COlH'tll'S
with most otlll'r l'xl)!'rts that Pakistan "either
posscs~;t>s
all
of till' (~OlllpOlwnts
nceded
to
manufacture lUll' or HI'v!'l'al atom hOlllhs 01' dse
remains just short of I his goal" (SpI'dor I mn, 1111).
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Ami lhe I BHH Cal'lll'gie EndowllH'nt n·port. est.imat.es
lhat Pakistan eUlTcntiy posscsses t.he "t'sscntials lill'
two to four atom it' 1.ombs" (CSI\t 17 Novl'mber
I !)8H, :12). Pakist.an may he ahle to produce fift.een
weapons by I U!) I (Spector and St.ahl I VHH, :l~).
And according t.o a I !IH4 Cenl." for Sl.rategic and
International Studies report, Pakisl,;\Il's presenl
estimated IIranillm elll'ieJunent capahility could yield
appl'Oximateiy t.hirty-six warheads hy ~()()n (Seth
I !lHH, 714),
lInlike India's ,.datively diverse capahilities,
Pakistan's (,IIITent delivery capabilities am limited 1.0
warplanes. U.S.-supplied F-llis alld FH·nch-supplied
Mirage fiPA:ls can bolh sUl'l'essflllly calTY nudeal'
bomLs.
Also, Pakistan's Miragt' :mps and Q-fiAs
can be modilied lo calTY Iludcar weapons (Spt'do)'
1!)H7,

I~:n.

lJ ntil rccent Iy, till' polit kill will of Pakistan t.o
exploit its nllclear capahililies has bCl'n rather
uncerlain. Pakist.an refraim·d from signilicant public
discussions concel'l1ing its nudear intentions unt.il late
I !lHf>.
Al a press-sponsored I'OlInd-tahlL' discussion
in Novemher I UHf> Mohammed Ilanif Hanay, leader
of Pakistan's opposition Mllsawat Party, stated,
"India's expansionism will make it attack liS soonm'
01' later.
The only way we l:an pl'Ot.ed ollnmlves
is by developing nuclear weapons" (Hpedo,. IH87,
I ()7).
The following monlh Tufail Mohammad,
chief of Pakistan's fundamentalist .Jamaat.-i-Islami
Pal'ty, called for lhe (ll'Odlidion of nllclear weapons
(Spedor IBR7, IOH).
And III 1!IHli Dr. Khan
puhlished a paper t.hat spoke favorahly of a
Pakistani nudear detelTenl, (Khan I !IHH, 4 2()-4 ~).
This is especially signiJicant. given Dr. Khan's
posilion as lite head or Pakistan's nudear pmgram.
Despile these st.atenll'nts, t.he late Primp Minist.er
,'unejo and the late Presidelll Zia lIl-ltaq both
claimed t.hal Pakisl.all did 1I0t illtelld to deploy
nudear weapolls (\VI' IX .'uly 1!1H1i, I).

N UCLI~A I{ PROI ,I FII:I{A'I'ION
But. ,'unejo and Zia were both killed III an
airplane explosion in August I !JHH. Since lhen, the
cent.er of polit.ical power in Pakistan has bel'n
obscured, complicating the analysis of Pakistani
nuclear intentions.
Following the assassination,
Ghulam Isha" Khan was appointed acting president.
The seventy·three year old leader was once Zia's
finance minister and later tile (~hainnan of t.he
Pakistani Sl'nat.e.
lie has IlI'en involved in
Pakist.ani polilies for t.wl'nly yean; (J.;("onom;sl 20
Augusl I HRR, '27). Ishaq Khan I.welllS to be rat.her
powerful and expl'rienl'ed.
It. is not clear how he
views the nuclear deployment issue, but. his ties
. wit.h Zia may indicate his prefel"l~nce for a conlinued
policy of ambiguity.
Following general elections in November, Ishaq
Khan appointed Benazir Bhullo to be Pakistan's new
Prime Minister on December .I, I ~18R.
Bhullo's
nuclear int.cntions arc equally unclear. lIer faUll'r,
Zulkifar Ali IlhuUo, initialed Pakistan's nuclear
weapons progt·am in the early I H7()s. Ill' was laler
execut.ed by t.he Zia regime, but. Bhutto seemed to
abandon her father's polit.ical legacy following Zia's
death (CSM 18 Novembet· 1BHH, :11;).
This may
indicate t.hat she docs not necessarily intend to
fm·t.her exlend her father's agenda, which included
a
slrong
commitmenl
to
lIuclear
weapons
development. Furthermore, she staled in I !lR() lhat
Pakistan's nuclear research program is infeasible and
would have to be rl'assesscd (Spedor 1!IH7, 110).
Lat.er the satTle year she t.old UIl' I",{illll /<;xp,-/,s.o;
t.hat. if she was dl'(·ted, she would ahandon the
policy of· lIuclear ambiguit.y, seU ling all doubts
concerning t.he potent ial military lISl' of Pakist.an's
nudear program (FillS/SA 1·1 Aligust I !Il'Hi, 1-'2).
This may indicate her willingn('ss t.o suhmit.
Pakist.an's nudea .. facilities to IAJo:I\ reglilation.
Even t.hough till' Pakistani political l'nvironllwnt
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has pl'Ohably stahilized since BhllUo's appointment.,
there IS sl ill a st mng polpnl ial for instabilit.y.
Inside her Pakistani People's Parly (1'1'1') Bhutlo is
confnlllied with a left-wing eoalition thut is "antiAmerican, anti-rich, and anli-arIllY" (l';cilllo/1list '27
August I nss, '2:n. With signilicant pressures from
the military t.o maintain good n'lations with the U.S.
and their own positions of pOWl'r, it will be diflicult
f(U" Bhutto to satisfy the far left's agenda.
At the
same time her authority is challl·ngl'd by the rightwing Islamic Democratic Alliance, who have vowed
to challenge her appointment in the Pakistani courts
(Ecoflomist '2() November H)88, :1'2).
If Bhutto is
unable to overcome these challenges, signilicant
instability is not in(:onceivable as a broad array of
interests remain unsatislil'd.
This instability may
increase the role of the military in Pakistani political
decisions. While lhe cu ....ent. military chief, Aslam
Beg, is said "to be without political ambitions,"
observers suggest that "enough blood on the streets
would bring the army in" (I":"oflo/1li8t 27 August
I H88, 2:1). Surprisingly, a milit ary takeover may
decrease the political will of Pakistan 10 exploit its
nuclear capabilities.
Stephen Cohen of Berkeley
University in his· I H84 study of the Pakistani
military has concluded that nudear weapons are not
generally attractive 1.0 Pakj~tan's military leadership
(Cohen I !)S4, laa-()().
The nuclear capabilities of both India and
Pakistan
arc
cause
'ill"
serious
concern.
Nevertlwless, as previously discussed both nations
am currently pursuing a policy of nuclear ambiguity
where they remain at the nm:lear threshold without
actually deploying nucleal" weapons. But it is clear
that deployment cannot be forestalled indelinilely.
Spector argues that "evcn if cal'll side refrains frum
testing or asscmhling bOlllhs, they will continue to
build st.ocks of plutonium lor uranium I, and internal
presslIre will grow with eaeh new spat. 1.0 Illove
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fm·ward with delivery systems" (CSM 14 December
HHn, 7).
If deployment occurs, a nuclear South
Asia will pose several serious problems. But even
without deployment, there is still cause for concern.

THE IMPACT OF INDO-PAKISTANI
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
There are basically three different effects of
nuclear proliferation in South Asia: incrcased
instability in lhe Indo-Pakistani rivalry, increased
.·isk of nuclear pmliferation beyond the region, and
an increased pressure on lhe woddwide nuclear nonproliferation regiml!.
Impact

Oil

lhe

Indo-Pakistani Rivalry

Nuclear proponents in Pakistan and India both
argue that nuclear deployment would enhance
military deterrence in South Asia, thus reducing the
risk of war.
Suhrahmanyam, an Indian defense
expert, a.·gues, "II istory shows that the development
of nuclear weapons capabilit.y among nations having
an adversarial rehltionship has led to stability" (Seth
1988, 720). S. M. Zafar, secretary of former Prime
Minister .Junejo, added that. the development of
nuclear weapons will "stop all danger of war in this
region just as the nudear strength of the two
superpowe.·s has eliminated the danger of war
between them since Wodll War II" (Spector 1!l87,
t (7). But this historical argument for dl'tl"Tlmn' is
invalid for several reasons.
Initially, them is a strategic pl"Ollll·m.
For
nlldear detc .... encc to work, hoth sidt's Illllst POSSl'SS
a credihle retaliatory capahility.
If this cap,lhilily
pxists, neillwr lIatilltl wants to lallnch IIIldea ..
weapons preelllpti vPly hccallst' then' is liu II' prospl't"I
of avoiding IIIld!!ar dl'slnlctillll fl"OlII a retaliatory
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strike. This condition is what Wl'stern strategists
call MAD (M ut lIally Asslln'if Ill'st ruction). Hidwn'
lIaass of lIarvard University has ex,Plaim'd the
absence of MA D in t he Indo· Pakist.ani rivalry:
"A It.hough both India and Pakist.an pOssess a nlllnb~~r
of advanced airnaft, capable of t.raveling co'nsiderable
range, and despite India's impressive strides in
developing a space program, each country is far
away fi'om possessing a stable retaliatm'y ('apabilit.y"
(llaass I UHH, 115).
The lack of MAD in South
Asia is primarily due to the small size of the
potential nuclear arsenals and the inability rOl' eilllCl'
side 1.0 quickly del.ecl a preemptive strike.
In a
crisis situation t.his strat.egic vulnerability would
inCl'ease bot.h Indian and Pakistani incent.ives to
preemptively launch theil' nudear arms because
delaying a launch would risk uUer dest.rUclion
without. any prospect. for retaliation.
But even if MAD (:ould be est.ahlished in Sout.h
Asia, t.here are st.iII t.he problems of accident.al
launch and crisis miscalculation t.hat the superpowel's
conl'ront in their nuclear rivalry. I·'ew would argue
that spreading t.hese problems t.o South Asia would
he desirable, But beyond these l'OImnon problems,
t.he nature of t.he Indo·Pakistani rivalry significantly
dilutes the utility of nudear weapons in South Asia.
«'il'st, the stakes in a typical I ndo· Pakistani conflict.
are much higher than in a typical superpower
eonflicl--naLional survival versus a particular regional
CIIIH.:ern.
India or Pakist.an might risk nudear
confrontat.ion to maint.ain tlll'ir nat ional int.egrit.y.
If the same interest.s Wl'n~ threat.encd in a
superpOWl'r conllict., the Sovil'l. Union or the United
Stat.es might. he expecll'd to at'! similarly.
Second, India and Pakistan also sharp a ('ommon
honler. Consl'qlll·nt.ly, "limited ('onfl'Ont.ations or low·
level dashes could spill over qui('kly into vital
national lelTil.ory and threaten nit,iral national
interests, perhaps even survival (DUlin I !'H~, 70).
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The pressure to usc nuclear weapons would be great
in this sit.uation as Michael Brenner of t.he
U niversit.y
of
l'iUsLu..,~h
ex plains:
"I n
the
atmosphere of a high stakes confrontat.ion where
ideology may he the driving force and where the
nuclear Lalance is so easily tipped, there is a fair
chance that t.he psychological balance will tilt
towards usc of nuclear weapons" (Brenner in DeWitt
IHS7, fiB).
"~inally, India and Pakistan share a legacy of
direct conflict. They have filught three major wars
since 1!)4 7. This legacy makes small nises more
dillicult. to diffuse. And even though a major war
has not. been filUght. since I !J7I, India and Pakistan
have not left the pot.ential fill' armcd conflict behind
them.
In .January I !l87 the two nations came
precariously close t~1 rekindling wal'.
lIaass
chronicles this crisis:
A I"l'ecnt nisis OCCUlTed in l~ady I !I87, when
a large Indian military l'xl'lTist' ("Operation
Brass Tacks") in t.he bonk'r st at.l' of H~~iast.han
prompted a Pakist.ani mobilizat.ion. India llIay
have sought. to intimidate Pakistan fi,.. any
number of reasons--t.o rClllind Islamabad of
I ndia's regional primacy, t.o Jll'rSlHldl' Pakist.an
t.o terminate alleged support fill' Sikh t.clTorists,
or simply to provide a foreign dist.raction for
domest.ic polit.ical purposes. What is ecrtain,
t.hough, is how event.s neady slipped out. of
control, and a fourt.h South Asian war was
narrowly avoided hy last minute diplomacy in
a mu~uul st.and-down (lluass I!I88, 112).
I ndia and Pakistan dashed again in lall' September
"at. positions oVl'dooking four mountain passes lin
Northern Kashmir I.
OLsl'rvl'rs ("alll'd it "the
higgl'st encOllllter sinl"l~ intermittent dasill's bl'gan in
ImH" W/·;/·;U 80etober t!I87, Itll. II Illay he only
II
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a maUer of time be/ill'c o/w of tlwse incidents
develops inlo an a/l-olli. wal".
If nuclear weapons
an' available, a IHldear '1OIoeall:;1 in SOlllh A:;ia is
very possible.
Beyond traditional Indo- Pakist.ani rivalries, the
very pursuit. of nuclear capaLilities might lead to
wal".
As nudear development proceeds, the two
nations might be tempted t.o preemptively strike the
other's IIlH:/ear racilities a:; Israel did in I BH I
against Iraq.
Some reports claim that Israd has
approached India on three separate ol·casions t.o offer
assistance in a joint att.ack against Pakistan's
nudear fadlit it's (Hhat ia I !IHH, ltHi).
In late
Seplembel o I !IH5 rlllllors surfaced in Pakistan
indic'lting that a preemptive strike had been
considered by tilL' Indian military during the
administration of Indira (;handi.
However, the
Indian government denied lhese rumors WillS/SA ti
November I BH5, I~ I). In a I !IH4 interview wit.h the
Jllterllutiollul Hemlli Tribulle, former
Pakistani
Foreign Minist.er Sahabzadeh Yaqub Khan warned
t.hat Islamabad "would have no alternative but to
relaliale" if India at.tacked it.s nuclear facilities.
Zalamay M. Khalizad of lhe Institute of War and
Peace at Columbia University daimed that "an
at.lack of this kind muld set the stage lill" a larger
Indo-Pakislani war" (Khalizad in eoldblat IHH5a,
1 :~8).
A 1!)S5 verbal agreement between lhe two
nations prohibiting preemptive strike against nudear
facilities might prevent this scenario. lIowever, the
agreement has not. yel been lill'maliwd, so its
usefulness is limit.ed (Makeig I!IS7, 2!H). Cleady,
the risk of war is high and probably increasing In
South Asia.
If India and l'aki:;l.an again go to war, lIlt.-n- is
no guarantee that a nudear conflict. can be avoided.
Probably most rright('lIing is tlH~ potential for a
broader lIuc/ear war ill volvillg IIH~ Hllperpowprso
lIaass suggests that "allY IHIl:lear cOllllict. ill South
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Asia would bring not just Jevastation to the region
but would raise the danger of a bl'Oader eonflid
involving lhe United States, the Soviet Union, and
China" (llaass 1miH, 1 iii).
Impad on

Extra-Regional

Pl'Oliferation
Another problem with Indo-Paki~tani nuclear
proliferation is the potential spread of' selHiltlve
nuclear technology to other Third World nations. In
general, an inneasing number of l'llwrgent nuclear
material or technology suppliers increases motives
fm· countries pursuing nuclear capabilities to go
ahead with weapons development. Stanley Ing of
the Canadian Department of National Defense
explains this general phenomenon:
Once a country has dedded to develop a
nucleaJ· weapons programme, the increased
number of exporters becomes an important
factor.
The availability of nudear
technology and Ii~sile materials means that a
country no longer has t.o spend years
developing a nuclear t.echnological infrast.ructure
heftll·e proceeding wi lh a nuclear weapons
programme.
Becuuse t he emergent
suppl,ers do not. export complete power
reactors, and bl'cause the nudear components
they do export are easier to obtain, certain
threshold countries may he persuaded to
establi-sh facilities dedicah·d solely tH nuclear
weapons developllwnL
Such a route could
incur political cost.s, but this, too, may be
acceptable in view of t.he financial savings and
the perceived strat.egic import.ance of quickly
acquiring nuclear capability (lng in DeWitt.
1!IH7, 12'l-H).
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This analysis may pSlweially apply t~1 the
potential henefil'iaries of Pakistani a 1111 Indian nuclear
experience. I·'ormcr Prcsidlmt Zia dedared in 1!lHH,
"Il is (Pakistan'sl right to obtain Inudcal'l
technology. And whcn we aequirc this technology,
the enti,"e Islamic world will possess it 'with us"
WillS/SA H' March I HHfi, ••' I), But Sl,th argucs
t.hat these t.ypes or stalemcnts fmm Pakistani
officials are probably symbolic:
Whether or not Pakistan will make available
its 'bomb' 01' nuclear technology tH other
Islamic countrics is aq~uable, and even if
I~akist.an were willing to share the bomb, there
are pradical probll'ms in terms of Ipoliticall
divisions in the Islamic world in which
Islamabad docs not want to get involved (Seth
1!lHH, 71 (i).
While Sclh's ohservation Illay he valid, Zia's
statelllenl neverlheless secms to rit wcll with
Pakistan's I URn nudear cooperation a~rccmcnts wit.h
Egypt and Iraq WHiSIN A n December 1BHn, D4).
India could also be contributing tA) the fUt,ther
sp,'ead of nudear wcapons in the Middle ~asl. Ing
has documented India's status as an emcrgent
nuclear supplier:
India is emerging as a potentially major
nucleat' supplicr.
As thc first Third World
counlry to invcsl signiricant.ly in nuclear
energy, I ndia is able to convcrt ils experiencc
in t.his area into an cxportablc commodity . .
I ndia has gonc on to conclude nudl'ar
agreements wilh some Third World wlllltries.
Among thcse arc countrics which arc in the
midsl of a war, or arc located in a region of
somc instability,
TIll'HC include Iraq, Syria,
and Lihya (lng in DeWitt. 1!IH7, I~II-I),
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<1iven the increasing evidence of Israeli nuclear
capahilities, the nudear ambitions of these potential
Middle I';astern Leneficiaril's arc probably not entirely
benign,
If (.hesl' nations were to oblain nuclear
weapons capabilities, the risk of renewed Arab-Israeli
conflict would inerease drastically, II' any of these
nations were to deploy nuclear weapons, the result
could be catastrophic given tlw volatill' nature of the
Amb-Israeli ('(Inflict,
But the potential for the
spread of nuclear capahili tics frolll South Asia Illay
extend beyond the MidJle (o;asl.
Impact on the Overall
Non-Proliferation

Regime

Both India and Pakistan are non-signalories to
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Tl'eaty (NPT), This
treaty established the first formal emnt to regulate
the spread of nuclear technology by ereating the
Inlernational Atomic Energy Agency (I A I'; A) to
enfm'ce the treaty's stipulations, . Other efl{lI·ts exist
to I'egulale the spread of nuclear technology,
including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSU), The
NSG has I()rmulated nuclear export guidelincs
adopted by the fifteen major nuclear supplier
countries in I ~n 7 (Council Oil Foreign Heinl ions
H)H6, fH), While other near-nudear ('ollnll'il's stich
as ISI'acl and Sout.h Africa wntributc, India's and
Pakistan's non I'l'coglll I Ion 01' the Nt''!' :lnJ its
potential disregard 01' the NSU conlribute to the
erosion of both nonpl'Olifi.~l':ll.ion Illl'aSUI'I'S,
Initially, their nonl't'('ognil ion (as well as other
nations' n'onrecognilion) of the NPT and continued
plll'suit
of weapons
capabilities
(:ould
(,:lUSl'
frustl'ation alllong ('omplying naliolls,
If thest'
conditions pl'rsist, I'nlsll'aled N PT nal ions Illay
eVl'lltually resign (1\1,,111'1' in I h' W ill I !IH 7, !1:I .. j"
I"dia's a"d Pakistan's slatus a~ ellll'l'gl'nl. suppliers
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Ing suggest.s:

I t is st.ill too early to predict whether t.he
increased volume of nudear transfers that is
likely to I'ellwin 'heyond I A EA inspection will
bring into question the legitimacy of the
NP'l'/IAEA regime. Ilowever, one may begin
to wonder about the I'c!evance of a regime
that is being partly circulllvented by emergent
suppliers which do not necessarily share the
non-proliferation perspectives (~ontained within
Uw current regime (lng in DeWitt. IHH7, 124).
I I' the N PT were significantly eroded, most would
agl'ee that the resulting global security environment
would be less stable.
India's and Pakistan's sl alus as emergent.
Ing again
suppliers also undermines the NS(~.
explains:
Further increase III the market share of
emergent suppliers abo could have adverse
effecls on the policil's and unity of the NSG.
Co-ordinat.ion of policies within Ihe NSG is
already dil'ficult, and the Iwed 10 be more
competitive as a result. or more supplier
alternat.ives could lead to a looser interpretation
or suppliers' guidelines (I !IH 7, 12[;).
At the mlillmum, Ing argut's that needed
improvements of NS(l gui.lelincs l'Iluld be post.poned
or ahandoned (IHH7, 125).
(liven t.heHe prohlclIIH, it HCCIllH deal' that nudear
proliferation in South AHia iH a significant problem.
What has the Unitcd States Jone to address the
problem?
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NON-PROLIFERATION
POLICIES IN SOUTI-I ASIA
Overall, u.s. policy has L)Cen ineffective in
confronting the problem of South Asian proliferation.
At limes it has exacerbated the problem.
The
legacy of U.S. non-proliferation policy in South Asia
can be analyzed in two different periods: prc- I !17B
pulicies and posl- I !17H policies.
Pre- I !I7B Policics
The IImblem of South Asian nudear proliferation
pmhably shu"ted in I !I71 when India testt·d a
nudear device.
lIaass dt'scril.ws the U.S. response
lo this lest as "perfune!.ory."
And although U.S.
naval presence in the Indian Ocean modestly
expanded, most lJnited Stales allention was focused
on othel" problems, inl"iuding "lhe final I hmes of war
in Vietnam, ddl'nte in I'~uropl', volatile conditions
in t.he Middle East, and the impact of the oil price
hike" (tJaass I !lHH, lOH).
IIowever, even if lhe
United States had vigorously condemned the nudear
teHt in I !I74, the influl'lwc OIl Indian policy prolJaLly
would have been minOI' hCt'ause of the Nixon
administ.ration's display of naval force during t.he
I !)71 Indo-Pakist.ani war. While the display was t.oo
insignificant to satisfy Pakistan, it was "enough to
t~onfinn American hostility fill" Indians" (II aass I !ISH,
I UH).
The end rcsult" was a decreased ability to
influence either India or Pakistan on any issue,
including lhe pursuit. of nudear weapons.
Following the Indian nudear test, Pakistan Legan
sl'l~king repr()(~essing technology from France.
In
I !I7H President Uerald Ford's nlllcern over Pakistan's
lHae/eal" intentions prompted him to send Secretary
of State IIenry I<issinger to Islamabad.
Lat~~r,
Secret.ary Kissinger Wl'nt to Paris to convince tlte
FI"cnclt to suspend n~pro('('ssing technology t ransfl'rs
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to Pakh;tan. In I B77 the French complied with the
United State's re'lul'st.
To furilll'r unders('ore its
concern, till' Ford administ rat ion tlll'n Cllt o'l
economic and military aid tn Pakistan (Spl'c\.or I !IH.I,
74-HIL
After Pakistan lost 'HTI'SS til reprocessing
technology, it started punilling uraniulTl cllI"ichment
tcchnology.
In I !17H the Carter administration
puhlicly expressed conn'rn OVl'r Pakistan's pursuit of
enriched uraniullJ.
Assist'''lt Secretary of SLaLe
Thomas Pkkering testified bel'orl' a Senate committee
that Pakistan's enrichment program was not
consistent with its nuclear l'nergy needs.
lie
condudl'd, "We are cOIll'l'l'Iwd, therefore, t.hat the
Pakiutani program is not peaceful but related to an
effort to develop a nudear-cx plosive capability" (U.S.
Congress I !l7!1, J (). The administration thcreafter'
again suspended military an!' eeO/wmie aid to
Pakist.an
in
compliance
with
the
Syminghlll
Amendment of the I H7H Nudear Non-prolifcration
Act.
It is dil'licult, to assess the impact of U.S. policy
on Pakistan's nuclear ambitions during this period.
The aid sllspensions may have had lUI dl'ed. After
the Ford administ.ration's aid sanctions and France's
suspension
of technical
aid
for
reprocessing
technologies, Pakistlln simply refocused it.s efforts
into enrichment t{~chnologies. Pakistani political will
to pursue nuclear capability also seemed to remain
strong as Prime Ministcr Ali Bhutto said Pakistan
would "eat. grass" if necessary til eCJual India's
nuclear capabilit.y (llaass I !IHH, IOH-H).
But on
Christ.mas Day I !17!1 the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan and the United States ahandllned ils
hard lirw position against I'l'Olif!'ration in South Asia.
As a result, thl' aid S:IIl!'tiolls approach was
ahandoned, making it unclear if' till' policy could
havc
anl~d('d
Pakistani
d!'('isioll-making given
sufficient t.ime,
The Afghan invasion marked a
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I'ost- 1!17!) Policies
Ii'ollowing the Afghan invasion, the Carler
administration moved IH restore aid to Pakistan.
The administration's ofler of $400 millioll was
rejected by Zia, "suggesting that the United States
had t.o offer much more 10 persuade him to provoke
Moscow or rethink his nuclear weapons commitment."
(Baass I USS, IOn). Carter was later replaced by
Reagan, who then sweetened the offer. In I H81 the
Reagan administration extended a six-year $:1. 2
billion aid package in return for Pakistan's
cooperation in U.S. security policy in Southwest. Asia
and the PeI'sian nulf.
Pakistan was also granted
a
six-year
exemption
from
t.he
Symington
Amendment (Spector 1087, 1(4).
But the situation in Afghanistan coupll'd wil h
Pakistan's nuclear ambitions prest'nted the Unit.ed
Stutes with a policy dilemma.
Ilow could Soviet
ex pansionism be checked without. abandoning nonproliferation'!
Ilaass
explains
I he
Heagan
administnltion's resolution of Ihis dilemma:
The adminisl ralion Iwlievcd Ihal denying aid
to gain access to all nuclear facilitil's would
pmve futile.
Moreover, the administration
argued that. a slrong scnnity relationship with
the United Slates would provide Pakistan with
an alt.ernative ml'ans of gaining security while
the United States, as tlw prindpal source of
conventional weaponry, would gain leverage in
the pmcess. . . But nuclear nOll-proliferation
t:ompded with removing the Soviets from
Afghanistan. And of Ihe Iwo, the laUer was
more import.ant to Ihe Ih'agan administration
(llaass I !)HH, IO!)).
Even t hough less imporl ani, IlOn-proliferal ion
dl(II'ls did not cease l'ntirely.
III .June I !IH,I U.S.
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officials heeame aware t.hat Pakist.an was continuing
to pursue nudear capabilities, which included work
on weapons design and covert 'l('quisit.ion of nudear
mat.erials from abroad. However, resisting presslll-e
from Congress, Reagan aides insist.ed that the
renewal of aid sandions was impossible given the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan ("Unit.ed St.at.es
Set~urity Interest.s in South Asia" 1!tH4).
I,ater t.he
same mont.h, three Pakistani nat ionals were indict.ed
fo,· t.rying to smuggle lilly high-speed nuclear
weapons swit.dll's known as hytOlIS.
While lhe
Pakist.ani govenllnent denied any l·omplicit,y in the
affair, it was later shown t.hal. till' kryt.ons were
ordered by S. A. Bull, direcl~)r of supply and
procurement for the Pakistani Atomic Energy
Commission (N\"/' 25 February I !tH5, I).
In
response to rumors t.hat China was aiding Pakistan's
nuclear program by offering weapon designs, t.he
Reagan administrat.ion postponed for almost a year
approval of a Sino-U.S. nuclear trade pad (N\"I' 22
June HtR4, I). And in Seplcmber Reagan wrote a
letter urging President Zia t.o abandon the pursuit
of weapons capability.
The lett.er suggested that
U.S. aid would be t.erminated if weapons grade
uranium was produced (WS,/ 25 Odober I B84, I).
Foreign Minister Khan and President Zia both
seemed willing to comply with the Reagan let.ll~I-'s
stipulations.
Khan assured Reagan of this
personally in a mid-November visit to Washington.
And when Zia announced in early I UHf) that
enriched uranium had been produced at Kahut.a, he
was careful t.o stipulate t.hat it was not weaponsgrade (Spect.or I BH 7, 10(;).
Meanwhile, Congress began ilHlislillg that more
efforts be llIade tH dissuade Pakistall from pursuing
weapons capabilit.y. III .July I !)Hfi COlIgrl'ss allll'ntled
the aid package, requiring Ihe Presidcnl to (~crtify
that Pakist.an did 1101. pOSSI~SS a lIuclear dt~vin~ hdiH'e
funds could hI! dishursl'd (SpI'clor I !IH'l, 101i). But.
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Pakistan seemed 10 be undaunted.
As described
above, in the same IlHlnth it was reported that
Pakistan had tested a lIuclear trigger.
In August
Pakistan reportedly attempted to buy flash X-ray
cameras from the Hewlett- Packard company for use
in non-explosive nudear lests. The sale, however,
was blocked by the U.S. government (Spector IH87,
1(7).
Congress again tried to act in the summer
of 1~)85 by passing the Solarz Amendment, which
would terminate Pakistani aid if its covert ell"ol·ts
were not ceased.
But the Reagan administration
exercised discretion granted in another amendment,
choosing not to apply the Solarz measure to Ihe
case of Pakistan (Specl~lr IHH7, 115).
Instead of applying the Solarz Amendment, the
administration dispatched Undersecretary of St.ate for
Political Allairs Michael Armacost and National
Security Council stall member Donald Fort ier IH
South Asia.
Thei.· mission was hI
slall
pmlilcration by encouraging an Indo-Pakistani
regional initiat.ive.
But India ~purned this effort,
"claiming that Washington was attempting to avoid
its responsibilities for halting the Pakistani nudear
pl"()gram" (Spet"t.or I BH7, 7H).
Today, the United Stalt!s seems to have
abandoned these types of initiatives, depending on
t.he aid incentives established in I ~)R I instead.
In
the spring of I BHti another aid package was
negotiated with Pakistan on even more generous
terms: $'L02 billion over six years to begin in
October IDR7. A 1111 ill October IDHti Ihe presidcnl
certilied the dishursl'llll'nl. of till' lasl installllwni of
aid from the I !IH I agrct'ment.. This seems 10 have
been dOlw in spite of inldligence reports lhal
Pakistan had pnlllut"l'd weapons-grade uraniulll (WI'
4 November I !IHti, I).
As t.he end of lilt' I !18 I aid package approadll'd,
Ihe non-prolilcrat.ion debate was again renewed on
Capitol Hill in \ate 1!IH7. And on .July 10, IDS7,
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a Canadian eit izen of Pakistani origin was arrested
in Philadelphia for attempting to purchase and
export twenty-five tons or maraging stcel used in
uranium enrichment processes.
This seemed to
alienate some members or Congress (llaass U)88,
I 14).
Ncvcrthcless, a new aid package was
eventually approvcd by Congn'ss ill Dpcembel".
Before the aid was approvcd, Congn'ss passed two
nonbinding I'esolutions calling fill' Pakistan 10 submit
it.s nuclear facifities 10 international regulation in
order 10 qualWy fiJI' fmUler linited Slatl's aid.
Thesc resolutions were never madl' law, howevel',
and so t hey had no effect on lJ .S. policy. I n the
end, Congl'ess approved the aid as Ill'gotialed by the
administration in I m~H. The Syminghm Anllmdment
was once again waived fill' two and a half years,
while a new stipulat.ion was added providing fiJI' the
automalil' resl"ission or till' waivcr should India
accept international regulation or its nuclear pl'Ogralll
(lluass I !)88, I I :1).
And till' stipulat ion requiring
presidential wrtificalion for aid dishursl'ments was
abandoned WI';/·;U 24 Dl'celllber I !)H 7, 21).
U.S. policy since I !lSI has had liUle erred in
ClII'bing South Asian pl'OIiferalion.
I\s described
above, Pakistan might currently he capable of
assemhling two to filllr nuclear wl~apons.
India
might be capable of assemhling twenty to fifty.
While possihly forestalling a Pakistani nuclear test,
U.S. policy may have contributed to till' further
development of Pakh;tani capabilities.
Spector
explains:
U.S. law unambiguollsly specifics thaI aid will
he terminated ir Pakistan rahrkates a l'ompletc
nuclear weapon. Quite possihly, Pakistan will
I'cfrain from doing so, since the rcstridion
would not, in any even!., preven!. Islamabad
from obtaining a de facto IHldear ddl'nent by
building all the ncecHsary l'omponents and
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thereby remaining only "a screwdriver away"
frolll nucl~~ar arms.
On t.he other hand,
having seen the United States repeatedly back
away from terminating assistance because of
concerns
over
the
Soviet
presence
in
Afghanistan, Islamabad may reason that if it
quietly violates this slt"iclurl', U.S. law will he
amended to pl'rmit aid to continlle just as the
Symington AllIendlllPnt was modified in 1~'R 1
f()r this purpose (Spect.or I ~'H 7 1 I H).
While U.S. polky has fililed to inflllence
Pakist.an's nllclear decisions, it has ahm increased
insecurity am()ng I ndian decision-makers.
India
resent.s t.he extensive military aid given to Pakist.an
since I HH 1. Ilaass explains ImJia'l) fear:
Indians resent U.S. military sllpport. fiJr
Pakistan even more.
American explanations
t.hat t.he aid is provided in t.he cont.ext of
Afghanist.an and not. the Indo-Pakistani rivalry
ca .... y little wat.er in New Delhi; similar glosses
in the past. did not prevent. U.S. arms from
being used against. Indian targets (llaass 1!tHR,
Ill).
Among India's defense establishment, this resentment
extends to insecurity. Indian Defense Minister K.C.
Pant. in an address bdilt"(~ India's Parliamcnt. on
April 27, HlH7, denounced U.S. policy for ignoring
Pakistan's search fill" nudear capability. Ill' fllrt.her
claimed that "linkages between t.he U.S., China, and
Pakistan, . wit.h anti-Indian oVl'rt.ones, have become
more and more pl"Onollnl"l'd" (SPlh 1!lHH, 712).
TIH'se ("edings of ins('t'lirily add to tlw pressures for
an Indian bomh. Pant's addn'ss confirms this: "The
enwrging nudear t.hn'at. to liS from Pakistan is
fi,,"cing liS" to review 0111' opt ions.
I alll sure the
IIOllse dOl~S nllt l~xpl'd Ille 10 detail this option as
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also our reHponHe whidl will Ill' adt'lJllate to our
pern'ption of t he threat" (Sdh 1!IHH, 7 12). Clearly,
thiH statement is a thinly veiled reference 1.0 the
nudear option.
But even though India feels threatened over U.S.
policy t~)ward Pakistan, U.S.-Indo relatiolls have still
improved sOllwwhal.
After a long tlrought, the
Unitetl States began U) ."eevaluate lntlia in I UHf».
Fred Ikle, then llnden;ccrcl.ary of Ddl'nse lill' Polil~y,
staled that t.he emergence of India as a world power
created an "exciting possibility that opens a new
chapter in United States-Indian relations" (\Vi» 4
May 1HH5, I).
Ikle seemed to be expressing the
recognition of the National Security Council's 1UH4
National Secu.-ity Decision Direelive (NSllll) 147.
NSDf)
147 advised the U.S. foreign policy
establishment U) establish better relations with India.
A year lalcr a memorandum of understanding on
technology transfer signed in t HH4 was put into
efreel.
Prime
Minister Oandhi viewed the
memorandum as an important indicatHr of improved
U.S.-Indo relations (Mukerjee I!lH7, (jOt).
In
addition IH the drastically increased industrial
cooperation resulting fmlll the memorandum, the
Unilcd Slates and India have also pursued milita.·y
cooperation.
While tiandhi told the U.S. press that American
military supply was unreliable OVP t 4 .June I UH5),
New Delhi has nevertheless been receiving U.S.
military sales since 1!)Hti, induding its purchase of
the (; I~ 404 engine lill" its newly planned light
combat aircraft (IIaass t BHH, t to). By early I !lH7
some Indian leaders had become more tolerant of
the U.S.-Pakistani security arrangement.
Writt~s
Hilip M ukeajec, a long time observer of South Asian
politics:
Though official Indian pronouncements continue
to describe lJ.S. military commitments I~)
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Paki~tan as excessive, the tone has generally
been less shrill... New Delhi may be ready to
live with a U.S.-Pakistani security partnership
provided
Washillgtoll
guards
against
destabilizing the regional military balancc and
extends help to India's endeavor to keep lip
with advances in milit.ary technology (Mukerjee

IHH7, H()!).

In October HlH7 <:andhi visited Washington. This
visit seemed to further allay Indian fears. Writes
Seth, "Prime Minister <:iHldhi detected a distinct
shift in the U.S. position on Pakistall's nudear
ambitions, and he rcportedly was assured hy
President Reagan that the United St.ales would take
action against. Pakistan if it wellt ahead with its
nuclear weapons program" (Seth I !IHH, 7~5).
Bul lhese assllrance~ seem to have been empty
given lhe cu ....ent Unitcd Stat.es aid agreement with
Pakistan passed in I!lH 7. The bill thal authorizes
the U.S.-Pakistani aid agreement. also seems to
discriminate against India.
While exempting
Pakistan rrom presidential certilication as described
above, it also includes a provision that "no countr·y
in South Asia may recClve U.S. aid or buy
sophisticated U.S. technology unless the presidl'lIt
determines that is not producing weapons-grade
mate.·ial" WJ~J.~U ~ .. Decemi.JCr I!lH7, 24).
While
exempting Pakistan from this st.ipulat.ion, the bill is
silent on India's status. To date, the law seems to
have little effed on U.S. technical assistance to
India.
But reports indicatl'd t.hat "the move has
angt;red Indian of"fieials--indllliing Primc Minister
Rajiv Gandhi--as, for the lirst time, till' bill would
put the Indian alld Pakistani nuclear programmes Oil
a par alld the 0I1US Oil India to prevl'nt nudear
proliferation ill South Asia" (/··I·~·I';N ~I D(~t"l'mbl'r
IHH7, ~4).
This n'lwwed inst'nsitivity S('('I1\S to
thn'atcn improving 1I.S.-lndo n·lations.
An April
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I !)HH visil 10 New Delhi by lI.S. Dpfl'nsl' Set'l"etary
Frank Carlucci "gave Iii til' salisfadioll 10 India on
ils cOlll'erns oVl'r Pakist an."
In fad, Cal"llll'ci
indicated Ihal U.S. mililary assislalu'p tAl Pakistan
would cont.inue unchangl,d despit.e Ihe impending
Soviet pull-out 1"1"0111 Afghanistan WEI';/{ 21 April
I HHR, :W).
This intent.ion to continue providi ng
military aid can pl"Obably be cxplained by skcpticism
ovcr Soviet intl'ntions in Afghanist.an.
But t.hc
cOllt inlled emphasis Oil East.- West security isslles is
undermining non-pl"Oliferat,ion efforts in South Asia.
The United Slat.es must. recognize that. there is lillie
risk of Soviet expansion int.o the Persian Gulf and
South Asia.
Recognizing this should not be lA,o
diflicult given the pullout of Soviet. troops from
Afghanistan in Fl'bruary I mm filllowing a peace
agreement reached in neneva on April 14, I !)HH.
Also, t.he Soviets have given up any hope of
maintaining the communist Najibullah regime after
the pull-out, making the stability of this rcgimc a
non-issue in tcrms of the Geneva agreement (CSM
22 November 10HR, I). In fad, the Soviets have
ah'eady begun building relat.ions with the rehels. In
October the Soviets extended $(iOO million of aid to
help rebuild post-war Afghanistan (/·;.·otlom;sl 22
October I BHR, 44).
Also, prisoncr cxchange talks
started in lat.e Novembcr havc bl"Oadened into wider
talks on t.he post-pullout transfer of pOWl'r (CSM l)
lJe(,l'mbel' I !tHR, I).
Clearly, t.he Soviets have
accepted military defeat. and do not intend to persist
wit.h lhe war. II opef"ulIy , U.S. policymakl·rs will be
convinced that nuclear proliferat.ion, not. Soviet
expansionism, is thc real sccurity pl'Ohlcm in South
Asia.
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NON-PHOLIFEI{ATION IN SOUTII
ASIA: A NI~W APPROACH
li'OR U.S. POLICY
As argucd prcviously, thc problems of South
Asian proliferation arc real and potentially severe.
U.S. policy must be adjusted to more effectively
address these prohlems. Initially, the policy needs
to work loward JlI'evenling Iluclear deployment.
Nexl, the Uniled Slales musl work toward
preventing prolift.~rati()11 he yond South Asia. Finally,
,"egional arms control and disarmamenl should he
promoted to prcvent further (fevciopmcnt. of IndoPakistani nuclear capahilities and t.he potential
demise of the Non- Prolifemlion Treaty (N PT).
Prevenling N uclcat, Deployment
As highlight.ed frequenlly throughout LlIlS paper,
neilher India nor Pakislan have deployed nuclear
weapons, even though both nations arc probably
weapons capable. COIHH'qllenlly, a reasonable short
lc,'m goal f(U" lJ ,S. poliey is to prevent deployment.
To achieve this goal, it is important. to
understand the mot ivcs as well as the disincenlivcs
fiu" nuclear deployment in South Asia. The primary
motives to deploy IIllde"r weapons in South Asia
arc security rehtted: India's fi.'an, of P,Ikist.ani and
Chinese hostility, and Pilkislan's ft.'al's
Indian and
Soviet hostility. The disincenlivcs will he describcd
below. To prevent /luclear deployment, U.S. policy
Illllst be designcd to rl'ducc the motives ,Ind enhance
thc disincentives of nudcar deploYIlll'nt in both India
and Pakistan.
Reducing molives rcquires an improvcll1l'nl in the
security c'nvironllll'nt or South Asia.
The most
dil'cel way fiu' the llnitl'd Slatl's 1.0 cnhancc the
security environlllcnt is through ils military aid
policies.
The presidcnt should "exercise his
discretionary authorily to wilhhold rmlll Pakistan at
least seleded advanCl,d ("onvl'ntional wI'allons syslems
that :Irc not essenl ial for defendillg Pakistan's
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Afghan bonier" (ltaass 1~IHH, 1 10). This would help
to ease Indian fears of an overly al'lIll'd Pakistan,
thus rcdm'ing t he risk /tll' war.
To a point.,
reductions in U.S. military aid to Pakistan may
improvl' t.he securit.y environment ill Sol.t.h Asia.
Bul t.hese redudions would need to be balanced with
Pakistani Sl'CUl'ity perceptions. Pakisl.\ni rears must
a\so he t.aken into ,H:count in U.S. military trans/cl's
10 India. In general, all U.S. milit.ary aid and sales
t.o Sout.h Asia should Ill' evaluated to ddl'nnine their
enL~d. on Indo-Pakistani security perceptions.
U.S. policy should also help Illdia and Pakistan
in their ongoing efforts to improve bilat.eral relations.
After achieving a partial dell'lIll' in the lin;t half of
the decade, Indo- Pakistani I'd,,1 ions seem to again
Le souring.
There have bCl'1I 110 high-level talks
between India and Pakistan sincl' February 1HH 7.
following the FeLruary mcet ing, Indian President
Zail Singh re/clTed to Pakistani support of Sikh
terrorists in the Northeast. Indian province or Punjab
as a major ohstade to improved Indo-Pakistani
relations W/t;/t;U 12 March 1!lH7, :W).
Since last
yeal: over two t.housand people have been killed in
stepped-up
t.e ....ol'ist
attacks
following
India's
imposition or direct rule over Punjab. The Indian
government also suspects Pakistan of supplying Sikh
lcrrorist.s with sophisticat.ed weaponry, including US
machine guns and Stingel' missiles int.ended IiiI' the
Afghan resist.ance Wl~lal 14 April IHH8, :W-7).
These developments in Punjab seem t.o have sOUl'ed
Indo-Pakistani rclatitlns.
But India may be starling t.o I't'cogniw their own
responsibility /ill' the instability in Pun.iab.
In
SeptemLer 1H88 Gandhi visited Pun.iab in an
unpl'ecedent.ed ellt)rl to reconcile dillcl'CI1Ces wilh
PunjuLi Sikhs. During lhe trip Iw anllounced a new
government investment Jlackagt~ worth $fi()() million
to Punjab. While the tClTorist.s 1'l'''USt~ to Iwgoliat.c
with the Indian g()vcl'IIlIlent., (:andhi's visit may
mark the I)egilllling of a political seUll~lIIellt.
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PunjaLi im;tability (I';cllllOm;sl 24 September 1!IHH,
41-2). Indeed, eadier in the year some factions of
the Sikh tel'l'orisb seemed to indicate a willingness
to reach a settlement with Ihe Indian government
(f.':collomisl B April I !IHH, :1!1).
Pl'IIgress ill Punjab
would undoubtedly have a positive efrect on IndoPakistani ,-elations_
Besides Punjab, another recent
development may scrve to undermine Indo-Pakistani
relations.
On Decemher I, I BHH, India expelled
Pakistan's senior military attache, Z_1. Abasi, on
charges of spying.
This will undoubtedly hurt
relations in the short term, but it may also have a
more long term effect.
One Western diplomat in
Islamabad said, "This could stiffen resistance 110
diplomatic overtures I within Pakistan's military_
This will certainly not increase I Prime Minister
Bhutto'sl mnge in dealing with the Army" (CSM 2
December I HH8, !I).
The newly appointed BhuUo
could be effectively prevented from improving
relations with India as she works to maintain
sUppot·t fmm the milita,-y.
I~ven though Indo-Pakistani relations seem to be
souring, the United States can still usc its inlluence
to encourage the two nations to come to a better
understanding_ U.S. policy should also be desiglll'd
to pmmote specific confidence building measures that
enhance the Indo-Pakistani security environment.
These might include agrecmcnts t~) "limit thc size,
numbe,-, and loeale of military exercises, provide
wlvance notification of exclTises, and pl'nnit the
exchange of ohservers_
Demilitarized zones would
also contJ.:ibute I~) stability" (llam;s 1!IHH, 112).
These types of measures would serve to avoid
intermittent border clashes that threaten to ignite
another Indo-Pakistani war.
The promotion of
conlidence-Luilding IlWa:-ilIH'S might also include
encouraging the conclusion of a Iw-war part and I he
signing of a nudl'ar non-aggression treaty agreed to
ill prilll-iple hy Ualldhi and Zia ill 1m~f). A lIudear
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non-aggression treaty would serve to dccrease the
risk of' a milit.ary strike on nudear fal'ilities. All of
t.hese measures would have a significant. inlluence in
n~llucing lhe risk of war hl'lwl'l'n
India and
Pakislan.
Bul Pa kislan is not. India's only Sl'cul'ity th,·eal.
India also feels t.hnwtened Ly China. The nat.ions
have been enemies since I BH'2, when t.hey foughl a
war along lhe Tibelan border that India losl. Bul
India and China have llegun 1,1) improve their'
relations sincc J !lRO. .John Garver of Uw Georgia
Institute of Technology documents t.he "remarkable
transformation" of Chinese polil"y toward India:
Beijing has explicilly acknowledged India's "big
brolher" role in Sout.h Asia, adopt.cd a ncut.ral
posilion on llw I<ashmi.. issue, stAlpped
suppOlting insurgencies within India, begun
encou .. aging amity rather than cnmity he tween
India and its neighbo .. s, and sought to expand
bilateral
Indian-Chinese
.. elations
while
negotiating on the border question (<tarver
JU8?,121U).

India has also reevaluated it.s policy toward China.
According to Nancy .Jet.ly or t.he School of
Int.ernational St.udies at ,Iawhadal Neh .. u University,
India is "exploring all avenues--polit.ical, diplomatic,
and unol"licial--lo speed lhe Lorder lalks wilh China"
WI~'/~U U April
U)R?, 40).
India also withheld
public support for a Tibetan up .. ising in late 1U8?,
resisting the temptation lo cncourage instability and
create further prohlcms fill' China (I"IU·:1l 22 Odohcr
I U8?, I :n. In Novemher I BR? China and India mel
in New Delhi lo discuss lhe llo .. der question and
olhe.. isslles, llolt. sides ag ..ccing "t.o a void conflid
and confrontat.ion along t.hei .. nlllt lIal b" .. dt· ... "
In
March I HRR lhey had laid t.1lt' groundwork for a
fulu .. e s('ttleml'lll of the bonier issue.
Thpy also
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agreed to meet again in laIc I !lkH WIO.;/l !I .June
1!IHH, :0-2).

Although lhe improvement in Sino-Indian relations
is cause ror great optimism, India's defense
establishmenl remains skepticaL An April reporl to
Parliament. by the Indian Defense Ministry noted
thal "China was continuing lo upgrade its logist.ics,
communicat.ion net.work and military airfields in
Tibet" W[';[';U !I .June I HHH, :12).
In its bilateral relations with both natiom;, t.he
Unit.ed Slates should encourage China and India t.o
continue their dialogue, also enClluraging t.hem to
limit. and event.ually reduce military ad.ivities in the
border region. To accomplish lhis, lhe Unit.ed States
musl bolster its slipping influence wit.h China. Over
the past year, U.S.policy makers have expressed
rrustration over Chinese policy in Tibet and Chinese
missile sales to North Korea and Iran. U.S. leadel's
aI'e also nervous about. growing Chines lies wit.h lhe
Soviet Union ([.';conom;st !I .January I HHH, 2B). U.S.
leaders need to be aware that. pushing China on the
Tibet and missile sales issues might. decrease its
influence on lhe Sino-Indian security equat.ion, thus
in the long t.el'm undermining its abilit.y t.o enhance
Indian secul'ity and reduce proliferation pressures in
South Asia .
•J ust as Pakistan is nol India's only security
llll'eat, India is nol Pakist.an's only security t.hreat.
Since the Afghan invasion, Pakist.anis have fl~ared
Soviet expansionism into Sout.h Asia. While these
leal'S have been drast.ically rl'dun~d since t.he Soviet
pullout, Pakistan still feels uneasy.
lIowever,
Soviet-Pak.istani relat.ions have improved sOIlll'what.
over t he past. two years part Iy lJt'c<lusl' of limit.ed
Suviet. economic aid. which the Sovil'ls have hinted
will cont.inue Wnlllomisl I (j, April
I !IHH, :I!I).
Anot.her conel'de llle,'!HII'e l:ould lIl' t.aken to allay
Pakistani rears, This would he t he establishment 0('
a non-aggression pad IIl't.wl'l'n I{lIssia and Pakistan.
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Both the Soviet Union and Pakistan have expressed
the desire for sueh an arrangclllcnt, but neither
nation has taken action to formalize an agreement
(Council on Foreign Relations I m'Hi, I a).
The
United States could ,'emind hot.h natioils of this
Opt.iOIl,
cllcounlging tIle IIaliolls 1,(1 'sigll a 1)011aggI'Cssillll pact. T/,;s measure Willi II} gI'Catly I'Cduce
Pakistan; (cm's, I,hus mlieviJlg a sOlll'ce of PI'CSSlII'C

I~) deploy nuclear weapons.
The use of military aid
and diplomatic influence described above is designed
only to reduce the primary motive to deploy nuclear
weapons: insecurity.
U ,S. policy also needs to be
designed to emphasize disincentives to deployment,.
Fortunately, lhere are many strong disincenlives.
India realizes thal deploymenl could lead to lhe
chilling of Russian relalions, lhe deslruction of
improving Amel"ican relalions, and the imposilion of
severe economic sanctions f!'Om the Wesl (Spector
lOS 7, SB). Pakistan realizes that t hl-'y arc int'apable
of competing wilh India in a nudear arms race.
They also (cm' a powntially adverse reaction from
the Soviet Union. I n ,I une I !18ti t he Soviets warned
Pakistan thal its deployment of' nudear weapons
would conslitute a t.hreal to Southern Russia lo
which Moscow "cannot 1m indifferenl" (WI) 15 ,'uly
1H8H, 1),
Pakistan also fean; the more dclinit.e
pruspect of an adverse American reaction lranslaling
into an elimination of military aid and an imposition
of' broader sanctions.
Again,
the
most direI'!, way
to enhalH'e
disincentives is through military aid, lIowever, 1I.K
leaders should not considcr relH'wing the prc-l07!)
aid sanctions approaeh to non-proliferation by
applying the Symington or Solarz Amelllimenls.
Mililary aid needs 10 continuc 10 be disburscd while
a credible threat is established that sanctions will be
applied if the (Il11'suit of nuclcar capabilities is not
curt.ailed.
Phillip GUill/net of' Ihe Universily of'
MalH:hesler explains how a counlry's llIilitary
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bUI'caucracy can oe influenced to forestall nuclear
deployment:
Military
((,rces
are
notorious
for
their
reluclance to accept new technology, especially
wherc this threatens existing missions or roles.
There is also plenty of evidence from around
the world of resistance oy one branch of the
armed forces to the acquisition oy another of
anything which may increase its relative
status.
lIence, military forces will not
nccessarily automatically and unanimously
support a decision to aClJuire nuclear weapons ...
A continuous supply of advanced t~onvent.ional
arms could be offered, on condition that the
rcdpicnt armcd serviccs played it.s part in
delaying a decision to acquire lor deploy I
nuclcar weapons «( iummet ill Simpson I !lH7,
145-t)).

Today, this policy might have a signilictlnt clTect on
Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, since the stat.us of
Pakistani armed forces has become increasingly tied
to U.S. military aid and the military establishment
has also become an important. center of power in
Pakistan.
Tradit.ional aid embargocs are not the only way
to institute aid sanctions.
,·'Iuduat.ing thc amount
of aid in relation t.o the pursuit of nuclear ambitions
could of reI' a promising alternative to a eomplcte
aid embaq~(). P.-ovision of aid docs not nced to bc
an either-~)r issuc.
For instancc, with Pakist.an a
billion-dollar pcnalty could be levied for failure to
halt uranium cnrichment programs or a bonus t:ould
bc offercd for yielding the facilities to IAEA
safeguards. Aid fluctuations could pl'Ovide a way to
excrcisc influcncc without sacrificing flex ibility.
Thcsc mcasurcs· could havc a decisive clh'd on
Pakist.an's decisioll to deploy lIudear weapons.
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Unfortunately,
U.S.
aid
to
India
IS too
insignificant 10 have a lil-dsive erfed, but concert.ed
lTlultilat.l'ral eflill"ts could pruVl- to "l' '1l1ile clfedivc.
Initially, India has dose til'S wit.h till' Soviet Union,
making supcrpOWl'r l:ooJll'rat ion in Sout.h Asian nonproliferat.ion policy quit.c aUradivc. Spedor & Stahl
suggcst. that. thc issuc could lw discusscd at. thc ncxt
superpower summit (Spcd-or and Slahl I ~IHH, :1:1).
A SUPCI'P0WCI" agl'ccllll'nl t.o l'Olllhat. JlI'oliferation in
South Asia could {:onsist of a division of labor where
the United Stat.es would seck lo inlluenCl~ its ally
Pakistan, and the Sovicts would seck to inllucncc its
ally India.
Thc cfli)rt.s wuld be wordinated to
maximize
innucllcc,
bot.h
sidcs
agrecing
to
{'onsistcntly apply sanl'lions and rcwards,
lJ .S.Soviet cooperation could probahly hc a significant
l'actOl' in managing prolifcration in South Asia given
that t.he dcploymcnt disinccntivcs or both India and
Pakistan include rear of superpower displeasure.
Multilateral cooperation t.o cnhance deployment.
disincentives could also include clli,rt.s through thc
Nuclear Supplicl's' Group (NSm. The United States
should excl'cise its influcnce in the NSU to rormulate
a consensus concerning sanctions in the event India
or Pakistan dcploy wcapons.
This could be
significant as the Council on Foreign Relations
concludes, "The aggregate of all economic and
military assistance provided t.o India by members of
the NSU is significant enough t~1 pl'Ovide a potent.ial
multilateral disincentive t.o I'Ut,ther pl'Oliferatory acts."
(Council on I. . ordgn Hdations I ~IHlj, I H).
NSn
policy could abo dircdly affcct India's nudear
policies, Spcdor explains:
India remains depcndcnt on cxt.ernal sourccS
fi,," OIlC key comlllodit y, hell v y watcr, whidl is
essential to thc oppratioll of most of its
nudear reactA)rS, including the Dhrllva and
Madras plants that are t:ent.ral t.o India's
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nuclear-weapons (·apabilit.y .. , Tight.ened cont.rols
on nudear supplies might have a grealcr
impad on India's nudear supplies than is
generally believed (Spector H)S7, !l2-:n,
Gummct suggests that "elements of the Indian
bureaucratic and scientific elite have been prepamd
to pnHnot.e 'Western' arguments in order to ensure
a continuous supply of nuclear technology and
malcrials" (Gummet in Simpson H187, 145). Thus,
just as the threat. of U.S. aid sandions could be
used to influence the military bureaucracy in
Pakistan, the threat. of NSG sanctions might be used
t.o influence the nucleat' power bureaucracy in India
as well as ot.her cenlct·s or power. In the end, t.he
influence generalcd by t.hese two sand.ions policies
may be enough to '()rest.all the decision to deploy
nuclear weapons.
This influence might. also he used t.o persuade
India and Pakist.an to pursue confidence-building
measures specifically relalcd to t.heir nuclear
progt'ams. One or these measures is a Ill'ar-nlldear
weapons states' code of behavior. Suggested by M.,)'
Wilmhurst of the British delegation to t he I A I~A, it
could consist or the f(,lIowing point.s:
I.

2.

:l.

All import.ed and indigenous nuck-ar plants
and material would be placed under I A 1<: A
sareguards, wit.h the except.ion of those
specified plants and mat.erials t.hat. are
deemed essential to nat.ional security,
An undert.aking would be givl·n neit.her t.o
manuracture nor to t.est a nuclear
explosive device except under circumst.ances
of a grave lIneat. to national securit.y.
A commitmenl would be made t.o adhere
t.o the N PT as soon as ohslacles based on
questions of national security havl' been
t'emoved (Wilmhurst. in Simpson and
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McGrew 1ntH, 1,HI).
If instituted,
this agreement would
preclude
deployment while at the sallle time setting the basis
r(lr longer t.erm solutions.
Of course, these policies might fail and India and
Pakistan could deploy nuclear weapons anyway. If
deployment does O(Tur, U.S. policy should shift from
prevcntion to management.
Baass desc\'ibes the
appropriate measures or a management policy:
The United Siaies would want to wOl·k with
both Pakistan and India lo promOle arms
control and to enhance their command and
control systems to lessen the likelihood of
accidental war.
It could even selectively
enhance nuclear eapabilities tAl strengthen
rctaliatory potential and, thus, reinforce mutual
delerrence (lbass I HHH, I 17).
But if the policies to pl'event deployment are
implement.ed by the United States, the management
of an Indo-Pakistani nuclea\' deterrent can probably
be avoided.
But the prevention of deployment
should not be the only goal of U.S. non-proliferation
policy in South Asia.
U.S. policy should also be
designed lo prevent extra-regional proliferation.
PI'eventing Pmliferation
Beyond South Asia
The primary policy for preventing prolircration out
of South Asia is broadening and improving the
cUlTent NSG. Initially, as the Council on Foreign
Relations concluded in 1UHn, the membership of t.he
NSn needs to be broadened to indudc India and
Pakistan (Couneil on I"oreign Itelatiolls I ~IH(i, I H).
As docunwnted above, both India and Pakistan have
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t.he pot.ential to become significant Iluclear suppliers.
The Unit.ed St.at.es needs t.o adively pun;ue
expanding the membership of the present NSG. A
new NSG should include all current and potential
supplie.·s, including India and Pakistan. This should
be a f()I·mal group that meet.s regularly to discuss
nuclear export st.andards.
Besides expanding t.he NSG, its current. export.
standards need to be reevaluated. To begin with,
existing nuclear safeguards are not consistent among
nuclea.· supplier::;. While the United States' export
standaJ·ds arc very strid, those of Canada and
Western Europe are rdatively lenient (Walker in
Simpson and
McGrew
I !lS4, H?-n).
These
inconsistencies are complicated by a recession in the
nuclear maJ·ket that "places further pressures on
supplier governments to relax their standards or at
least to .·esist any upgrading thereof" (Moher in
DeWitt IUS?, !l4). And the existing st.andard::; arc
not very restridive to begin wit.h.
David Fischer
and Paul Szasz of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institut.e desnibe t.he problems of cu .... ent
NSG guidelines, "They place no embargo Oil the
expOl·t of the technologies that can he direelly used
to
make
nuclear ex plosives, enrichment and
reprocessing. They do not require full scope I A EA
safegua.·ds in the impoJ'ling country as a condition
of supply" (Fischer and Szasz I HH5, 10:1).
The United Siales should encourage t.he adoplion
of consistent. st.andards wit.hin t.he NS(i.
These
st.andards would include consistent crit.eria till· till'
export of sensit.ive tecllllologies and consist.ent criteria
t.o asses's when full scope safeguards are appropriate
as a condition of ex pori. At. I he lInit.(~d Nations the
NS(I should conSilII extensively wit.h till' I A I~A and
all members of the NPT t.hrough lI.N. confl'n'nn~s
and assemhlies.
All NPT stat.es should have a
chance t.o conirilllllc to the formulation of NSU
sLuuianis.
This will help avoid perceptions Ihat.
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NSG countries are fOl'lnulat.in~ a nudear tel'hnology
monopoly. U.N. participation will also cont.ribut.e to
t.he access of rdevant. t.echnolo~ies for all nalions
seeking genuindy peaceful nudear capahilities.
If t.he NSU is expanded t.o inl'lude Pakistan and
I ndia and strengthened to bett.er limit. t.he risk of
weapons prolifl~rat.ion, the spread of nul'lear weapons
from Sout.h Asia will be a minor threat.
But a
complete Sout.h Asian non-proliferation policy must
promote arms cont.rol and event.ual disarmament in
South Asia.

and

Promoting Anns Cont.1'01
Disarmament in South Asia

Arms control in South Asia should be designed
to maintain the nudear stat.us quo in South Asia.
Speetor & Stahl suggest three arms cont.I'ol
measlII'es designed to maintain the nurlcar status
quo:
1.
2.

:1.

A formal, H'eiprocal ball Oil nlldear test.s,
which eould he renewed pl'riodil~ally.
Fixed duralion, rccipl'Ol'al illsped.ions of
key nudear installations, to vl~riry that
nudear materials are IlOt. heing used f(lr
military purposes.
Verifiable,
temporary
shutdowns
of
sensit.ive nudear weapons mat.erials plants
(Spedor and St.ahl I H8H, :I:H.

The first pl'Oposal seems particularly aUradive to
the South Asian situal\on.
Pakislall has already
pl'Oposed a regional t.est. han, It. would be "highly
advantageous to India silll"e it would preserve India's
lead in this field while hdping to wnst.rain further
Pakistani proliferation." The sewnd measure could
be open to periodic renewal, whill' preventing
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"additions to both countries' de fado nuclear
weapons stockpiles as long as it was in effect."
The third measure could ahlO freeze existing
stockpiles "without necessitating on-site inspections,
since whethel' a plant was shut down could probably
be det.ermined from sat.ellit.e data or from ag,'eed
phot.oreconnaisance overflights or other cooperat.ive
measures" (Spector and Stahl lHHH, :I:n,
These measures should be promoted by U,S,
diplomats in New Delhi and Islamabad, The United
States could also offer t'(l help negotiate agreements,
provide ve.-ification for the measures, or arrange for
another more agreeable third party to assist India
and Pakistan in their bilateral arms control efforts.
There are also multilateral efforts that would
serve U) f,'eeze the nuclear status quo in South
Asia. One of lhese effOl,ts could be a mullinational
fuel cycle center (Fischer and Szasz 19H5, 112).
This would provide one spent fuel reprocessing planl
for lhe region. And even lhough both Pakistan and
India have built their own reprocessing and
enrichment plants, the establishment and use of
these facilities could still serve t.() freew the
su)ckpiling of pluumium and enriched uranium. In
the long term the United States might increase the
viability of this proposal by offering financial
compensation for the Indian and Pakistani plants
that. would no longer be needed in the event of a
viable
regional
reprocessing
plan.
Another
multilateral approach might be a multinat.ional spent.
fuel cente... This would provide one facility fill' the
region UI SUIre spent fuel (Fischer and Szasi'. 1HH5,
1 1:1).
If est.ablished and used, this facility would
eliminat.e t,he viability of plutonium reprocessing,
Again, the Unit.ed Stales could offer financial
compensation U) inncast' the proposal's viahility.
Beyond arms conI 1'01 is disarmament.. Olle way
t'(l promote dis;u'IlHU1Wllt ill Soulh Asia is I he
establishllll'nt. of a lIudea.. w('apolls fn't' zOlle
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(N W I"Z).
This would ban nuclear weapons from
South Asia. So far, India has rejected Pakistan's
proposal fiJr a N W fi'Z because it docs not include
China, who has intermediate range nuclear ~eapons
stati()ned in Tibet. (,Jian in Goldblat HlH5b, 97). To
a large extent., a South Asian NWFZ depends on
Sino-Indian relations.
In addition to encouraging
India and China to continue improving their
rclalions, the United States could also encourage
China to disarm along the Tibetan border.
This
would Jlmbably go fa.· toward convincing India of the
desimbility of a NWFZ.
Probably the best disarmament measure in t.he
long term is to integrate India and Pakistan into the
intel'llational non-proliferation regime--the N PT and
the IAI~A.
lIowever, Pakistan will not join the
N PT unless India docs. And India has opposed the
NPT since its inception. Ambassador Azim lIusain
presented India'!; reasons for rejecting the NPT in
his I ~.(iH address t() the United Nations 1t)lIowing the
treaty's adoption. Rodney ,Jone!; of the Center for
Strau'gic and International Studies pruvides a useful
summary of the ambassador's arguments (,Jones in
Goldblat W85b, 104). fi'irst, India claimed that the
treaty was discriminatory, justifying the possession
of nuclear weapons for some states and condemning
t.heir possession for others. Second, the treaty does
not est.ablish mutual obligat.iom; hdween nuclear
suppliers and constllners. Finally, China was nol a
party lo the treaty, so India withheld its support to
maint.ain its nuclear opt.ion against a potential
nudear-anned adversary.
China also rejeels the
treaty on the grounds t.hat it discriminal.cs, just.ifying
the
possession of nudear
weapons by
tile
superpowers
while
implicitly
condemning
the
possession of weapons by other powers.
Given this reasoning, it seems t.hat the onus of
ex panding the N PT inl~) South Asia lies wit.h
superpower efforts at. arms control and disarmament..
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Thc U.S.lSovicl agreement to eliminatc intennediate.-ange nudear f(1I·ces (INF treaty) in Decem~er HIH7
was a giant step towUl·d legitimating the N PT for
countr·ies like India and China.
Prime Minister
Gandhi praised the IN F treaty in thc Illt/iall lIwL
J.'orcign /(cview, calling it a "truly momentous
development. to Progress on Stratcgi(· Arms Reduct.ion
Talks (START) could also have a significant impact
on South Asian non-proliferation. <lalilihi indicated
in Oct.oLer InS7 during his visit to Washington that
"progress Itowards N PT participation I mighl be
possihle in the context of superpower nudear
cutbacks" (CSM 14 Decembcr I !lH7, 7).
START
calb (ill· a fifty percent redudion in the overall
nudear arsenals of the superpowers. In April I !lHH
the last di/liculties were worked out in terms of
weapons ceilings, making till' agreement dependent
on the signatures of pn~sident -dpd George Bush and
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.
The START
agreement is virtually completed.
After the completion of START between the
superpowers, its stipulations should be integrated into
Article V I of the N PT. Also, a multilateral summit
discussing the positive and negative points of the
treaty could be Iwld with all interested world
nations.
This internationalization of the START
treaty could help further reduce perceptions that the
N PT docs not apply to t he superpowers.
These
perceplions could be further reduced if subsequent
superpower arms redm:tions WCI'C worked out in the
context of the N PT.
The end result of these
measures could be an increased spirit of cooperation
fiJI" world-wide disarmament.
U.S. policy Illust soon be adjusted to avoid
further proliferation ill South Asia.
While some
would say that the full nudearization of South Asia
is inevitable, there is reason to be optimistie that
South Asian proliferation can hc CUdICd. The Sovicl
pullout from Afghanistan, the appointment of Prime
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Minisler Bhutto in Pakistan and her desires for
improved Indo-Pakistani rdations, improved SinoIndian relations, as well as giant sleps being made
toward superpower disarmament are all cause for
hope that nudear weapons will not he part of the
Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Bul these dl~vdopinents will
also requirl' a propel' U.S. response if their benefits
are to be fully realized. If Ihe United States allows
military aid and sales 10 pl'l'Jll'tuate insl·curity in
South Asia or somehow allows the disarmament
process t.o he derailed, then the siluation in South
Asia could significantly deteriorate.
And if this
occurs, there arc plenty of reasons to bdieve that
the region will become Lhe second vidim of atomic
holocaust in Asia.

NUCLli;AR PROLIFERATION

Ii I

WORKS CITED
Ilhatia, Sh'yam. I !ISS. N "dear rilla!s
/<;ast. New York: Routledge.

lit

the Middle

CSM (Christiun S(";eTII~'! Monitor): 14 December 1!IS7,
7; 17 November 1!IHS, :12; 22 November I HRR,
I; 2 December 1USR, U; 6 December I !JRR, I.

Cohen, Stephen. Hl84. The Pukistun army. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Council on "'oreign Relations. 1!IHH. Blockillg the
spread of nue/enr wcupons. New York: Council on
Fm·eign Relations, Inc.
Cranston, Senator Alan. 1!IR4. Nuclear proliferal ion
and U.S. national securit.Y interests. COllgressionul
Ilecord (21 .June): S 7!1O I.
DeWitt, David, cd. 1HH7. N"denr 'IOII-prolili~rutioll
uutl giollni s.~eu,.;ty. L()ndon: Croom Iidm.
Dunn, Lewis. I !lS2. Control/;ng the
tlaven, CT: Yale University Press.

bomb.

New

"~nl/lomist: !)

.Januar.Y 1HRH, 2!1; 2(j Mardi 1!lRR, :112; !l April I !lSS, a!l; Hi April I !IHH, :I!I; 20
August HlHH, 27; 27 August HIRR, 2:\; 24
September I!IRR, 41-2; 22 Odoher I!IHS, 44; 12
November 1!ISH, :16; 2(; November I HRR, :12.

"'''~Ji;1l

(I,'ur /':/lsll'l"II [.; ... lIIom;.· Ne";I.",):
12 Mareh,
1!lH7, 15, :\-t, :Ui; 5; !) Apl'il I!lR7, 40; S Octo\)er
tUR7, 10; 22 Odober I!lH7, 1:1; 24 Deeemher
HIH7, 24; 14 April I!IHR, ~W-7; 21 April l!ISS,
:1(); U .hllw I HHH, :11-2.

ti2

PI SIGMA ALPHA

l{~VIEW

Io'ischer, David ami Paul Szasz. I !IH5. SU/i!gllllrding
the utom: A criticlli uppr(l(u.·h. Philadelphia: Taylor
& Francis.
PH1H/SA (J.'oreign Hmwlmst I n/ill"1TllItioll Servin!/South
Asia): 5 .June 1!lH5, EI; H August IUS5, 1~2; (i
Novemher I US5, E I; l!l MardI HlHH, Fl; 14
August I USti, 1"2.
FH/SINA (f.'ol"l!igll Hrow/("(Ist III/iwmutilln Sa/)ice/Nellr
l~ust & A/i·ica) n Den~mher I HHti, D4.

Garver, .John. 1UH7. Chinese-Indian rivalry in
Indochina. Asiull Surrwy 27 (Novemher): 1205-1 H.
Uoldhlat, .Iozef, cd. 1UH5. Nlln-l'roli/i!rutioll: 'J'Iw why
anti tire wlwre/il/"(~. London: Taylor & Francis.
Goldhlat, .Jozef, ed. I !lS5. Su/i!grumlillg the atom: A
critimi uppmisui. Philadelphia: Taylor & I·'rancis.
lIaass, Richard. 1nss. South Asia: Too late t.o
remove t.he homh? Orbis :l2 (Winter): U)7-IS.
Khan, A.C}. I nS6. The spread (If nudear weapons
among nations: Militarizat.ion or development. In
Nudear war, nudear proiij"emtion (lllti their
cOllsequences, ed. Sadruddin Aga Khan. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Makeig, Douglass. IUS7. War, no war, and t.he
India-Pakistan negot.iating process. I'uei/ic Alli,;,.s
60 (Summer): 271-!l4.
Mukerjee, Dilip. 1~IS7. U.S. weaponry for
Asiull S/trlwy 27 (.June): 5!lfdi 14.
Nl"/, (New }'orJl ,/,imes):
February I !IHf), I.

22

.llIne

I !184,

India.

25

NUCLEAR PROLIF'ERATION
Seth, S.P. I !IHH. The Indo-Pak
United Stales. Asiall Survey

nucl(~ar
~H

dud and the
(,July): 711-~H.

Simpson, John, cd. I !IH 7. N "dear n(lll·prolili~mli(lll:
A 11 agenda liu- the HJVOs. New York: CamLridge
University Press.
Simpson, .John and Anlhony McGrew, cds. I !tH4.
1'he internutiollal llOlI-pruli/cmtioll system. London:
MacMillan.
Spcclor, Lconard.
MA: Ballingcr.

I !lH7. Goillg nlldear. CamLridge,

Spcclor, Leonard. I !lH4. Nudear
New York: Vinlage Books.

prolili~mli(lll

tmlay.

Spcclor, Leonard and Shcllcy Stahl. I !IHH. Cooling
the arms racc in South Asia. Blllietill of the
Atomic Scielltists 44 (April): :12-H.

Time. :lO March I !IH7: 42.
Stlltes illterests ;11 SOllth As;a: A sta/f report.
I !lH4. preparcd for lhc U.S. St'lwte Jo'OI·cign
Relations Commil tee, April. Washington, D.C.:

llllitl~d

GPO.
U.S. Congress. Senate SlibeonllniUet~ on Energy,
Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services. I !17!l.
lIearillMs 011 Iwdca,. prolili.'''lIlioll: 'I'hl' si/llllt;OIl ill
IlIIlill. alld I'lIkistllll, I May I !l7!l. Washington,
D.C.: (11'0.
U.S. Congress. Senate Subt~omllliUee on Energy,
N udear I'rolift'ral ion, and Uovt'rnmt'nl I'roccsscs.
I !IHti. 1I.~lIr;/IM Oil ""/';.'/1'
UJ8[) II.S. MO".'nl/W'/lt
IWII-proli/i'rut;oll IId;"il;.'s, I 0 April. Washinglon,
D.C.: (iI'O.

or

(H

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

WSJ (Willi Stred ,JII"nwl): 2:, October HIR4, I.

WP (WushitlJ.:toll l'tlst): 14 March IUHn, I; 2H
February IBHa, I; 4 May IBH5, I; 14 .June
IBR5, I; 15 .July IBRU, I; IH .July IBH(), I; 4
November I URH, I.

TIII~

"PIUMACY"OF TIII~ I"IRS,),
AMENDMENT: DOES IT lIAVE
A JUSTIFICATION IN
NATURAL LAW, HISTORY,
AND DI~MOCRACY?
.James U, McLaren

.J ustice Cardozo has charaderizcd the protedion
of speech as a "fundamental" liberty in part because
"our history, political and h·gal," recognized "freedom
of thoughl and speedl" as "til!! indispensable
l~cmdilion of nearly every other lilrm of freedom"
(Gunthel' I HH5, !17 5),
This essay will examine whether or nol .Justice
Cardozo is correcl.
Is freedom of speech a
fundamental liberty and a prerequisite to otlll'r
freedoms'!
Is it necessary tAl the maintenance of
fl'ee democratic government:! If the answer to these
<Iueslions is in the affirmat.ive, then which one
govel'ns our development of the civil libert.y of free
speech?
Il must be recognized that. a tension exisls
between the slat.e and the individual when
attempling lo posil the genesis of frce speech in
America:
As wc cont.rast t.he right.s of the
individual to speak his piece during t.he Vielnam
War wilh those of his World War One count.erpart,
we notice a movement. in favor of lhe idea lhal
individual freedom is curt.ailed if we deny freedom
of expression; lhat an individual can only experience
the tolalit.y of his olher liberties through the Slate's
recognition of his right of free expression,
\I' this
view is accept.ed, t.he conclusion Illust be t.hat this
"fundamentalily" of right. has it.s origin in nat.ural
expression, nol tied to the State or its instit.ut.ions,
and only susn~Jltihlc to curtailment lInder the mosl
extnlOnlinary cirl'ulllstam'l's,
On Uw other hand, we may posit as the origin
of a righl of fn'l' ex pression t.he Ill'('l'ssity of free
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speech t.o opell, democratic gOVt~rlllllelll. This admit.s
of restraints Oil free speech in order to protect the
dellloCl'atic illstitutiolls which the fret'dolll of speech
is int.ellded to fosler.
III order t.o dct.ermine which or t.hese t.W() geneses
is "csponsible for our First. Amendment freedom of
speech, I shall examinc thc hist.ory of frecdom of
speech in Israel, Athens, Rome, and England.
I
shall then trat:e t.he possible derivation of freedom
of speech from natural la w, to determine whet.her
01' not there is a connection.
Based upon my
findings, I shall condude by analyzing the "special
treatment" or "p.-imacy" or "fundamentality" uf the
f"eedom of speech.
Is it based on historical
precedent, philosophically moted in natural law, or
a man-made invention of a twent.ieth century liberal
judiciary'?

FREE SPEECH UNDER
JEWISH LAW
In Ancient ,Jewish Law we deal with essentially
a t.heocratic legacy, since the Mosaic law was
wrillen down and prcservcd, whereas the secular
Icgislation of kings such as Manassah, David, and
Solomon is all but lost to history (Uorowitz 195:l,
20). Though t.he kings we."e supposed tH be subject
to t.he aut.horit.y of the Torah, t.he activity of kings
t.cnded 1.0 displace and weaken t.hat. authority rather
than enhance it (liorowitz I H5:1, 2 \).
In biblical law thcrefore, there is no democrat.ic
tradition, or movement toward liberty of spccch to
prot.ect democrat.ic inslitutiolls. Inslead, laws against
open expression sought to prot.cct Israel from bdng
drawn away to idolatry.
Since idolat.ry was
regarded as rebellion against nod, all Israel might
lill"leit the blessings of' God if' it allowed a city to
lUi'll to idolatry.
Thus ir a cit.y "ralls away by a
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whole it shall he invest.igated and called upon to
repent."
I r the cit.iwns will not repent then all
Israel will "ali,ack them by force of arms." Wives
and children will be slain by the sword, while those
who seduced them will be stoned (llol'Owitz 1!l5:1,
178).
The offense of idolatry posed such a threat to
Israel that it was the only offense in Talmudic Law
in which evidence obtained by entrapment was
admissible (Horowitz 1!l5:!, 17H).
Strict penalties
also met "idolatrous prophets" and "false prophets."
Those prophesying in the name of an idol could be
summarily strangled, "even if his statement coincided
with the law." lie who prophesied in the name of
the law, but falsely, must be tried by the Court of
Sevent.y-One, the Supreme Court of Israel. I~ven if
the pmphesy were true, if t.he prophet did not.
personally receive it by prophetic revelation he was
strangled (Horowitz 1nfi:l, 17!)-80) .
•Jews we.-e not allowed to curse t.he deaf or blind
(liorowitz 195:1, 1 10).
They were not allowed Lo
"cause the face of their neighbor t.o blm;h" (llorowitz
lH5a, 1 10). The prohibit.ion of injurious gossip and
slandenms defamation arose from t.he commandment
to "love thy neighbor as thyself," (Lev. l!l: 17- 18)
(Horowitz 1!l5a, 120). I~ven if the other party was
guilty of an offense, the Rabbi should be told
p.-ivately so t.hat lhe offender had a chance lo
repent p,·ivatcly.
Insulting one's wire in public was a crime in
Israel and was grounds for divorce (Horowitz 105:1,
258). Spreading an evil report. in order t.o injlll·e a
I'eputalion was punishable by a fine and damages.
Siandea· would not be f(u'givcn unlil apology had
been made.
There was also an offcnse of
humiliation, t:hargeable t.o t.hose who had "done some
act directly on the hody of the (:omplain:lnt," like
spit.t.ing on him or heating him (llorowitz t !15:1, 5!lH(iOO).
Though this offt'nse is more
in 10 OUl'

a"

liB

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

modern battery, it was regarded in Israel much like
defamation
and
insult;
an
offcnse
to
the
commandment to love thy neighbor.

FREEDOM Olf' SPEECH IN
ANCIENT ATHENS
The 'irst known use of lhe word "freedom" O(~CUlOs
in a twent.y-filllrth cent.ury BoCo manusnipt. in which
King Urukagina of Lagash issued decrees proclaiming
the f,oeedom of his citizen-subjects (Muller 1961, 404 I).
There is no ment.ion of freedom of speech,
however.
Freedom of speech is said to have been
bonl much later, during the At.henian archaic period
ROO-600 B.C. (Tedford 1985, 4). During this pm"iod,
t.he aristocratic rulers of Athens allowed free
communication of opinions without fear to "cert.ain
classes of citizens."
An expansion of the right
occulTed under the reforms of Solon (c. 5!)4 B.C.)
and Cleisthenes (c. 50n B.c.), reaching a zenith
duroing the golden age under Pericles (c. 44:1-429
B.C.) (Tedford 1n85, 4).
At.henian citizens had wide-ranging freedom of
expression, from the governmental institutions of the
council assembly and courts, to socil,ty at. large.
Max Radin notes t.he extent. of artistic lihert.y
permitted in At.hens by recount.ing the works of
Aristophanes. This dramatist niticizcd the Athenian
politician Cleonymus as a "glutton", "perjurcr",
"in'i)rmer", "swindler", and "onc who t.hrows away
his shield in Laltle" (I !127, ~n:~-2,1).
Calling
someone a "shield throwcr" or coward was
dcfamation undcr A thcnian la w, but the n'sponse to
the insult is not known (Tcdliuod I !IHf), 4).
Although AthcllH was rcput.cd by Plat.o to bc the
city with "Ihe greatpsl lilH'rly of spcech in all
Orcecc" «Jcorgias), then' w('n' restrictions .. pon
speakcrs, content, and the tilllc and place III'
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uUerance. As Radin observes, there never was "a
community in which a man might say whatever he
pleased.
"~ven those who at various times have
pleaded f(lr great fn~edol1l of uUerance, have always
hastened 1,0 add qualifit'ations" (1927, 2(5).
Freedom of speech was at lirst narrowly conlined
to a few, then extended in accordance with the
numbers of citizens who had a say in government.
Before Solon, landowners were eligible as citizens,
and could speak with freedom in the assembly.
When the Athenian constitution was reltmned in 54U
B.C., all classes of citizens including non-landowners
were pennitted to participate in the assembly. With
this
extension of enfranchisement carne the
concomitant extension of a right to free speech.
Nevel·theless, the designation "citizen" excluded sixty
percent of the population who were males under
eighteen, women, resident aliens, or slaves (Tedford
1985, 5).
The Athenians had measures of "prior restraint"
to prevent unworthy orators fmm padkipating in
public life. If they had been convicted of a <Time,
did not pay t.heir t.axes, or were accliseu of
dishonorable ads t.IIl'Y could not. speak to audiences
(Tedford 1985, 5).
Siandet· laws providl'd lor lines of t.hose who
spoke evil of the dead, or slandered the living
dUl'ing festivals, in h.'mples, in court.s of law, or in
public onices (IJonner I HH 7, 81-84).
1,;1 ws also
existed t,o punish t.hose who deceived t he people,
gave bad advil-e, or pmmoted inexpedient or
unconstitutional legislation."
The "bad advice"
mentioned above was meant in the context of
misleading an audience aftl'r being hrihed hy an
(\nemy. In esscm'l' it aded much like till' I'~spi()nage
Ad of 1H 17.
(llll' colony in (~rel'('e was so
protedive of its democracy and const.it.ution that:
The original code of laws . . .
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contained a provi:.;ion to prevent tampering
with the law:.;, namely that the person wishing
to propose an amendment. or an existing law
must speak with his head in a noose; if he or
she failed to convince, the noose was tightened
instantly and t.he complainant was strangled
(Freeman 1!)50, :~5).
Despite
the
legal
rcstrict.ions,
freedom
of
cxpression still flourished because it was necessary
to protect. the democracy which the Athenians
treasured.
As Hobert Bonner stat.es, "no laws or
penalties could have fully enfill"Ced responsibility for
public utlerances . . . . Popular government would
have languished and failed if every citizcn stood in
dangel" of the law every time he ventured to speak
in public" (Bonner I!Hi7, 84). One who did flaunt.
the warnings of his legislalors Wits Socral.cs, who
was (unjustly) put. to death for sedition in :HHl B.C.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC
The free and responsible cit.izen in Rome, to
whom the assembly was open, posscsscd certain
rights which the stal.c could prolect. as long as the
citizen cxerciscd CIVIC rcsponsibility.
Romans
believcd in social rcsponsibility and obeying the law,
and therefore toleral.cd a highcr dcgl"ce of stal.c
control ovcr thcir livcs than Athcnians (Momigliano
IH42, 124).

Thcl"c wcre no legal guarant.ccs of frccdom of
spcech; howcvcr, a tradition of 1~llerancc dcveloped
during the Rcpublic that pcrmitted a high degrec of
fl"ee cxprcssioll by thc population. Laura Robinson
flOl.cs that wrilen; of satirical vcrse, poets,
pamphlcu!crs, and hisUII"ians suff"crcd no state
ccnsOl"ship (I~HO)"
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AIUwugh the assemhly was open to all citizens,
they only had the right to vote and not to speak.
Senators were called upon to speak (and influence
the vol.m's) in order of rank.
Therefore, although
their speech was proteded, Sl'nators of low rank
were seldom allowed tAl speak (Tedford 1!IHIi, !I).
Senat'(II's could defamc without much fear of legal
aclion. Cicero called PisH a "plague", "Least", "dog
of Clodius" and a "donkey", I'~ven in the {:ourts it
was pennitted to call the defendant a "parricide",
"lover of his sister", and "desecrator of religious
ceremonies" (Robinson 1H40, :n).
Roman legal restrictions upon freedom of speech
were most prcvalent in the slate-run theater.
It
was not pel'miUed tAl insult a person Ly name on
the stage.
The issue of freedom of speech in a
state supported enterprise remains with us tAlday.
As Tedford notes, one argument to support North
Carolina's 1~Hi:l "Speaker-Ban Law" was that
"known communists" could exercise their freedom of
speech in society at large, Lut tax-supported schools
need not provide them with a platform (Tedford
1985, 11).

FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN ENGLAND
A pattern of "dbsent Ly permission" was
estaLlished Ly the Roman emperors who exhibited
various levels of toleration of crit.icism. This pattern
"became accept.ed pradiee throughout. Europe ,tnd the
British rsles for more t.han sevent.een centuries,
during which time no Wt~stern nation extended to its
citizens a legal guarantee of freedom of t~xpressi(ln"
(Tedford 1!l8:', 12).
The established Christian
church, having won its battle against. persecution by
the authorities, made full use of this lack of legal
protection by persl't'ut ing ot hers whom it deemed
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unorthodox 01' herelical (Pfi.,ni.~r I !}(j 7, 10- 20).
I n the thirteent.h l~t'nl ury, as I he Inquisition bt·gan
on t.he Continent., t.he Magna Carla was Leing signed
in I~ngland.
Though it mnlains II(} ment.ion of
freedolTl of speech. it laid the fiHlIldalion of
constit.ut.ional libert.y "by dedaring that just.ke was
not. t.o be sold, denied, 01' delayed and that no
freeman could be deprived of life or proJlerty except
by peel' judgment and by t.he law of the land"
(Tedrord I nR5, 12).
Tedf()I'd argues that it was
subsequent I'eaflinnat.ions or t.he Magna Carta which
gave rise to a freedom or speech.
No direct line
of free speedl theory passed from Athens and Rome
t.o England (I UR5, 12).
Freedom of specch evolved in England into a dr,i/
liberty.
This involves legal guarant.ees t.hat. each
citizen must be protected by law from arbitrary
arrest. and imprisonment, and t.hat. the law must
support each citi;wn's right I~' speak and not just
a privileged few (Tedford I nR5, 12).
Arbitrary
arn~st or outspoken crit.ks has becn abhorred in
England ancl Ihe Unil~'d Stales, and our crit.ics are
pl'Otected by writ of habeas corpus.
The law
protecting rreedom of speech spread slowly in
England fmm the monarch and high clergy In the
members of parliament in lhe I fiR!) English Bill or
Hight.s, and finally I~, t.he gellt'ral populat.ion as a
civil liberty in the IRHOs (Tcdfiml I!)R!), 1:1-14).
The English adopted legal constraint.s over t.hree
t.ypes or speech: sedit.ion, defamation. and blasphemy
(BlacksUlIlc 17(i!), 151).
Unlike the Greeks, the
I~nglish ext.ended blasphemy U, covel' "immoral" and
"lewd" messages under t.he lahel "oLscene libel"
(Tedf<ml ) BR5, ) 4-15). The reason the rree speech
tJ'adition did not pass unfettered int.o I~nglish society
may Le attributcd U, thc undcmocrat.ic nature or the
government of I~ng'and, even in t.he cent.uries
fi,lIowing Magna Cart.a. The "crimc" of nit.idzing
the King, govcl"nment oHicials, laws, symbols, 01'
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policies w'as punishable as sedit.ious libel under
statutes of 1275 and 1:nn (Levy I !Hi:l, 7), These
laws I'estricted the publication of views critical to
government ft)l' the next. six hundred years,
To cont.-ol seditious libel, the monarchs established
t.he Privy Council and St.ar' Chamber, infamous for
its tor'ture-drawn {~onfessions and executions wit.hout
tl'ial. The public alienat.ion these practices amused
caused Parliament. t.o aholish the St.ar Chamber in
1ti4 I (Tedf(lJ'{j I m~5, I (j).
Suppression
of political
crit.icism continued
however.
The rationale was explained in a 1704
sedition trial by Chief .Justice lIolt, who argued that
if speakers and writers "should not be called to
account for possessing the people with an ill-opinion
of the govenlment., no government can subsist. 1<'01'
it is very necessary for all govenUllents that the
people should have a good opinion of it" (Levy
1963, 10), This rationale came after the relaxation
of licensing of the press, which had persisted in
England from 1538 to UW4, This means of pl'ior
r'estr'aint was the alter'native, and companion to,
seditious libel as a means of controlling fr'ee political
expr'ession, Much of the debate about t.he Framers'
ol'iginal intent revolves around prior restraints and
seditious libel.

THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA
Leonard W. Levy has said thaI. the
persistent. image of Colonial America as a
sodety in which freedom of expression was
cherished is an hallucinat.ion of sl'nt.in1l'nt t.hat.
ignores hist.ory, , "
Till' AIllcrican people
simply did not. IIndl'rsland that. frecdom of
t.hought. and expr('ssion nwans ('IIIIal frcedorn
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for the other fellow, espet.:ially the one with
hated ideas (I !Hi:i, I H).
Among those helping t~) perpet.uate the myth include
.J ustices Brandeis and lIolmes. J ust.ice Bra;ldeis said
in Whit"e),:
Those who won our independence . . . believed
t.hat. freedom t.o think as you will and to speak
as you t.hink are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth, that
without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile (I H27, 375).

Justice lIolmes interpreted "the theOl·y of our
constitution" as belief "that the ultimate good desired
is belte.· reached by a free trade in ideas--that the
best test of trut.h is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market and
that truth is the only gnHl/ld upon which their
wishes safely can be carried Olil" (Abmms II. United
Stutes 1HI H, n:H)).
One way to reconcile these opposing camps is to
treat the I"ounding Fathers and the society in which
they lived as separate entities.
The I"ounding
J"athers were exceptional men of high ideals and
refined thinking.
It was WashingulIl who had t.o
convince the populace that "toleration" of other
religious groups meant "acceptance;" toleration was
more than refraining from hanging the other fellow,
"t.he one with hal~~d ideas."
A distinction could also he drawn between preand post-Revolutionary America.
Prior to the
Revolution, Colonial' governors could banish Puritan
and Quaker clergymen; some Quakers were even
executed for heresy (Tedlill'lJ I !lHfi, :12). As .Justice
Ilugo Black wl'Ote of the period:
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Catholics found themselves hounded and
proscribed because of their fai~h; Quakers who
followed their conscience went to jail. . . .
All of these dissenwrs wCl'e compelled to pay
tithes and taxes lo support governmentsponsored churches whose miniswrs preached
inllammatory sermons designed to strengthen
and consolidate tlw established faith by
generating a burning hat.red against dissenters
(/<~"erson v. /lourd of I~d"etltioll I B4 7, 10).
The Bill of Rights was a positive attempt to cure
these ills, as lwidellced by .Jefferson's fear that the
Constitution
itself did
not
pl'Ovide
adequate
pmwction: "I will now tell you what I do not like.
First. the omission of a bill of rights, providing
clearly, and without the aid of sophism, (illo f.oeedom
of religion, freedom of the press
Ietc!"
(Lipscornh and Bergh I !)O:I-().1, :187).
How the Founding Fat hers sought t~) curl' these
ills has been I he subject of vigorous dcbate.
Zechariah Chafee argues thaI. the framers of t.he
first amendment "inlended I~) wipe out the common
la w of sedition, and make further prosecutions for
CJ"iticism of the government, without any incitement
1.0 law-breaking, filloever impossible in the United
States of America" (I!H I, 21). Levy disagrees, and
"I"Cmains convinced that t.he revolutionary generation
did not seck to wipl' out the cure idea of seditious
libel, t.hat the goveJ"lllllent. may be assaulted by
Illere words, lhat the legislahlJ"s were more
suppressive than the cou.ts, that the freedom of
political expl"Cssioll remained quite narrow until
17H8. . . . " (1!)85, 7ti7L

These two argumcnts characterize my searl'll for
the origin of the First Amentlnwnt protection of free
speech.
Was our fn~e spec(~h conel~ived as "Ihe
matrix, t.he indispensable (~ondilion of nearly every
other (illom of freedom" (I'ulko ". COli JI('d;1" II t I H:I7,
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:1 I B)?
01' did frccdolll of speech evolvc as it did
in I~ngland, as an offshoot of ollter libcrlics as the
laws of sedition, prior rCHtrainl, and liccnsing werc
cl'Oded after the Magna Carla?
Sincc Chal'ce allli Lcvy have alrl'ady lo(~kcd horns
in their examination or First Amelllillwilt hislmoy,
rcl.racing illl'ir sleps would be ml'rilless. I propose
instcad a novel thesis: Is fn'l' speech a natural
right.? II' Ihen' is a nalllloal right. of fn'c spel'{~h, ils
primacy ovcr 01 her liberties not acrordpd that status
is assured. This would support. I hose who espouse
the view I hat free speedl is Ill'cessary to freedom
and tnlC democracy, since these are fundamental to
our happincss and self-realizatioll.
If there is no
natural right t.o floce speech, then it must have
adsen as a residual of eroded protedions of the
state froll) disruption of ordeL

]S THERE A NATURAL LAW
OF (i'REE SPEECH?
The Roman lawyer Cicero staled:
There is in fact a true law - namely, right
reason - which is in accordance with nat.ure,
applies to all men, and is unchangeable and
eternal. . . .
Neither t.he Senate nor the
people can absolve us from our obligat.ions to
obey t.his law, and it requires no Sext.us Aelius
to expound and interpret. it..
It. will not lay
dowll olle rule at. ROIne and another at.
Athens, nor will it. be one rule I~)day and
another tOIlHlITOW. But. there will be olle law,
eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times
upon all peoples; and there will be, as it w(~re,
one common mast.er and ruler or men, namely
Uod, who is the author of this law, it.s
int.erpreter, and it.s spollsor (Wilkin I!H'l, ~~fi-
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2Ii).

The hist.ory of free speedl in Ureece leads us to
reject. any notion that it conformed to the Ciceronian
litmus U!st for natural law. Individual communities
within Greece changer! the enfranchisement of who
could speak and the penalties and conditions of
speech.
As I~ugene nerhart. has not.ed, any
fragment of natural law found in the writings of
ancient Greece is no more "than the recognition of
man's inherent desire fill· reciprocal justice" (Gerhart
195a, 34).
Similarly, for the Romans, nat.ural law belonged
to t.he present, and was defined in terms of their
present institutions (Maine 1931, 70-7 I). The "one
law, eternal and unchangeable" was in fact. a
product. of the reasoning of t.he Roman Rulers,
subject. to change as expediency required. They, like
the Greeks, expanded the enfranchisement of
participants in government, yet exduded a large
population of polit.ical eunuchs from expressing their
opinions.
"In medieval t.imes t.he law of nature and the
law of <tod were regarded as similar" (lerhat·t
I !J5:I, 40).
With Rome as ·t.he cent.er of the
universe, and the Pope t.he final arhit.er of (lod's
laws, successive popes poured out. delTl'lals which
we.·e formed into st.at.ute books. These purposed to
be t.he laws of (lod in rule fill·maL Every law not
in the books was repeated, and "every sent.ence,
every rubric lof the <1regory IX statut.e book I was
law"
(Pollock
and
Maitland
I H~)5,
HH-H~».
lIoldswOlth· not.ed the erred of Uwse laws on secular
rull~rs: "To disobl'Y till' law of God might. mean
excommunication and a king 01' otlll'r rull'r who
deliberately cont.inued t.o defy it might expose his
t.erritory to an int.erdiet." (1 !I22-2H, 21 Hl.
Thus
there arose legal as well as religious grounds for the
revolts of the Jo'ranl"ist"an t.ertiaries of t he period
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who refused t.o bea.· arms for their secular kings
(Fort.ini 1!IH I, 522).
During the Middle Ages however, it would seem
that primitive attempt.s to define and apply natural
law served only as a check on the excesses or
Church legal jurisdiction. The Dominicans used lhe
writings or SL Thomas Aquinas t.o a .... ive essentially
al the Ciceronian definition. Mu(:h like Ulei.· Greek
counterparts however, t.heorists or natural law did
not use it. as a st.arting point in the creation or law,
but as a comfortable justification ror ideas or
abstract justice and "equity," which would grow inlo
a great body of English law.
As Grot.ius put il,
equit.y was "the cOlTectioll of that wherein the law
fby reason of ils unive.'sality' is deficient" (Gerhaa't
J HS:J, 4H).
Gmtius could have drawn li'om the
lesson of t.he Magna Carta. The grant of individual
freedom to I~nglishmcn "evoked immediat.e opposition
and hostility from the papacy," and was seen "as
the result or a conspiracy" (Gerhart 195:l, 4 H).
Thus, despit.e an Aquinan and Dominican legacy or
nat.ural law, the Homan church did nol even
recognize the basic rights of property and trial by
peers, let alone free speech.
The great principles embodied in the Magna
Carta also spulTed the lH'eak of America rrom her
mother country. Writings on the social contract, the
laws governing human understanding, and the
reform or government /ired the imaginalion of the
framers and rormed a basis or "natural righls" the
violation or which was used to justify the rebellion
(Holdsworth 1922-2(3, 15).
The Declaration of
Independence is based on "truths that are sclfevident," that man has "inalienahle right.s."
It is this philosophical (and natural right.s)
t.radition t.hat jurists slI(:h as Brandeis, lIolmes and
Cardozo draw upon when I.IH'Y proted speech,
lIowever, they do so e .... oneously.
The only
prot.ection of free speech (;Ollsistcnl wilh a theory of
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natural law would be absolutism.
.Justice Black's
absolutist thesis is stated in one sentence: "I take
no law abridging to mean flll Law abridging"
(Kudand I !l75, 2).
This is the only positIOn
consistent with free speech and expression being first
among the inalienable rights of man.
Yet, as we
shall see, the absolutist viewpoint has never been
that of United States courts.
After the Revolution, t.he Americans commitlt~d
the sin of enfranchisement limitation: " . . . in spite
of the high sounding generalities of the Declarat.ion
of Independence, \the Americans) did not abandon
the institution of slavery; landl the suffrage in many
of the states was very limited . . . . " (lioidsworth
1922-26, 15-16). The lirst historical limit on speech
was thus imposed --who had the right. Before the
landmark cases resulting fmm the Espionage Act of
I U 17 and Schcflk v. Uflitcd States, numerous
Supreme Court decisions upheld I·estrictions on
speech. Since the Fourt.centh Amendment had not
been extended to include guarantees of the Fi.·st
Amendment against. the stat.es, AntAlIlin Scalia
al·gues that pre-World War One decisions shed light
on what the Court conceived the guarantees of the
First Amendment to be (I US7, 10). An examination
of these cases led Rabban to conclude that "\olnly
a lew, isolated opinions before World War One
indicat.l~d that the First. Amendment wuld be more
than a paper guarantee" (I !lSI, 540 note 2). Scalia
condudes
that Ilw "First Amendment is a
parliculady fragile protection, constantly subject to
assault in. authoritarian times, and tliliS constantly
in need or zealous defense" (I !IS 7, I I).
Scalia is implying that our ClIITent "libertarian"
stance toward freedom of speech is suscept ible of
change.
Threats 10 national security, real or
mispcrceived, have seen tlw Iwavy hand of
authoritarianism slldd(~nl'y desl"l'11I1 to restrict free
speech.
As .JustiCl~ lI"dan said in KOllisbl'rg II.
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Stnie Ilnr, " . . . we reject the vicw that freedom
of speech and association . . . , as protected by t.he
First and Fourtccnt.h Amcndllll'lIts arc 'absolutes'.
Throughout it.s history this Comt has
consistently rccognized at least two way~ in which
const.it.ut.ionally protecl~d freedom of speech is
narrower than an unlimit.ed license t.o t.alk . . . ."
( I un I, 4 B·!iO).
One of these has heen national
security.
Chief.' ustice Vinsoll st.ated in I U!i I:
"Nothing is more cCI'tain in modcrn society than t.he
p.-inciple t.hat. there are no ahsolut.es. . .. To t.hose
[eleven Communist leaders in this inst.ancel who
would paralyze OUI' Government, in the face of
impending threat. by encasing it. in a semanlic sl.-ait
jacket wc must. reply that all COlH'cpts are relativl'"
([)ennis Ii. lIlIitl'd Sl(/tl~s I B!i I, !iOH).

CONCLUSION
Any au,riIJlIt.ion of our First. Amendment right (of
free expression at least) to nat.ural law sulrers from
the same defeds which we aU.rilmlt' t.o the Orel'k
and Roman syst.ems; it is t.il'd t.o our CllITent
insl it.utiolls and valucs. By illfl'I'ence, t.his would·he
natural ";ght is subject to change in scope as ideas
changc and instit.utions shin Ihe balance of their
power. By dcdudion, since t.he law is not. appli(~ahlc
t.o all timcs and all places, or l'Vl'n constant wilhin
t.he limit.ed history of t.he United Slates, there is no
nat.ural law of frel' speech .
•J ustice Cardozo's chal'acterizat.ion of the First
Amendment freedom of expression as being fil'sl
among the first. is a fallacy.
We arc not. uniqul',
bUl a mere extension of our hist.OI'ical pn~deccssors.
Like the Ureeks, we value the preservation of our
democracy above t.he right. of t.hl' individual to speak
his mind. Locke's theories of social nllltrad explain
that. the individual must compromise cert.ain liberties
to aUain greater securit.y of other liherlies.
It.
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would appear that Ihis is the case in Ame/'ica.
Like the I~nglish then, Americans can make a case
that liberty of speech has sprung from the
consolidation and assertion of other liberties, rather
than being the catalyst of thm;e liberties.
The
jurists of the twentieth century who have tried to
attach a special status to speech have CITed in their
philosophical origins.
The framers saw only the
greater dmnonatic freedom envisioned by Locke for
the populace as a whole.
The theory of a self·
realization only aU,ainahle through free expression is
a creation of our modern jurists.
These jUl'isls,
unfettered by the prad ical concerns of our Founding
Fathers, may see a different First Amendment than
did Jefferson.
They may be the great.est natural
rights 'theorisls since the Dominicans.
Jlowever,
history tells us, and Ihe mes~;uge and philosophy of
the Founding Fathers l'onti ... ns, thai reversions to a
state of nature and natural laws of self realization
will inevitably be crushed in any confront.ation with
the pr'inciples of national security and the protection
of democratic order.
Our rel:ent. flirtation with
natu/'al law has served merely to lemporar'ily
redefine when such a confnmtatioll occurs.
III the penultimate analytical sedion of this essay
I put the Greek, Roman, English and Ame.-ican
systems to the litmus lest of Cicenmean natural
law.
The astute observer will have noliced the
absence of a .Jewish Illodel. The .Jewish law, being
based 011 theonat.ic p"illciples, is the nearest to
natural law.
The ultimat.e offense in Israel was
idolatr'y.
Offenses against God were the most
serious, . nol those against the government or t.he
people. Ofli..~nses against the individual were next.
in gravity, since they were regarded as vicarious
sins against God, who had commanded love for one's
neighbor.
A cursory examination of \lw many
prohibitions imposed upon Israeliles may lead us
dismiss their daillls \0 fn'pdolJl 01' spp!'l'h, or III allY
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imJividual rights. I::; it. not. t.he case, however, that
tlll'Y enjoyed the greatest. frcedom of any peoplc'!
The law elevat.cd the pcrson or the individual such
that. the standard of giving offense wa_s anything
less t han love.
Could it he t.hat our present dilY jurist.philosophers convey t.he ambivalence of our American
sodety toward God and the individual'! We st.arted
the American l'epulJlic on the principle of a New
.Jerusalem, covenanted to God to preserve freedom
and democl'acy, then Wll immediately tumed away
fmm the pl'ior-ities we sha,"ed with the old
,Jerusalem. God W,JS not to be p/"()tecl~d. Instead,
the individual was to be pmtecwd in His stead. As
we have refined and expanded the proteclion given
to the individual over two hundred years, we have
elevated the status of t.he individual t.o a level far
below, but perhaps directed t.oward, that which he
held in ancient Israel. While we need not love him,
we must increasingly resped his right. to ad as he
pleases.
The euphoria of this elevat.ion of the individual
to the achievement of his inalienable rights has
intoxicated our philosopher jurists. In canonizing the
individual such that he can achieve a self-I"ealization
and a fulfillment of all other rights, we arc not
legislating the fulfillment of the measure of his
creation.
Cicero mentioned the Senate and the
people as subordinat.es in the natural law.
lie
envisioned
no
Supreme
Court,
uneleded,
unrepresent.at.ive, and incapable of ouster, which
could decree that instead of nod-then-man, "nat.m-al
law" bids us worship man thcn (lod, wit.h t.he lat.ter
optional or it would offend man. The natural law
of OUI' jurists is of tlll'ir own making, and fails to
meet. any definition of natural law rcquiring
eternality and unchangeability.
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CITIZENSHI P'S LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS: CONVENTION
AND NATURAL RIGHTS
Kif Augustine
Citizenship acls as a coonJination solut.ion
OJ'ganizing a legal society into members and nonmembers. Despite this fairly simple definition, the
nature of citizenship remains a diflicult concept.
The primary diflicull.y in understanding the nature
of citizenship resides in the tension between the
contractual and the natural rights perccptions of
society.
The
contractual
approach
emphasizes
the
reciprocal duties and rights of individuals and
community. The communit.y sets the st.andard for
exclusion or inclusion, tcrminating or pl'cc\udingt.he
relationship when it. is not beneficial to itself. The
citizen also fl'('c\y t.erminates t.he relationship if he
finds the particular eonditions of membership
onerous, bul the st.andards set by the society
condition his initial inclusion.
As a community
membCl', the individual fulfills dut.ies and pal'ticipall's
in the polit.ical proccss. In retul'll, hc receives the
substantial
benefit.s
of
communit.y
life
and
government. prot.ection.
Overall, the communit.y's
needs balance against. the individual's needs.
The natural right.s pen:eplion, on t.he ollll'r hand,
holds t.he individual's nceds paramount.
Man has
right.s that arc inherent in his being and these
society cannot violate, no mat.t.er t.he communal
needs.
Therefore, {:itizcnship carries lillie weight.
The individual docs not have any dut ies to the
community; t.he community exists t.o benefit lhe
individual.
Whichever t.heoretical appl'llach one takes, living
in a cOlllmunit.y obviously requil'l's some nlOrdination
between individuals. 1·'01' that. maUer, any human
interaclion, however simple, funclions on mut ual
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expectations.
The real eoonlination problem is
understanding anoUll'r's expectations, or rat.her
ident.ifying what that. person exped.s you to exped
of him (Schelling I !l(i:l, 5·1).
On a sm·idal level,
conventional agreements in many forms (laws,
traditions, ct(:.) coordinat.e individual expectations.
As Reynolds points Ollt, coordination solut.ions in the
fill·m of conventions simplify life and reducp
uncert.ainty, tllllS benefitting the individual (1!IH7,
5).
By ddincaling l'xpcctations, eoonJination
solutions provide a practical, eonH~ntional framework
in which individuals and communities operat.e.
The consequenCl's of citizenship as a coordination
solution will be discussed in light or the contractual
and nallu·al rights vil'ws of socil·ty. In the practical
arena, the concept of eil.izenship developed by the
V.S. Supreme Court. denwnstra/cs the tension
between these two views.
Alien parUeipal.ion and
expatriation will be two at·eas of emphasis.

THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION
For· citizenship to be valuable, it must entail
ceI·lain p.·ivileges t.hat are denied the alien.
Essentially, these privileges arc embodied in a
distinction between roles.
The citizen fills many
formal roles which the alien may not, while they
share the infi,rmal role of subject.
Most basically, citizenship itself is a role.
Citizenship grants the individual a paJticipatory role
in the legal eommunity.
Cit.izens define the legal
eommunity as they modify and change it; therefi)J"e,
they are ultimately responsible for its fill·m in ways
non-members arc not.
Citizenship also allows the
individual atTeSs to more onit-ial roles slJl~h as juror,
legislator, and judge, roles that further develop and
define the (~OInrnunit.y. Citiwns can partieipate ill
the political process.
III addition to his participatory roll's, till' ("it iZ('1l
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shares the role of subjed witll the alien.
I\s
suhjed, the individual complies with and supports
the conventions of soeidy. lie abides by the law,
pays taxes, fulfills military duty, participates in Uw
advantages of the system by selting up a business,
sends children 1~1 school, and is inl(lnned on issues.
Overall, he contributes 1.0 the success of the system.
In these instances of everyday lile, the alien's
actions and duties are indistinguishable from those
or a citizen.
The citizen, nonetheless, retains a
part.icipal.ory advantage.
While the rranchise is often deemed a necessary
characteristic of the citizenship role, it is not always
a reliable tool 1<11' measuring participat.ion.
Some
citizens are denied the vot.e while at times aliens
are allowed 1.0 vot.e. Children receive protedion as
citizens but their participat.ion in the polit.ical process
is
severely
limited.
Convicts
retain
their
membership in the political community--they are still
citizens--but not their ability ti, participate in the
political decision-making pnlcess because they violate
the laws and conventions of that community.
Indeed, an ex-felon can be denied the vote evt.'Jl
after he has served a prison sentence and CIImplet.ed
parole (11 ichnnisotl II. Numirez 4 1H lJ .S. 24 I 1!t7 -, n.
lIisulrically, women were denied the franchise
while still counted as citizens (Mitior II. lIupperselt
Sup. Cl. Oct.. 1874 H(2). Likewise, at othcr times
voting privileges were determined hy pJ'()perty
ownership, not citizenship status. Currently, Puert.o
Ricans are lJ .S. citizens but are not n'JlI'esl'ntt.,d hy
a voting member in Congress; nor do they participate in ,federal l~ledions.
Indeed, the recognition
of Puerul Ril'ans as United Stat.es citizl'ns was based
on the assumption that t.heir citizenship was
substantively different. (see :1:1 Congressional Record
247:1-74 as quoted in Cabrancs, 1!t7H, :17) .
•Just as Ull' fnlll('hi~w is sometimes dcnied t.o
cit.izcns, it IHls at tillH's bel'n granted to aliens.
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Currently, a nwnber of SC<lndina vian count.rimi grallt.
f(lreign nationals tile right. to vot.e in local and
regional elections and even hold eledive of1ice (Tung
1HH5, 45:0.
In the Unit.ed St.at.es, a number of
st.ates allowed aliens t.he vote in the inid-I HOOs
(B,oseberg I H77, IOn!), and aliens were completely
excluded from vot.ing in presidential elections only in
1B2H (Aylsworth I n:ll, 114).
The justificat.ion for excluding individuals from the
vole varies over lime, thus relleding t.he tension and
interplay bet.ween t.he natll,·al rights and «:ontractual
theories.
Although it seems unfair to a modern
mind formed in a t.radition of individualism and
independence that women were excluded fmm the
f,·anchise, they wel'C ,·eprescnted and conside,·cd full
citizens in an cra whcre representation and power
were wielded by families rather than by individuals.
The family filled t.he part.icipat.ory role.
With the
indust.rial revolution, the concept of a completely
independent woman, especially linancially, bccame a
possibilit.y.
Such a woman was rare if nOot noncxist.ent in previous ages.
Therefore, a woman,
although denied t.hc vot.e, was fully reprcscnted as
a citizen through . her family, specifically her
husband, in the elcctoral proccss. Thc contractual
notion prevailed.
The valuc of citizenship, despitc an inconsistent
applicat.ion of thc franchisc, remains problematic only
if a spccific definition of cit.izL·nship is ,·cquircd and
forccd upon the past.
Whilc the content of
citizenship, meaning t.hc privilcgcs and bcnefits
granted to cach citizen, changes and may indccd be
dirTcrent for specific citizens at a givcn time, a
citizen is nonetheless an official membcr or the
Jlolit.ical communit.y. Cit.izens are always represented
in the political process. They change and modify
the legal and political framework t.hat. governs their
lives even if rcpresentation and participation has not.
always been as sJlecific and directly aimed at t.hc
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individual as it is today. The communit.y and the
individual define
the cit.izen
as an insider.
Consequently, Iw is allowed privileges the community
has decided are spe(~ifically relevant t.o membership.
The alien is an outsider and denied those privileges,
whatever they are.

CI1'IZENSHIP AS CONTRACT
The mere existence of citizenship supports a
contractual approach to society. Citizenship is not
even relevant unless t.hel·e is a society t~) be a
member
of;
citizenship
defines
the
political
communit.y. Furthermore, citizenship has never been
considel'ed an absolulc I'ight del'ived from me.-e
exislcnce, not even in an age commitlcd t.o
individualism.
Aliens do not have the I'ight to
become citizens.
Once a member of the group,
one's right to remain a member may be paramount;
however, obtaining membership is not the right of
anyone.
The I mmigration Reform and Cont rol Ad of 1mHi
provides amnesty to many illegal aliens but docs so
only for those individuals who can meet the
standards of I'esidency, English language ahility and
other crilcl'ia set by Congress,
Not everyone is
admitlcd, and those who are enter the political
pmcess at the communit.y's initiative and diserclion,
The Supreme Court expressed t.his notion more
explicitly in lIlIitt'd Stuics 0. (Jills/l('''~ (~4:1 U.S. 472
II B 171> and ,IO/WIIII('ssell II. IIl1itl'd S/utl's (225 U.S.
227 II !tl2-J).
(jill ,'ihI'T'M , emphasizing t.he decisions
reached in ,/(I"{lfIlWSS(~/I, argues t.hat. "an alien who
seeks political rights as a member of t.his Nat ion
can rightfully obt.ain tlwm only upon t.erms and
conditions specified hy Congress. Courts are wit.hout.
aut horit.y to sllndion dlanges or modifications" (24:1
U.S. at 474). Congn·ss, as repl'l'sl'ntativl's of tlw
commllility, IllUSt. (kt'itie the "terms and eondit.ioll::i"
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under which any individual can participate in the
political process of t.he nat ion. Moreover, "no alit'n
has the slightest right. to nat.uralization unless all
st.atutory requirements arc complied wit.h" (24:1 U.s.
at 4 75). In this case, t.he Court reeognize~ t.hal lhe
community decides who will be admitt.cd; lhe
individual has no right to membership unless he
complies with the standards set by the community.
If the statulory requirements are mcl., then the
individual must be admitt.cd; bUl as a non-member
of the society he has no right and no real way lo
change the standards lhe community sets.
llis
membership is dependent on their good will.

STANDARDS FOR EXCLUSION
The pot.cntially discriminatory nature of dtii'.enship
becomes almost immediately obvious.
I':ssenlially,
the definition of members and IHIIl-members of a
political communit.y is an arbit.rary ad, a necessary
dist.indion presently governed by little besides lhe
values and decisions of the eommunity itself.
(<;xc\usion of some is Ill'ct'ssary to the ident.ity, even
lhe exist.cnce, of the community. A eommunily is
formed by individuals sharing values and traditions,
which nat.urally implies that tlll're arc oUll'rs who
do not share the same traditions and values.
In a spt'cifk community, rule of law and
constructive unanimit.y provide a mdalegal standard
for' dedsion-making, a standanJ spedlically designed
to prevent. discriminatioll.
Rule of law requires
genemlity, that individuals or individual groups be
essent.ially unidentifiable for' privileges or punishment.
Under the rules and procedures of the legal system,
no one is above t.he law, as all individuals arc
treat.ed equally.
The rules must be prospective
"ather than rcl.roactive, sunicicntly puLlkiwd, and
clearly stat.ed (Reynolds I !lHfi, :1, 4). Discrimination
against. communit.y members is tlll'l'eby pH·venled.
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Constructive unanimity, substituting fill" complete
unanimity, serves as the most important aspect of
rule of law.
Constructive unanimity implies a
cOOl"dination solution where certain individuals such
as legislatm"s are entrusted with the decision-making
power, but rule of law circumscribes their decisions
so that any decision they reach is one that could
have belm reached hy the community as a whole.
Rule of law and consll"uctive unanimity arc simple,
effective (~oordinat.ion solutions t.o t.he problem of
governing a large hody.
Rule of law and constructive unanimity do not,
however, answer thc qllestion of who should and
who should not he included in the community in
the first place. Rule of law prohibits discrimination
among
individuals
for
spel"ilie
benelits
or
punishments, but. citizenship itself is discriminat.ory
in the drawing of community lincs"
Constructive
unanimity depends upon a definition of insiders and
outsiders, a definition of those whose opinion really
matlers.
Such is not the ease of course if the
eommuni~y is .all- inclusive and thc world becomes
the unit of decision. But a world community if' not
a viable coordination solution to the prohlems of
govCl'nance; the world divides itself into competing
and distinct legal systems. And any unit less than
a wodd community demands a definition of
member"s. Rule of law and construdivl' unanimity
reduce discrimination, but only within an already
defined community.
In its discriminatory nature, l~itizcnship is logically
bound to the {'onventions of the admitting society.
The comm.unity will admit those whose presence it
finds beneficial and exclude those who pose a threal
economically, medically, even culturally.
The
contnlct of citizenship must Iwnefit both t.he
individual and the l~ollllllunity" The alicn benefits
the society lind indicatl's his dl'sirl' for communit.y
membership hy l'omplying with its wnventions.
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Tlw individual's abilily 10 support. community
conventions, however, rests on his physil~al locat.ion
in t.he (~omlllunit.y sincl~ territorial houndaries are t.he
cUlTent. solution to jul'isdidional pmblems. TClTit.orial
bordcrs arc a simple, effcdivl' (,(Hlrdinatitin solution
as I hey define parametcrs for both jurisdiction and
membership.
The legal alil'Il's prcsence in the
count.ry is consented to hy I he members of the
communit.y as he mel certain standards prior to his
physical admittance.
Illegal aliens prcsent a unique problem in that
they circumvent Ihe consensual pmccss of the
community by ent.ering unlawfully. But the alicn's
very abilit.y IH demonstrate his own consent depends
on that. circumvent.ion.
Ont"e bere physically, it
becomes increasingly dinicult IH dist.inguish between
illegal aliens, legal aliens and citizens in the
pelformance of duties t.o the ('Ollllllunity, if the alien
pays t.axes and is law abiding. In some ways they
may even embody the ideal of the community mtU'e
than actual members.
In a nat.ion built by
immigrant.s such as t.he United St.ates, t.he
immigrant. family "making it" after years of struggle
and hard work stands as a testament to the values
and opportunities many consider the essence of
America.
An immigrant. family becomes American, not only
because they identify themselves with t.he American
ideal, but also because of the generous tradition of
citizenship the United States offers. Any individual
born here, with a few diplomatic exceptions,
aUhlmatically receives American cit.izenship regm'dless
of the parents' legal 01' illegal presence, nationality,
race, 01' religion.
Whether an individual alien
nat.uralizes 01' not, in a generation or t.wo his family
aut.omat.ically becomes American.
The citizcnship
conventions in t.he United Stat.es are broadly
inclllsive.
If the alicn can clearly idl'lIlify himself wilh the
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core values of the communily and demonstrate his
commitmenl lo that t:ommunily through per/ill'mance
of specific duties, docs the fact lhat he entered
illegally really maUer'! II' one slresses the nat.ural
rights perspective, lhe answer is no; lhe individual's
"ighl Lo self-detel'lninat.ion weighs heavily. On lhe
othe,' hand, if one applies conlract theory, the illegal
alien's violation of communily standards for enlrance
undermines the societ.y itself. The present solution
Lo illegal entry in the Immigration Reform and
Contl'Ol Act. of I HtW mixes the lwo views. Il is a
ve,'y pract.ical solulion t.o a difficull problem. Mosl
impol'l.anlly, as a congressional ad, lhe solut.ion is
conventional and bound by conslruclive unanimity;
the illegal alien may legalize his slatus but only
according to communily slandards.
A like queslion centers around consenl but not
physical presence in the communily; should nol
anyone who agrees tH the convenlions of a
community, a legal sociely, then be considered a
membe,', no maU~r where they live'! In this case,
lhe answer is no, simply because the benefits
traditionally associated wit.h a nation-slalc would be
nearly impossible Lo pJ'()vide. Pl'Oteding a population
from enemy aUack when that population is scaUered
around the world would prove extremely dillicull.
Governments presently issue warnings against travel
in specific areas or evacuat.e citizens frolll
troublesome areas.
Physical protedion is limit.ed,
Of course, exceptions can he given, but it is
obviously more difficult to proted a scattered
population . than one bound by terrilHrial and
t.hel·efore relatively contmllahle horders. Other public
goods for which government takes responsibility
would also he diflicull I~l pl'Ilvide, Cit.iwnship and
t.errit~)rial
distinctions go
hand
in
hand
as
coordination solutions,
Given
Ihe necessarily arbitrary nature of
IC'Titorial bOlllHiarips and the lack of a IIIctalegal
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standard for inclusion or exclllsion, natural rights
and cont.ractual theory place compet.ing demands on
citizenship.
Within the United Statt's, the
contraclual approach overrides any natural rights
presumption or citizenship. Nonet.heless, the nat.ural
rights approach strongly innuences the granting or
civil rights and el~onomic bcnelits t~) aliens, making
citiwnship
basically
a
polit.ical
designation.
ConsequenLly, it is impossiblc tH show a consist.cnt.
application or either natural rights or cont.raclual
theory in the wnCl'pt or ritizenship developed by the
U.S. Suprcllll' Court.
Even the recent t.tmdency
t(}wards individual rights in expatriation cases and
civil rights cases is mitigated Ly a contractual
app,"oach in alien participation cases.

CIVIL RIGHTS FOH ALIENS
Although the United States Const.itution and Bill
of Rights define the nature of the American polit.ical
community, they are applicable ~) all those
physically present in the United States whether they
al"e oflicial members of t.he community 01" not. In
1885, the Supreme COlll"t argued in Yick Wo u.
Hopkins (118 U.s. 35H [ISSH» that
The Fourt.eenth Amendment t~) the Constitution
is not confined to the proteclion of cit.izens .
. . . These provisions are universal in their
application, tH all persons within the tcrritorial
jurisdiclion, without regard t.o any diflcrell("cs
or racc, or color, or of nationalit.y; and the
equal prot.ecl.ion or the laws is a pledge of t.he
protection of equal laws (liS U.S. :l!i(; at
:U;U).

Thcrefo,"e, "all persons," no\' jllst cit in'ns, are
entitled 1,0 t.he equal proll'clion of t.he laws or t.hl'
United St.ales.
Even illegal ;dil'lIs ren~ivl' l·qual
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rights pmtecl.ion.
In a semie, sllch a broad application or equal
protedion seems a denial or a community's distinct
responsibility to proted its citizens in return fill'
their strict allegiance, as opposed (,() all others whose
allegiance is limited alt.hough they may be present
"within 'the lerri('()rial jurisdidiOIl" or the United
Stales govenunenl.
By its very wording, equal
protection be(:omes the right of the individual, but
a right granted (,() him by a political community
t.hat values rights. The right is inviolale but only
because the community deems it so.
The
Fourleenth Amendml~nt. grant.s equal protedion (,() all
per'sons because the American pcople value such
rights.
Given the individual's absolule right (,() equal
protection, what right does t.he stale have when
observing its dut.y to provide equal protedion'l Is
the individual's right to equal protection always
trump against. the stale's needs to define it.self'?
Although Y ick Wo II. Hopkins grant.s broad protedion
t.o citizens and aliens alike, it does not oblit.erale
the dist.ineLion between the two in tt'rms of their
respedive roles.
An examination or Iwo Supreme
Court cases citing \' ick Wo demonstrates Ihat. equal
prntedion applies to the alien in his role as subjcd,
as a private individual, but not necessarily in his
pal·ticipation in t.he polilical arena. I';qual protedioll
docs 1I0t. grant. politiml privileges.
Alt.hough polilical part.it'ipation is not part or
equal Pi'll led ion, Iht' Court finds Ihal welrare
bcnefits arc. (]mlwm II. Uicllllnisoll (·10:1 U.S. :1fi5
11 B70 D st.ruek down slale law denying welrare
benefits 10' alit'lls since the Fourtl'enth Amendllll'nt.
applies 10 all pl'rsons, eili,..cm. and alil'ns (.1n:l U.S.
:lfi!i at :n I).
TIll'n·rorl', Ihe COUl'l hdd "Ihal a
st.all' stat.ule thaI dl'nil's wdrare bl'ncfils 10 residcnl
aliells who havc not. n·sidl·d in Ihe Unill'd Stales 1'01'
a specifil'd IIIlmber or Yl'ars violates till' Equal
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Prot.ection Clausc" (4 l:l U.S. :W5 at :nU). Gmhum
further maintains that the community's "concern fill'
litical
integrity"
is
not
a
justification
for
classifications (4 1:1 U.S. :W5 at :175).
I
n
GmJHlm, the Court fails t~1 recognize that the
communit.y granted equal prot.cet.ion rights in t.he
first place.
Y ick Wo v. I/opkitls certainly did not
indicat.e
that.
the
community's
needs
were
unimport.ant.
A COlTllllllllity which values rights,
such as the United Stat.es, will obviously grant more
rights t~1 individuals t.han a t~ommunit.y without. such
values.
But right.s UlClllseives enme as a societal
grant, not. naturally,
Gmhum's decision sct a new prccedent by
emphasizing individual rights as it overt.urned Pcople
IJ. Cmllc (214 N. Y.
I r,4 II!)J 5 D.
P.-eviously, as
Graham notes, Cmlll' set a standard emphasizing thc
integrity of the community over the rights of the
intlividual:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed,
but not. arbitrary discrimination, Itlr till'
principlc or exclusion is tile rcstriction of the
resources of the stat.e UI the advancement and
profit
of
lhe
members
or
the
state.
Ungcnerous and unwise such discrimination
may be. It. is not. f(lI' that reason unlawful .
. . . The state in determining what lise shall
be made of its own moneys, may legitimately
consult. lhe welfare of it.s own cit.izens rat.her
t.han that of aliens.
Whatevcr is a privilege
rather t.han a right., may be made dependent
upon citizenship. In its war against. poverty,
the state is not required t.o dedicate its own
resources t.o cit.izens and aliens alike (214 N. Y.
)54 at Hi), lti4).

GruJwm's concern f(lI' t.hc individual
CrOlle's cOIH:crn for t.he communit.y.

overwhelms

i
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NYllltisl I). Multdel (4:1~ u.s. I 11!1'Ilil) shows a
further
emphasis
on
Lroad
equal
proteclion
application for aliens. State financial aids may not
be restricted to citizens hut mllst abo he availaLle
to resident aliens regardless of their intent to
Lecome citizens.
III a ;'·4 judgment, the Cou.·t
decided that educating the eleclorate is not a
sullicient justification for excluding aliens from
student financial assistance.
Resident aliens pay
their share of taxes alld should benefit from
contributing to the programs these taxes support
(4:12 U.S. I at I I).
La('k of citizenship is
essentially a political liahility: "And although an
alien may be baITed from full involvement in the
political arena, he may play a role-·perhaps even a
leadership J"()le--in other areas of import to the
community" (4:12 U.S. I at 12). Partieipation in all
nOll-political benefits is not. limited.
In their dissenting opinions, .Justices Burger,
Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist stress contraclual
theOl·Y. The community docs have a special interest
in pJ"()viding educatioll I~) UlOse who will remain to
benefit the community (4:12 U.S. 1 at 14). Powell
argues that "states have a substantial interest in
encouraging allegiance IH the United States on the
pa.·t of all persons, including resident aliens, who
have come to live within their borders" (4:12 U.S.
1 at 16).
Moreover, the community has made it
very easy for the alien u) remove himself from the
excluded category by declaring an intent to become
a citizen or by becoming a citizen if he is currently
eligible (4:1-2 U.S. I at ~().
)n this case, the t:ollllllunity dclines a standard
whereLy an individual may benefit fully from
financial aids if he only declares an allegianw t~) the
community. The alien already receives benefits from
t.he communit.y and his ineligihility for additional
henclit.s rests only 011 his unwillingn .. ss 10 fully
commit to the cOllllllunily. AllY inveslllll'lIt should
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yield a JlI"Oi"lt. 01' hl'Ill'i"l1 10 t.hl' invest.o!'. The St.at.e
or New York invl'st.s in it.s ('itizens and resident
aliens who demonst.rat.l' a desire to become citizens
in a perfectly understandable el'lillot to build the
eornmunilyo
In t.he end, Ihe dissenting opinion
supports the community, but the individuoal winso

ALIEN PARTICIPATION
In contrast. to civil right.s and equal prolt~ction, in
the political realm the community retains great
power
in
delcrmining
the
exlcnt
of
alien
pal"loicipation. SIl/:urmUTI II. /)ollgull (4 1:1 U.S. 6:l4
II H7:Jl) allows exclusion of aliens from jobs that
precisely relat.e to t.he political pmeess even though
the decision st.ruck down a stat.e statulc limiting
pennanent. civil service employment to citizens. The
judiciat,y recognized that a slate has a special
interest. "in establishing its own fi,nn of government,
and in limiting participat.ion in that government to
t.hose who are within 'the basic conception or a
polit.ical communit.y'"
(41:1 U,S. (j:14 at. 642),
Therefore citizenship can he a
qualifier fill'
par'ticipalion ill a number of oCl"upaLiolls. Aliens al'c
not members or t.he community in Ihe same way
that citizcns arc and hold only thosc political rights
that the community grants them.
SllgarmaTl's standard fill' exclusion of aliens from
specific jobs outlines the formal parLicipahlry roles,
Thesc roles logically reflect lhe responsibilities or
those
who
define
t.he
community
and
the
communit.y's need for self-definition:
And t.his power and responsibilit.y of the State
applies, not only IH the qualificat.ion of vot.ers,
hut also to persons holding state clective or
impor!.ant nonelective cxecut.ivc, legislative, and
judicial positions, fill' officers who participate
directly in t.he f"nnulation, execut.ion, or
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review, of broad public policy perfill"m functions
that go 1.0 the heart or" r('presentative
government.
There, as ,Judge Lumbard
phrased it in his separate concurrence, is
. where
dtizenship
bears
sOllie
rational
relationship to the spedal demands of the
particular position' (:I:HI I". Supp. at B 11,
quoted in 4 13 U.S. fi:14 at fi47).
Citizenship docs bear a rational relationship to the
demands of political positions. S,,/-:armall recognizes
the pel'sona, the political role, as distinct from the
individual, since it does not deny civil '"ight.s t.o
aliens while still limit ing political participation (4 1:1
U.S. n:14 at 64 I).
The responsibilit ies of that
political role are disl.inet. fnHn the rights of the
individual but explidlly linked to the rights of the
dtizen.
The alien's obligations t~) obey the
conventions of the society in which he lives a1'e
similar to those of a fit iZl'n (4 1:1 U.S. ti:14 at H4 Ii),
even while his alienage limits his participation in the
political system.
Although he argues for upholding the citizenship
requirement for civil service employment in New
Ym·k in his dissent.ing opinion, ,'ustice Rehnquist
essentially uses the same contractual theory
expl'essed in the opinion of the court.
lie argues
that citizenship is an important dassificat.ion, rar
more important than t.he majority SlIgarmall opinion
expresses. '''or him, (·it.i".enship is "a st.atus in and
relationship with a sociely which is nmtinuing and
more basic than ml'n~ presence or residence" (4 1:1
U.S. H:14 .at (ifi2).
It should have value beyond
the political rcalm (-11:1 U.S. fi:14 at lifiH).
Ironically enllllgh, in arguing the v a It 1(' or citizl'llship
and the import.an(·t' or a ('iti7.l'nship n''1uirclllt'nt ror
specific activilil's that gn'atly arfect the ('ollllllunity,
RehnlJuist cil<~s Army;", II. /lll:;h and 'I'mI' ". /)"lIt':;
whidl value ('itizl'llship hllt. primarily from a lIalural
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rights view. III rc Grillitll:; (., I a u.s. 717 II naJ)
decided that t.he legal profession, despite its clOt;e
link with the political process, was open to aliens.
AIt.hough lawyers have tl'aditionally heel} seen as
officers of the court wit.h a llIoral responsibility to
uphold and defend the law, III rc Grimtlls rel1eds
the contemporary view that a lawyer's first
obligation is to his client.
Grilliths argues that
Ia wyers aI'e not oflicials of' the government., although
they do occupy professional positions of' responsibility
and influence that impose on them duties correlative
with their vital right of access to the courts (41:1
U.S. 717 at 72H).
They may be leaders in the
community but being a lawyer docs not "place one
so close to the core' of the political process as to
make him a «lI'mulatol' of' government policy" which
is the standard (II' exclusion set by Sugarman (4 1:1
U.S. 717 at 729).
In this view, lawyers arc
pmteded under the Fourteenth Amendment from a
citizcnship I'cquircmcnt..
In f'ollowing Sugarmall, /I'olcy v, COllllelie (4:15
U.S, 2n 1 11977 J) places state troopers in the
category of individuals whose important noneledive
position and broad discretionary powers allow them
to ad significantly as policy formulators.
Police
officers act as government representatives in their
employment.
In allowing a distindion. between
citizens and aliens, .J ustice Burger in the opinion of
the court notes that membership is relevant to
participation:
A new citizen has hecome a member of a
Nation, part of a people distinct. from others
lomit citat.ion I. The individual at that. point,
belongs to the polit.y and IS entitled t~l
part.icipat.e in t.he processes of democrat ic
decision-making (4:1:' Ll.S, ~!l1 at 2!1f).
The differencl' bel ween ,diells alld t:itiwmi lies in
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their rm!mber~hip.
That difference affecl~ their
ability to satisfaclorily fulfill the obligations of a
state trooper.
In a dissenting opinion, .Justice Stevens states
that troopers are implementors rather than makers
of policy, an opinion shared by .Justices Marshall
and Brennan.
There(c)I'e, political community
membership is not relevant, but the individual's
ability to fulfill the job requirements is.
Stevens
further
dissents
by
arguing
the
inconsistency of Poley v. COllfwlie and III re Grillitlis:
The disqualifying characteristic I in J.'oley I is
apparently a foreign allegiance which raises a
doubt concerning trustworthiness and loyalty so
pervasive that a flat ban agailH;t the
employment of any alien in any law
enforcement posit ion is thought to be justified.
But if the integrity of all aliens is sllspecl,
why may not a State deny aliens the right
tAl pmclice law"! (4:lfl U.S. 2!) I at. :WH).
Stevens feels that the allegiance of aliens should be
as Iitlle, ()J' as much, of an issue for police officers
as fcu' lawyers.
But allegiance is not what distinguishes lawycrs
from
police
offiwrs.
The occupations
arc
fundament.ally ditrcrent. The polin' of"liccr acts as
a I'cpres~ntative of the government granted specific
powers by the eomlllunity and receives his paycheck
di.·eclly from its t.axes, t.hereby just.ifying a
citizenship. requirement.
.Jobs that involve public
represent.ation such as districl attorneys, state
prosecutors, and judges t~ollid ah;o attach a
citizenship requirement, not only becallse the roles
demand the broad public policy formation and
implementation of SIIMlirmllll, but also because they
specifically reprcsent tlw political cOIllIlHmity.
In contemporary view, a Iawyt·r is significantly
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dilfercnt since his prillHlI-y n·sponsibility is to thc
client., not the community of law.
lie does not
represent the political community.
lie derives his
power from employment by the individual; he ean
be hired or fircd acconling to t.he will of t.he
individual; he ren·ives his paydle(-k' from the
individual. lIis activities test and evaluatc t.he rules
set down by t.he political community but he derives
little power from that l~olllmunit.y. Lawyers do not
rcpresent the public and Uwrelilre should not be
SUbjl'ct to a l'itizenship rcquin·menl.
By thesc
contemporary standards which stress individual rights
rathc," than communit.y responsibility, Inn' (;rilliths
and Foley u. Conndic arc nol inconsistent..
Ambach IJ. Norwick (441 U.S. ()H ,IB7BI) serves
as another example of tlw communit.y limit.ing the
participal ion of aliens in I Ill' polit.ical process.
According to .Justin~ Powell's opinion of t.he court,
public school t.eachers perfill-m a role that goes 10
the heart of represental ive government and in
accordancc with SUf{urmfln may bc subject to a
citizenship rcquiremenl.
In Ambach the intent to
bennne a cit.izen is sullieient. qllalilicalion 'ill- t.hose
who are prevented from becoming citizens due IA' a
lengt.h or residence requirement.
In furthering
Sugarmnn,
Ambadl
holds
that
a
citizenship
qualification for public sdlllol teachers does not
violate the I~qual Protection Clause since "some state
functions are so bound up wit.h the operation or the
Slat.e as a government.al entit.y as to permit the
exclusion from those functions of all persons who
have not become part of lhe process of selfgovernment" (441 U.S. fiH at 74).
Relying on
/t'oley, Ambw:h dcems public education "a most
fundamcntal
obligation
of govenllnent to
its
constitucncy," as fundamental even as the police
function.
Similarly, the inlluenw of a teal"lwr is
"crucial to the continued good Iwalth of a
democracy" (.14 1 U.S. liH al 7!1).
Amlmt"ir
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re(:ognizes the teadll'r's pow .... f'ul though not political
role in transmitting the values and traditions of' the
communit.y and deems the cOlllmllllity int.erest
sufficient to its exclusion of' IlIIn-members f'rom t.hat
role.
The dissenting opinion o f"fi! red
by .J IIstiee
Blackmun and joinl,d by .'ustiees Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens, once again argiles t.he inconsistency of
111 rc Griffiths and A mb(l(~".
Why should a state
allow resident aliens to take a har exam and 'lu<llif'y
In practice law if teachers arc barred frulll
employment in the public schools'!
Lawyers arc
signifi ..:ant role model!; t.oo(441 U.S. fiH at HH). As
in the cont.roversy between I""ley and 111 rc Grill/tlls,
the I'eal issue is public versus private roles. The
public school teacher acts in a public role, recdving
his paycheck from the community, while the
attorney docs nolo
1~!Jually import.ant, Ambach
places a citizenship refJlIirement only on puhlic school
teachel·s.
Private institutions lTlay hire whomever
they wish, n~gardless of' citizcnship stat.us.
Although sensitive to natural rights arguments
about the discriminat.ion that may result f'rom
catego.-izing individuals, like -""MarmUII, Cubdl ".
Chtwcz-Sulido (454 U.S. 4:12 II !tH21) recognizes lhe
community's interest. in defining itself':
The
exclusion
of'
aliens
from
basic
governmental processes is not a deficiency in
the demo('l"atic system but a necessary
consequence of' the community's process of
polit.ical self'-definition.
Aliens arc by
definition those outside of" t.his cOlllnlllllily (.\ 54
U.S. 4:12 at. 4:m, Hn).
Thruugh its n,liam'(' on -",,/:ur"'(III, Fol!'y, and
Am/mdl, (;""1'11 suhjt'cts probat.ion and deput.y
pl'Obat.ion onkers t.o a cilizcllship rl'll Uirellll'lIt.
the
basic
bound
up
in
because
the y
an'
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governmental pl'Ocess; t.heir participat.ory role belongs
t.o t.he citizcn.
I'l'Ohat.ion and deputy' probation
officcrs perflll'm a fundion essent.ial t~) tilt! political
community.
Cubell pmvides an interesting insight inu) when
aliens may be excluded and when they may not.
The distinction hetween aliens and citizcns is suspect
when applied t.o distribution of economic benefits. but
"it is a relevant ground fill' det.ermining membership
in the polit.ical community" (454 U.S. 4:12 at 4:12).
The different roles of subject and citizcn underlie
this distinction.
On the other hand. many significant occupations
do not fall within the st.andal·d sci by Sugarmall and
extended by Ambw:h. Poley. and Cabell.
The
community cannot prescribe rules against alien
pal·ticipation in occupations that are not bound up
in the very essence of democratic governmcnt The
position of lawyer previously discussed is an
cxample. Nor can the government exclude the alien
fmm dist.rihution of many economic henclits. In the
private, non-political realm t.he alien is as free as
t.he citizen. This inclusion of t.he alien in t.he nonpolitical I'Oles of life seems fairly consist.ent. wit.h a
conventional
appmach
t.o memhership.
The
community did not. want to exclude the alien from
all participation or he would not have been allowed
within the boundaries of the nation in t.he first
place.
lIis legal presence is the community's
consent to some sort of participat.ion on his part.
The community only excludes t.lw alien f\"()m t.hose
roles where membership is important in a political
sense.
Start.ing in In 15 with '/'f"IlUX II. Uuic" (2:H) U.S.
:l:n, the Comt decided that.
It requires no argument t.o show t.hat. the right
U) work for a living in t.he nITnmllfl

(wl"lI/JUtiIlIlS

of t.he colllnlllllity is of t.he very essence of the
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personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
pUl'pose of the I Fourteenl h I Amendment to ~ecurc.
. . . If this could be refused ~olely upon the
gmund of race or nal ionality ,the prohihition of the
denial to any person of the equal protection of
the laws would be a barren form of words (2:W
U.S. :1:1 at 41).
The reference back I~) Yi/,k \VO v. lIophlls along
with the defense of alien participation in common
occupations, indicales that the alien is primarily
excluded from the community's political self-definition
but not fnllll activities Ihat are part of everyday
life.
The issue of discrimination is important
because it impinges "upon the conduct of ordinary
pl'ivalc enterprise" (:~:H. U.S. :1:1 at 40).
In the
political realm, community desire weighs heavily; in
the non-political realm the individual's rights, citizen
or not, are virtually invincible.
Like 'I'rllClX, Takahashi /J. f.'ish Will Gllme
Commission (:1:14 U.S. 410 I H)481) affirms the right
of aliens to pa,·ticipate in the common occupations
of the community.
Initially, Torao Takahashi was
excluded fnun fishing off the coasts of California
because he was an alien.
The Supreme Court
decided that the ability of a state to "apply its laws
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a dass is
confined within narrow limits" especially in terms of
occupations (:l34 U.S ... 10 at 420). If a compelling
state interest (an important and justifiable stale need
such as self-definition of the political community)
could be demonstrated, Ihen exclusion of alil'ns might
be justified.
Otherwise, exclusion of individuals
lawfully admiUed I~) I he political l'olJllllunity is not
justified.

EXPATRIATION
Natural .. ight~ alld contract Uwory not only
the wayan individual bpl'ollH's a nll'lJlb,'r
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of a societ.y, hut. also whetlwr or not. Lhat. relat.ioll
can he terminaled.
If a ('ommunily grant.s
citizenship based uJlon its own slwl'ific criteria, can
it also t.ake it away,! Theoretically, t.he answpr is
yes, eSlJecially if the cont.ractual approach is
emphasized. What one grants, one can- withd,-aw.
Nonetheless, court cases indicat.e t hat in practice
once one receives membership, it is the individual
rathe,- than the community that. retains the right to
sever the relationship. I n an strong application of
natural righl.s t1wO/-y, the Cow-I. finds that even acts
Ihe community has specifically designated as
expatriating cannot deprive an individual of his
citizenship. The Court's strong position emphasizes
natural rights far more than does the community.
A/i-oyim v. !lush (:lR7 U.S. 2r.a IIH()7J) sets the
current precedent for expatriation issues.
In this
instance, an individual of Polish descent naturuliwd
as a citizen of the United States voted in a political
election in Israel. Section 4() I (l') of the Nat.ionality
Act of I H4() defines vot.ing in a foreign political
election as an expatriating acl. Afmyim's passport
n~newal request was denied by till' U.S. Department
of St.atl' based on his violation of this st.at.ut.e. The
Supreme Court however supported Afroyim's claim
t.hat he was still a United St.at.es eitiwn because he
had not expressly renoUlwed that (~il.izenship:
We hold lhat. the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed t.o, and does pmit'd every citizen of
Ihis Nation against a congn~ssional fillTible
deslrul'l ion of his citizenship, what.ever his
crl'ed, color, or race.
Our holding does no
more than 10 give to this citizen t.hat which
is his own, a constitutional right to remain a
citizen in a free counl.t-y unless he voluntarily
,"elinquishcs thaI l'ilizcnship (:IR7 U.S. 2r.:1,
at 2(jR).
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The Court. essentially provides the comITlImit.y no
power to scvcr the relationship or citizcnship; the
individual's dccision is pm'amount.
Just prior t.o this ,'ccognition of the allsolutc right
or t.he citi",en to retain his membcrship no matt.er
what his actions, the COUlt emphasizes t.he
communal nat.ure or dtizenship in the United St.at.es.
I mnically, this st.aLcment. stands in stark cont.rast
with Uw powerlessness of Uw community to
del.ermine that membership:
Citizenship in t.his Nation is a parI of' a
coopel'Utivc afTair. Its citizcnry is the country
and the country is its citizenry.
The very
nature of Oll/' f','cc governmcnt. makes it
completciy incongnlOus to have a rulc of Ia w
under which a group of citizens temporarily
in ofTiee ('an deprive anlltlH'/' gl'llup of ('itiwns
or their citizenship (:lH7 U,S, 25:l at 2liH),
If citizenship is a coopc/'ativl' ,llfair, the individual
has a
responsibility lowanls t.he comITlIlI1ity.
Communit.y and country imply cooperat ion in \.\-ays
that Afroyim IJ. Ull.~k and its later applicat.ions have
denied.
Furt.hermore, what. t.his majorit.y opinion docs not.
recognize evcn in its valuing 01' coopcration, is
constructive unanimity and rule of law. The COllrt
docs not. use till' t.erm rule 01' law as a nwtalcgal
principle, hut more as the rule of a particular law.
The dist.inction is of great importanee. If a nat.ion
is abiding by !'ule of law as previously deli Ill'd , it
will not. set lip discriminatory standards against
those who a/'(~ already ITwmlwrs of' the comlllllllit.y.
The nat.ion may, howcver, choose (,0 ,,"oted itself
against those adions that would be parlieulal'ly
disrupt.ive t.o the unil., against those illdivilhlals who
violat.c.~ t.11t' (,(lIlvCllliollS alld do /10" fullill
tlwi ..
I'l~sponsibili"y t.o mailltain thl' system from which
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they benefit. By arguing that one group of citiwns
might. deprive another of citi:t.l'm.;liip based on "creed,
color, or race" t.he Court assumes lhat the
communit.y follows majorit.y rule rather t.han
consl.l'uctive ullanimity, Minorities of whaleve/' kind
could he discriminated against II/Jlll'r majority rule.
They would not. he discrimillatl'd against under a
syst.em of rule of law alld construcl.ive unanimity.
If citiwnship is a cooperative affair as the Court.
agrees, then the individual must have some
rm;ponsihility to cooperat.e.
Abiding by lhe
convenlions of the cOlllll1unily is a logical demonsl.mUon of cooperation.
By arguing thal the
individual's "voluntary renunciation" of cilizenship is
required before he can be expalriated, the courl
denies any responsibility of the individual towards
the community. Two eases decided prior to Armyim
but following essenlially lhe same logic support. lhe
idea thai the individual's violation of convent.ions, or
wit.hholding of consenl, docs nol granl the communit.y power to expalriate him.
In l'mp II. /Julies (:15(i U.S. Ht) 1l!)!,)7!), a nativebOl'll American was considercd 10 have expatriated
himself by wart.ime desertion ill violalion of secl.ion
401 (g) of the Nationalit,y Ad of 1!)40.
Chief
.J ustke Warren presents his opinion and is joined /"y
.J uslices Black, Douglas, and Whillaker. lie argues
lhat "lhe dUlies of citi:t.enship arc numerous, and the
discharge of many of lhese ohligations is essential
tAl lhe security and well-being of lhe Nat.ion" (:l5ti
U.S. Hti at 92), and lhal the ciliwn who docs nol
fulfill lhese basic responsibilities, be ,thcy lax
obligalions or lIll' obligat,ion to bc honesl, may
scriously damagc lhe niltion. Warrcn thcn asks a
rlll'torical qucstion and bascs his furthcr aq~umcnl
on t.he assumpt.ion thai lhc answer is no: ''('ould a
citizen be deprived of his nationality lill' evading
I.hl'HC baHic rcspOlIHilJilil.ics of cil.iwnship?" WalTcn's
heHt HlIIlIlIl<lriws his position in "citizl'nship is not
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a liceIH;e that expires UPOJI mishelwvior.
citiwnship is not lost every time a duty of
citizenship is shirked" (:151, U.S. H(j at !l~).
While granting that citizenshiIJ is not revoked fill·
violation of some duties of citizenship, a felony
cunvictiun for tax evasion or fl·aud, severely
circumscribes the individual's ability to participate
in the political process. lie docs not lose civil rights
but loses all rights of citizenship. Like an alien he
cannot participate in lhe political process, lhough he
retains lhe title of citizen. CitizeJlship itself is not
lost every time a duty of citizenship is shirked, but
the political role is limited to the degree that one
has violated the conventions of the community. If
a citizen docs not violate any cOJlventions or laws,
then his participation remains intact.
Since Warren also n.~cognizcs t hat failure to
perform the basic duties of citizenship may cause a
"dangerous blow" or "serious injury" to the
community, one wonders how the community could
defend itself against such violence.
Warren docs
grant that "in appropl"iatc circumstances, the
punishing power is available to deal with derelictions
of duty," but one could hardly imagine a dereliction
of duty more serious than the desertion in wartime
at issue in 'I'mI'. If the community has no right t~)
demand the execution of basic duties from its
citizens, such as military service, then lhe nation
hardly has a tfut.y til provide benefit.s to those
citi ....ens, such as defense against. an enemy. If no
one will serve t.here (:an be lUI defense.
In theil: dissenting opinion, .J ustices Frankfurter,
Burton, Clark and l1.lI·lan support the contract ual
concept. of citizenship
by
demollstrat.ing
t.he
desirahilit.y of allowing a nation to protcel itself
against injury from within as well as from without:
"One of the principal purposes in establishing the
Constitution was to ' provide for the common
defense'" (:J5(j U.S. H(i at 12(). Moreover,
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possession hy an American eiti:l.en of t.he rights
and
privileges t.hat. cOlIst.itute dtiwnship
imposes co ....elative obligat.ions, or whkh t.he
most. indispensahle may wcll be . t.o t.ake his
place in t.he ranks or t.he army of his count.ry
and .-isk the chance of being shot down' in it.s
defense' Jueobsl'TI II. MnsslII-/",sdts, I B7 lJ .S.
11, 2~)" (:ISn U.S. Hli, 121).
Their argument. is essentially a recognition (If t.he
duties of the individual that accompany the benefits
pl'Ovided by the community of t.he Constit.ut ion.
In a similar case, KCTlfII:dy /J. MCTldozo-MurtiTla,
milit.ary service was OIWC again at issue. Ifere an
individual evaded lhe draft. by living out.side of t.he
Ill' t.hen relurned t.o t.he Unit.ed
Unit.ed St.at.es.
Stat.es and was conviet.ed of draft. evasion pursuant
to Section I I of t.he Selective Training and Service
Act of I H40 and his dti7.l'nship was questioned.
The Court. held t.hat. "t.he Constit.ut.ion is silent. about
the pel'missibilit.y of involuntary forfeiture of
citizenship rights" and more impmtant.ly that "while
it [the Constit.ut.ion I confirms citizenship rights,
plainly there are imperative oLligations of citizenship,
pel'f{it'mance of which Congress in the exercise of its
powel's may const.itutionally exael" (:172 U.S. 144
at 15H).
.Just as in 7'mp v. /Julies, these
statement.s seem t.o recognize lhe power of the
community to exact duties from the citiwns it
proteels. Nonetheless, the Court aflil'med lhe lower
court ruling that Mendoza-Martinez did not lose his
citizenship, t.Ill1S in pradice ensuring that the
communit.y could not. exad ohligations from its
memLers.
In VUTlCl: I). 7'amzus (441 U.S. 252 11!J7!l)),
Sedion
:l4B
(a)(2) of the
Immigrat.ion
and
Nationality Ad is called inl.o quest.ioll. This st'dioll
states specifically that an American citizen who
takes an oath or allegiance 10 a li,reign Htale will
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LaurencG.1. Terrazas, who
claimed a dual nat.ionality because of Mexican
parentage and U.S. birth place, took an oath of
allegiance whereby he swore n' adherence, obedience,
and submission t.o the laws and aut.horities of the
Mexican Republic' and 'expressly renouncledl Unit.ed
St.at.es citizenship, as well as any suhmission,
obedience, and loyalty to any foreign govenllnent,
especially to that of the UniteJ States of America'"
(444 U.S. 252 at 25f1). While such an explicit oath
of allegiance would seem sufficient juslirication for
,'evocation of citizenship based on t.he voluntary
"enunciation J"Cquirement of Af;'oyim, the Supreme
Court decided that Termzas really had not illtendl!d
to renounce his American citizcnship even while
voluntarily pe"fonning what Congress had defined as
an expatriating act. The burden of proof falls upon
Congress; there was not a preponderance of evidence
to show that TClTllZaS intended to relinquish his
citizenship (444 U.S. 252 at 270). The community
has very liUle reenUl"se if even sueh an explicit
statement does not delllonstmt.e int.ent.
A final case decided by the New York Fl·deral
Dish'iet Court on the precedent of Ali"Oyim II. !lllsk
presents a unique example of the individual having
it all his own way.
Ku/ulIIl! ". Sc-Il/lliz ((i5:J F.
Supp. 14RH IIHR71), Rabbi Meir Kahanc alTl'ptcd a
seat in the Israeli Knesset in violation of several
immigration anti nat.uralizat.ion codes whieh define
serving in a '<,reign governlllent. as an expatriat.ing
act..
Kahane argut's t.hat. while he knowingly
cmnmiU.ed an expatri,lting act., he IIl'Vl'r ;11/1'"<1",, to
relinquish· his (~itizl'nship.
He alld his lawYl'rs
I"l'pl'at.mlly wrot.e IpliNs t.o t.he U.S. Ilepartllll'nt. of
Stat.e affirming his inlent 10 J'('lIlain a lJ .S. fit izen.
In upholding Kahane'!,; U.S. riti/.enship, l'Vl'n as lit'
::iut in the Knessl't alld had aspirations to till'
position of Prinl(' Minist('r 01" Israel (1<'. SlIpp. '·1Xti
a I J.1 XU), til(' Dist rid Court ("it ('d til(' pn'redenl of
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AJi'oyim and quoted Terrazl/s: "In the last analysis,
expatriation depends on the will of the citizen rathel'
than on the will of Congress and its assessment of
his conducl" (444 U.S. 21)2 at 2(i()).
Mayan individllal then do what he pleases with
total disregard f()r the will of the community as
defined by Congress, desert. in time of war, pledge
allegiance to a f()reign government while renouncing
U.S. citizenship, serve a foreign power, vule in
foreign political elect ions"! The Court seems to say
yes. Such a decision leaves itself open for abuse
and goes fal' beyond lhe individual I'ighls conception
held by Congress, although according to construclive
unanimity and rule of law it is Congrt.~ss, not the
Court, who should decide these issues.
I n a perfect society cel·tainly no ont.' would lie
about his intentions; certainly no one would have
bad intentions in the first place.
Nonet.heless,
society is not perfect. An individual could intend to
remain a citiwn of the Unit.ed St.at.es, or declare
that his int.ent had been t.o remain a citizen when
it .-cally was not, merely fill' the bendits received
rat her than out of a sense of community OJ'
allegiance.
Kahane serves as a prime example; he freely
admits that. his int.enl. I~) r!!lain U.S. cilizem;hip
centers around his desire 1.0 lecture in t.he Unit.ed
Stat.es, a frcedolll that would be circull1serihed with
ISI'aeli citizenship and his cxtreme political views
((i5~ F. Supp. 14Hti at l4~1()-I).
Whilc recognizing
this as a "less than l:()Jlllllcntiable motive" the
Districl Court argiles t.hat "A/i'oyim and 'I'.".,.IIZUS
teach that an int.~nt to rdain cit.i:t.enship f(II'
hypocrit.ical or cynical reasons is no less valid-legally--than an int~nt prcdi('at~d on the noblest of
alll'llist.ic motives" (HI):I F. Supp. 14Hti at l4H4).
Ilypocrisy is a lethal tool against. the moral
characler of a nation, no maU(~r how legally valid
it may be. The cOIJIIlIllnity is fi)JTI~d to IInderwrite
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and protecl Kahane's individualism but can place
few if any demands on him.
AIUwugh the Dist.riel Court in Kahallt' abo tries
to preempt analogies of citiwJIl:;hiJ) intent with
criminal intent, its arguments arc less than
satisfaetory. The court asserts that criminals may
lie about. their intent in OJ·der to avoid punishment
but t.hat. "an aelm' who states that he wishes tH
remain a citizen is making a st.at.ement about his
own status" and it is therefore impossible for him to
The statement "I want 1.0 remain a citizen"
lie.
cannot be a lie (emphasis in original, (iG:1 F. Supp.
14Hti at. 14!1~, fn. 7),
Of COUI'!:;e the desire to remain a citizen may he
true, and from t.hat standpoint the statement not a
lie, but if the Court views the intent of the
individual as paramount, should not t.he intent
behind stich a statement also be examined'! .J ust as
the criminal may disguise his intent, so may the
citizen. Saying "I am not a murderer" with gun in
hand, and "I am a citizen" with expatriating act
committed arc not that. different; in neither case can
we know real intentions except. as they are
communicated to us by t.he individual. Nevert.heless,
in the fOJ·mel' we allow the community t.he final
decision (manslaughter or murder). In the laUer the
final decision remains with the individual although
his conducl may be as potentially damaging to
community integrity as the presence of a murdel'er
is to the community's physical well·hl'ing.
The Distl'icl Court seems to think that either we
can know the intentions of criminals hy the acts
they commit or that intent is at times irrelevant
t~) the fact that a aime has beclI cmllmiu.ed.
On
the other hand, a citizt~n's aelions do IIOt. always
reveal intent and int.ent is absolutdy necessary t.o
expatriation.
Without. intent, not.hing has really
happened.
NOllcthelm;s, this grant.ing of ahsolutt' right. of
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expatrialion 10 the individual has not always been
recognized.
Prior to A/iny;"" Ihe COlnllHlIlity's
demands hOllnd I Ill' individual 10 a milch 'greal~'r
degree.
Indecd, dissenting opinion in the 5-4
A/i'oyim case tites the majority opinion in Pacz (I.
Hrollllldl (:Hifi U.S. 41 II H57 n, which was overruled
by A/i"oyim. Pl'n~z recognized the greater ability of
the community to define itself and protl'l~t itself by
reqlllrlng altegianee to the laws ii, established
through the legislative process.
Perez II. Ilrowndl presents the case of an
individual who voted in a political election in Mexico
and also remained outside of the United States t.o
avoid the draft..
Retention of U.S. citizenship was
denied due to his violation of section 401 (e) and (j)
of the Nationality Act of 1B40 (amended).
The
Court decided that withdrawal of eitiwnship was not
an arbitrary act but one justified by the "rational
nexus" which
mtlst exist between the content of a specific
power in Congress and the action of Congress
in carrying that power into exe("ution. More
simply stated, the mcans--in this case,
withdrawal of citizenship--must be reasonably
related to the end--here, regulation of foreign
aflairs" (3()(j U.S. 44 at 58).
In Pen~z, the Court recognizes the community's need
to regulale ilself and its memhers sels a reasonable
standard by which the needs of the individual can
be balanced with the needs of the community.
II'
Congress has a specific power or responsibility, it
must also have a means 1.0 carry that power out..
In this case, the community's net'd to carry out
fi,reign affairs ("oherclltly justilil~s till' action takcn
against individuals whose actions threaten the
community.
The Court's opinion stands in stl'Ong
contrast to '/''-01' (I. /)ulll's, K('",wlly I). Melldoza-
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Murtillez, Kahane v. Schultz, alld A/;'(/yim

IJ. /lusk
where the cooJlerative nat.ure of t.he cOlTllllunity is
I'ecognized, but any
means of carrying out
communit.y responsihilit.ies is valid only if it. does not.
impinge in any degree on lhe individual's will.
By setting a reasonable standard, the Court. in
"erez neithel' advocates lhe extreme individualism
inherent in A/;'(lyim nOl' presses an extreme view
of community. Rather, the need t.o balance the two
serves as a basic and pnlgmalic crit.eria. Vot.ing in
a foreign election seems less potentially damaging
than the desert.ion issue in Tmp and yet Trnp
I'etained his citizenship and
Perez lost hili.
Ironically, Tmp 11. null,',<; and i»erl!Z II. Hroumdl were
bot.h decided on the same day, demonstrating the
inconsistent and at. times confusing applicat.ion of
cont.ractual and natural right.s theories t.o (·itizenship.
Significantly, ",~rez cites the precedl'nt. set by
Mw:kcIlZi,! II. /lun' (2:1!) U.S. 2!l!l) where individual
int.ent was deemed t.ot.ally irrelevant to communit.y
needs. In this case a nalive-born American woman
married an alien and t.hen t.ried lo register to vote.
By reason of her marriage t.o an alien sill' ('eased
to be a Unit.ed Stat.es citizen.
The need of t.he
govenllnent t.() avoid internat.ional ent.anglement.s allll
embarrassments superceded her inlerest in remaining
a citi7.en.
I n contrast t.o i»l'n!z where WalTen
.'ecognizes t.he people as the souree of sovereignty,
the court. in this caSl' views t.he government. itself
as sovereign.
Rat.her than sympat.hizing with the
communit.y's need to defend itself and then
withdnlwing all t.ools of defense, this Court
sympath.i:ws wit.h the individual bUl upholds the
communit.y:

We nmcur wit h COlIllSei t.hat citizenship is of
tangible wort.h, and we sympathize wit h
plaint.ifr in Ill'r desire t.o retain it and in her
earnest. asseltion of it. But t.here is involved
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more t.han personal considerations.
As we
have seen, t.he legislatioll was urged by
condit.ions of national mOllwnl.. . . . It is t.he
coneept.ion of the legislat.ioll limier review that
such an ad may hring till' (iovenunen"t. into
emba .... assmcnt.s
and,
it.
may
be,
int.o
cont.roversies. . . (2:W LJ. S. at :J 11-2).
In this case t.he rights of tilt! individual are
suhservient t.o the great.er needs of lIw (~(IInmunity.
1n cont.rast to more recent ca~:iCS even he.· desire
and int.ent. UI relain cit.izenship are irrelevant U)
those greater needs .
•Just as he presellted a strong case for the
individual in the 'J'rop decision, so Chief .Justice
WalTen argues strongly 't)r natural rights in his
dissenting opinion in Pcn~z.
Since the sovereignty
of the United States government stems from the
people, the "citizens themselves are sovereign, and
their citizenship is not subject. U) the general powers
of their government" (:J5() U.S. 44 at 65).
lie
likewise argues that "citizenship is man's basic right
for it is nothing less than the right. U) have rights.
In this country the expatriate would
presumably enjoy, at most, only the limited rights
and pJ"ivileges of aliens . . . II ( :J56 U.s. 44 at 64).
Although retention of citizenship may be a basic
right granted U) the dtizen hy the communit.y,
ciliwnship is hardly mankind's basic right; not even
WalTen extemls citizcnship privileges U) aliens.
MOI·eover, citizenship is really not the right to have
rights since the equal prot.edion and due process
cJamlCs apply quit.e hroadly to all persons O';£:k WO
IJ.
Jlopkins); rather, citizenship is the right t.o
part.icipat~~ and influellce the political adivity of t.he
Such a distinction between the right
cOlTllllunity.
t~1 have rights in genl'ral alld t.he right t.o participate
politically shows the ndevalll'e of citizenship and
subjed rolt~s ill the cOlllnHlllily.
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/,Ilriu II. Ullited Stoies (2:11 U.S. H II!tI:ID,
decided long before I'crl'z, demonstrates clearly that
membership in a community implies reciprocal
responsibility on t.he part of the individual and the
community (2;' I U.S. H at 22). Significantly, the
Supreme Court expressly recognizes that the
granting of citizenship be beneficial for both the
individual and the community: "In other words, it
was contemplaLcd that his admission should be
mutually beneficial to the Government and himself
•
•
•
tI
(231 U.S. n at 2:1).
Conventions and
coordination solutions come about precisely because
they are mutually beneficial to those involved. One
would not enter into an agreement if there were no
benefits.
Mutual benefit is a valid standard by
which we include or exclude individuals from
participation in a political community. Despite the
strong I'ecognition of community in both Perez and
I.Il r;u , the relative paucity of expatriat ion cases t.hat
expressly
support
the contractual
theory
of
citizenship wfleds the Court's stronger tendency
towards nat.ural right.s t.heory.

CONCLUSION
The inconsist.ent allli wntradictory applic<lt.ion of
natural rights and cont.ract theory in the Court's
development of citizenship reflects its dirficult nature.
Nonetheless, t.he essl~ntially conventional aspects of
communit.y in general ilnd cit.izenship in part.icular
ensure an ongoing balance het ween the t.wo
approadlCs, despite the Court.'s rewnt. emphasis on
natural rights.
Citizenship, as a coordinat.ion
solut.ion, delines the roles appmpriate t.o insiders and
out.sidl~rs, in acconiallce wit.h the values of the
community.
III
a
communit.y
that values rights,
t.he
convent.ions of nWllIhcrship will rdlcd t.hat. vahw, as
\' id~ \Yo II. lIopkil/s d"lIlOlIst.ral.cs.
Even with an
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emphasis Oil rights, it is the l'ollllllunity, Ilot t.he
individual, that determines the extent and nature 0('
those right.s,
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COMRADES IN ARMS:
CHINA AND VIl~TNAM, 1949-1979
Krist.yn Allrcd
On Oclobl'r t, t ~H ~I Mao Zcdong and his
Communisl IIIITCS dcfealed Chiang Kaislwk and his
Nalionalist Anny to become tile ruling party in
China.
Many a Chincse peasant chanted the
popular song "The I'~asl is Red," which desCI'iLed the
success of Communism in the castcrn world. For
years Amedcans viewed China and its Communist
neighhors as a st.rongly unilied Clllnmunisl lJloc.
HowevCl", a deeper analysis of the relat.ionship
between China and other" Southeast Asian CIIunlries
iIIustrat.es thaI. ideological loyalty is not lhe only
ingredienl in a statc's '(,reign policy.
In facl, a study of the relalionship bet wccn China
and Vietnam during the years HH!I 10 t !l7~1 rcveals
a greal deal of hostility bclween the two cIHlIltl"ies.
One of lhe major reasons for this hostility may be
attl"ibuwd to in\.c."vcntion from Ihe two m<\jor
superpowers, the Uniled Slatl's and thc Soviet
Union. This paper will investigale I he n'ason why
Vietnam has lJeen China's most fonnidahle Il,e in
Southeast Asia sinn' I n1~l. I helievl' Ihal mUl'h of
I,he enmity helween the two counlries is due to
China ':; shift from the Soviet lJ nion 10 the U nitl'd
Sta\.es in lhel'arly I H70s, and \.0 Ihe alliance
formed belwel'n Vietnam and the Soviet llnion aller
tilt' Vietnam War"
M any of till' sl'holars who sl wly Sino- Vid n:lllll'se
relations havl~ cOllllTH'nll'd on Ihl' limitations Ihal.
exist in a""roal'hing this suhj\'\"1. It is mon' diflil"ult
\.0 gel ,.diabll' informal ion fmm COlllmunist China
than il is from a \' <1I·il'l.y of SOUIl'l'S in I he frec
world. 'I'hcn'fon', r:lll1('r than 10 n'lying Iwavily on
official govcl"nllll'nl sl alL'llll'nls (which may 01" may
not be true) or edilorial opinions in till' "People's
Daily," n~seal"dll'l"s havl' tl'm"l'd Chinesl' foreign
policy by ohserving how China has l'\'al'll'd 11\
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specific situations. The Ill'st way to analyze Chine~iC
foreign policy towards Vietnam is by examining
what each etluntry has done with respect to their
posture towanJs the superpowers.

lNTEHNAL CONF1JCTS
Bel"ore the argument is made concerning the
influence 01" the Unilcd Stat.es and t.he USSR 011
Chinese foreign policy, it. should he noted that, there
were several ot.her I"adm's which ('<lused t.ension in
Sino- Vietnamese I'elat.ions after 1!14!t.
Overseas
Chinesl' in Vietnam were a major SOlllTe 0(: cunnict
and tension.
The majorit.y 01" overseas Chinese
want(,d a relat.ionship with China that was pmfitaLle
and fri(~ndly Witzgcrald 1\177, :1:1\1). lIowever, these
((Ireign resident.s proved t.o be a nuisance 10 Loth
China and Vietnam as their capit.alist pradices upset
attempts at. a eent.rally eont roll('d governmcnt in
Vietnam.
Vietnam was said to hc overly harsh
wit.h its northern Vlslt.ors, thlls sparking heat.ed
dehatcs bl't.wccn t hc t.wo natiolls (itoss 1HHH, 240).
Another prohlem «II' Chilla alld Vietnam was
est.ablishing a common border.
While several
confrontat.ions werc reconJcd, t he most promincnt
disput.e OCCUlTed in 1!)7U when China actually
invaded Victnam (liarding IHH4, 12\).
Pcrhaps thc great.cst t.ension between China and
Vietnam result.ed from their power st.ruggle in
Southeast. Asia.
Both countries competed to gain
the upper hand in Indochina (Lawson I !)H4, 4).
Aft.el' the Vietnam war, bot.h China and Vietnam
I ,am;
sought
dominat.ion
in
and
Cambodia
( Kampuchea).

SLJPERPOWI~R INFLLJII~NCE
While

all

of

t.hese

problclJls

t:l'calcd

t.ension
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between China and Vietnam, they were only
symphlms of a much great.er problem. I will argue
that outside influenco fmm t.he United Stat.es ami
the Soviet Union was the real problem bet.ween
China and Vict.nalll (I ,a wson I !1~H, (».
These
smaller issues were all arlirmation of t.he deep
seat.ed hostility that was already present due to
relations with the superpowers. Nations somelimes
ael as children when t hey are not geUing along;
they will use anything as an excuse t~l light.
Lean to One SiJe Policy
When the Communists tAlok over China in I H4B,
China turneJ to its most likely ally, the Soviet.
Union.
During Ihe early I !l50s China followed
Mao's "lean I~l one side" policy (Y ao HIHO, I). This
theory JireeleJ China's domestic and foreign
policies. Using Soviet lodlllology and funding, China
followed the Soviet model of industriali:wt.ion in its
first 5-year economic plan (liarding I UH:l, :n. In
foreign
relations with Southeast Asia, China
promoted
Communist
upnslllgs
and
anti-U.S.
campaigns (Martin I B77, H).
Chinese relations with Vietnam during this period
we.·e quit.e positive.
Both count.ries were aligned
against the Unit.ed Stat.es, who was then lighting in
Korea. China provided military and monetary aid
10 Vietnam in its light against the French (Ross
I !lHH, 18-1 H). They also shared the desire for Communist revolution in Vietnam (Lawson 1HH4, 20).
Perhap.s the most. important faelor which led to
favOl·able relations bet ween Lhe two countries was
the fact that China was so busy organizing a new
govt\nunent and managing the rl'COVt'ry of a
w.u·-hlrn nation that it had little time for Vit'lnam.
As long as n~gional powt'rs were gelling along,
V ietnam was in a good positioll to ask for aitl and
assistance from bot h China and the Soviet. Union.
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The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, anti
Mut.ual Assistance of I !HiO was <'it'arty in Vietnam's
Lest interest (II anJing I !)H·l, I HO-H,1).
The Spirit of Nt'ut ralit.y
These rosy relat.ions soon wilted in Imi4 with the
Geneva Conference.
Both China and the Soviet
Union supported the division of Vietnam, which
upset Ho Chi Minh and his Communist. rorces who
wanted a unified Communist nation (Wang 1B77,
75). In t.he wake of t.he Ul'neva talks, a conference
of Third World countries from Africa and Asia was
held in Bandung, Indonesia.
It was here, in the
face or anti-Chinese sentiments, that. Zhou "~nlai
presented China's policy of neut.rality and unity
among the lesser-developed nat ions (Chen t !nB,
15). North Vietnam was the only other Communist
count.ry present, but. seemed unimpress'ed wit.h
China's proposal for neutrality. 110 Chi Minh might
have relt that China was trying to be t.oo
independent of the Soviet Union (especially in its
foreign policy), which did not bode well for Viet.nam.
Ureat Leap

I·'orwanf

Relations began t~) deteriorat.e between China and
the Soviet. Union in 1~)57 wlwn Mao launclwd t.Iw
"Great. Leap Forward." Toward t.he end or t.he first
5-year plan, Mao Zedong was frustrat.ed by t.he
effeds of the Soviet Model on China. The very
t.hings he detest.ed were happening: unemployment.,
a lal'ge bureaucrm~y, a gl"l'alel' division between rural
and urban workers, and an elitist. educat.ion system
(Harding I ~)H4, fiO). The Un-at Leap was the first
wedge driven Letween China and the Soviet Unioll
because it emphasized Mao's rejection of Soviet
advice. The most. extrelTle Soviet reaction to t.hl'
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Ureat Leap took place in I !I5H, when Soviet
advisors pulled out of China (ilarding I !JH:l, :n.
Vielnam reuelet! negatively to China's Ureat Leap
Forward for two ,·easons.
First., Vietnam had
always looked to China as t.he model on many
domestic issues due to its size, culture, and
dominating political syst.em (Fit.zgerald I !I77, 50).
Vietnam had also ex perienced sOllie devastat.ing
economic problems during Lhe late I !H)()s, some of
which the Vietnamese blamed on China's bad example. The Great I,eap was a dh;aster for China
economically, which made Viet.nam leery of Chinese
policy and the direction it was taking (BloOllw(irLh
I !l75, I(H).
The second reaslln the <:reat Leap upset Vietnam
was because China had pullet! even furt.her away
from the Soviet Union. At t.he same t.ime Viet.nam
was criticizing China for the Ureat Leap Forward,
it was quite compliment.ary of Khruslwhev's policies
in the USSR.
As a n·sult., 110 Chi Minh tilted
tAlwards the Soviet 1I nion after the Sino-Soviet split
(Bloodworth I !I75, ""').
Lat.er we will sec how
Viet.nam cunningly shifled baek and f<IIth bet.ween
the Soviets and t.he Chinese during the war.
Viet.nam War
Probably the most. lTudal event which affeeled
China and Viet.nam in relation to t.he major
super'powers was t.he war in Vietnam.
In I H57
Communist f<II'ces frum North Vietnam began
aUacking South Vietnam. During t.he first year of
fight.ing China was
vcry sllpport.ive of the
Communist ,·evolut.ion in Vietnam. Mao had always
asserted the Marx ist. idea of l:IlIltinllous revolut.ion,
and wanted ComllHlnism t.o slIl:eeed in Sout.heast
Asia (Ii'itzgerald I !I 77 , Ii!).
lIowever, beeallse China was not. on good terms
with t.he USSR, Mao !"l'kl-ted Communist hlol' d1'orts

1:10

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

to provide joint assistance 10 Vietnam (Harding
1!lH4, I ~ I).
China had addit ional motives for
sending mOlwy and w(~apons to Ihe Vietcong. China
wanted to protect its own horder, and 'gain favoi'
with the Vietnamese so that they would lean away
from the Soviet Union and toward the PHC (Martin
1!177, 4).
Nevertheless, by 1lI5H the Soviet llnion had
pushed itself into a Illore fa vorable position with
Vietnam hy supplying Vietnam with a substantial
amount of financial aid to fight the war (Hoss
1!lHH, 20). Mao was caught hetween a dual policy
of encouraging Communist insurgencies, while at the
same time claiming that foreign revolutions must be
fought by thei.· own people.
As a result,
ideologically China was hesitant about supporting
Vietnam (Yen 1976, 56). 1I0wever, the biggest
reason China did not compete with Soviet foreign aid
to Vietnam was a lack of resources.
Sino-Soviet Split
What had begun in the mid-llI5()s as a rejedion
of the Soviet model and a more independent China
was by 1H60 clearly a Sino-Soviet splil. Several
factors led to the falling-out between China and the
Soviet Union. As far back as 1!157 China and the
USSR had been quarrelling ovcr atomic warfare
(Uarver I!lH I, 2~).
Following the conflict. in
domestic policy with the Ureat I.eap, the Soviets
added sail to the wound hy refusing to support
Chi na in the Sino-Indian dispute (Ilarding 1lIH:', :l).
In spit.e of all t.hese prol,I('lI1s, it was eventually
the different interpretations of Marxism that dropped
an ideological axe between (:hina and the Soviet
lJnion. After Stalin died in I !I:):I, the Soviets nune
out wilh (i,ur hasic pl'llposals ill t.he 2Ulh Congress
of the COllllllunist Party or tilt' Soviet. lInion. First,
the lJSSlt prl'selllt~d a III~W I'ol'l'igll policy which
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relied on peaceful coex istence between all nations,
even those supporting capitalism.
Second, they
wanted to move towards socialism peacefully. Third,
Ktu'ushchev denounced the Stalin cull. And finally,
the Soviets encouraged self-criticism for all the
Communist nations (Smyser I HSO, (i).
China
reacted negatively to all '(Hlr proposals, and felt that
the Soviets had forsaken true Communism. In the
eyes of Mao, the Soviet Union had turned revisionist
and could no longer be trusted (Wang 1!l77, W:l).
It should be noted t hat for a brief mOllwnt. afler
the Sino-Soviet split, V ietnam had a wave of good
I(~elings for the Chinese (Smyser I HHO, (iO).
China
increased its military aid, and convinced Vietnam to
unite against the Communist revisionists who had
taken over in t.he Soviet Union. It was t.he fall of
Khrushchev in I ~Hi4 that. pushed Vietnam !Jack into
a neutral camp, from which it could receive aid
from both China and t.he Soviets more easily
(Smysel' IHRO, 7(i). As mentioned earlier, Vietnam
did a fairly good jo!J of maint.aining favorable
relations with both (he Soviet Union and t.he PRe
during the war.
It was not until aft.er the war
that. Vietnam swung decidedly t.owards t.he USSR.
U.S.

III

Vietnam

The war in Vietnam changed after the Gulf of
Tonkin incident.
The United St.ates had been
involved in t.he war during t.he early I !HiOs, but it
wasn't until I Hti4 when Nort.h Vietnam sank two
U.S. PT boat.s that. the United States drast.ically
escalated its war efforts. The United States was a
common enemy of t.hl' USSR, China, and Vietnam,
hut strangely enough those count ries did not ullite
against t.he lJ .S.
III fad, hy t.he end of the war
China had left. t.he side of Vietnam, and had become
somewhat of an ally with t.he LJnitl~d Stat.es.
One explanation of this phenomenoll is that China
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was great.ly influenced by tilt! rnalll'uvering or the
superpowers in dealing with Vil'l.n<lrn during t.he war
(Lawson 1HH4, 6).
China shifh'd in its filreign
policy from pro-Soviet in the I !HjOs to pro-American
in t.he t H7()s (llarding I !IH4, 21 (j). One must look
at what happened to China during tlwse two
decades to see what. caused t.he dHlngc, and what.
implications this had fClI' Vil'tnam.
Two m~~jOl' events during t.he I !I(j()s involving the
Unit.ed Stutes and the Soviet Union caused China's
immediate interest.s to deviate rrom those or
Vietnam.
First, the war in Vil'tnam seemed to
weaken the U.S. in both domestic' and international
arenas (Smit.h I HH5, H-H>. While Vietnam was very
pleased by a weakened United States, China began
to fear that wit.hout a powl'rrul U.S. the Soviets
would become Ino strong.
While the United States sl'l'med to be losing
sleam in Vietnam, the Soviet Union was reassert.ing
itself as a powerful roree in Eastern I~urope.
In
I H(jH, the Soviet.s invaded CZl'choslovakia to stop a
nl'W government t.hat was seeking Communist
refcJnns.
Wit.h t.his invasion, China bl'came even
more fem-ful or the Soviets. Ilowever, Vietnam was
impl"l~ssed by this display of Soviet strengt.h.
Sino- U.S.

Rapprochement.

A furt.her analysis shows thest' incident.s to be
some
or
the
beginnings
tAl
Sino-American
rapprodwmenl. In I !HjH, President .'ohnson admit.ted
failure in Vietnam (llarding I HH4, 125).
The
United
States appeared
to have lost some
international power in relation to the Soviet Union.
,(,herefcn'e, China had t.o realign itself with the
U.S. in order to achil've a mOl"(' secure balam'e of
power internation:.tlly (Lawson I !'H4, 5). lIarding

COMRAI)li~S

IN AI{MS

describes China's change in this way:
As we have !{('en, the PRC's position in the
ongoing Cold War between Moscow and Washingt~m
has heen detennined by China's
assessment of the shirt.ing international balance
or power, as well as by the sfleeilie policies
which the two superpOWt~rs have adopted
towUl'ds Peking (l1:mling IB84, 2It;).
China shifted from the Soviet Union to the United
States because the U.S. lost flower, amI the
USSR became the major threat t~1 Chinese security
(Harding 1US:J, 1:1; Ilamrin 1mtl, 210).
China
sought rappl'Oehement with the United States so that
a powerful bloc would be established to oppose the
Soviet Union.
Without opposition fmm the Unit~~d States, China
was admiUed into the United Nations as a third
world power and permanent member of t.he Securit.y
198:1,
) 5).
Following t.his
Co.uncil· (llarding
recognition, China joined with t.he U.S. to sllpport
the
Association
or Southeast
Asian
Nations
(ASI~AN).
This was a big step for China because
previously till' PRC had heen a supporter of
Communist "evolution in Southeast Asia, not of
world peace (llorn 1!J78· 7!l, 585).
Clearly Sino-American rapprochement had a nu~jor
impact on Viel.lullll. The Unit.ed St.at.es was a longstanding enemy t~1 the Vidnamesl', alld IlOW their
Chinese eomrades Wl're aelivdy courting the
U.S. Vil'tnam was stunned by increasing diplomatic
rdati()l~s lwtween the
United Statl's and China.
quasi-alliann~s were then formed hl'lwl'l'lI (:hin:1 and
the Unit.(.·d Stat.es, and Vietnam and the Sovid
Union (110m 1!J7S-7!1, 5l10). As the Chilll'St' moved
towards wanner rl'iations wit.h the United Stales,
they be(~:une more indiffl'rent. 10 Vil'lllallll'Se desires
(narver I lIM I, 4ti:n.
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Anti-llegeJnony (:ampaign
Aller
China
had
taken
moves
towards
rapprochement with I he llnitl'd States,. it t.ook
another sharp turn in foreign policy.
In I !t7:1,
China Legan an ant.i-hegemony campaign (Yao H)SO,
tj:~).
Now
China
wanted
to
mat.eh
the
USSR against the u.S. in a power play-off (Yan
I H80, 50). China at lempt.ed to rhetorically .-eject
Loth the superpowers in order to be a champion for
Third World nations.
This change in Chinese
filreign policy was in part. due to it.s admiltunce intH
the United Nations, whieh Lrought. renewed world
power and independence.
Deng Xiuoping also gave a speech in front of the
United Nutions in 1\)7 ,j which was entitled "The
Three Worlds" (Harding 198:1, (j). In this speech
he described the Fin;t World made up of the
U.S. and the USSR, t.he Second World made up of
Europe, Canada, and .Japan, and the Third World
made up of China, South America, Southeast Asia,
and other developing nations (Yao I !tSO, 5ti).
China's move to oppose the world powers was
critical in communicat.ing it.s desire fur independence
and non-expansion in Southeast Asia (Wang 1977,
I :18). However, China was clearly pointing t'(l the
Soviet Union as the principal threat, and not the
United States. The Unit.ed Stat.es even signed an
agreement with China in I un (the Shanghai
Communique) that hegemony should Le sUlpped. As
evidence of China's ,decision to oppose hegemony, it
decreased its military spending, and the People's
LibeJ'al.ion A,'my lost major political influence (Mart.in
IH77, I~),
In orde,' to see the ,'esult of China's antihegemony campaign, it is necessary to look at t.he
conflict of interest. it created wit.h Vietnam.
By
.Janual'y of I ~17:I, tlw United Stales had cOllduded
negotiations wilh Vietllam to (,lid Ihe war, but. China
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had been pushing tH maintain a divided Vielnam
(ltoss I HHH, 24).
China, in its anti-hegemony
campaign, pushed for peace and concessions on
behalf of Vietnam.
Vietnam, on the other hand,
wanted a big victory over a unified country, the
United Slates, and mOl'e power in Southeast Asia.
As a result, the end of the war exacerbated SinoVietnamese tensions.
Vielnam tAlok revenge on these tactics of Chinese
foreign policy by siding with the Soviet Union
(Nguyen, 1H7H, )()fi I).
Vietnam wuld play the
same game that China had started wilh the United
States by increasing ils loyalt.y to the opposing
superpower.
When a frightened China countered
with ils ant.i-hegemony campaign, Vietnam t.limed
even more strongly towards Soviet support. The
Soviet Union was able to offer Vietnam economic
assistance, military aid, diplomatic support, and
ideological unity (Horn W78-7H, 587).
Postwar Events
From Ul7:1 t~1 IH75 Vietnam pushed to unite
North and Sout.h Vietnam, and to increase it.s
mililary power. This was countered by the Chinese
surge for peace and neulral relat.ions t.owards the
United States. China's indifference ulwanb Vietnam's goal lo end the war was a result of t.he
Sino-Amel'ican talks which had taken place only a
few years earlier.
I n summary, during the linal
years of the war, China ahandoned Vietnam: lirst,
when -China moved towards the United St.ates in
1!l70, and second when it leaned away frolll t.he
Soviets with its ani i-lll'gelOony ('lllnpaign,
The events which divided China and Vietnam
before the end of the war were t.he caUSl' of t.he
major ronllids hel weell Ihe two nations al'll~r I Wl5
(tim'ver I !)H I, 41).1).
I{elat.ions had IIl'en faltering
t.hroughout. I he Vil'lllalll cOlll1id, hut wlll'll t he war
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ended there was nothing holding Iht' t.wo cOllntril'S
t.ogethe,· (Lawson I !HH, ;I();n. Tht'y were free to
face each other in open hostility.
The first. sOll/'ce of conHict hetween China and
Vic/nam fill/owing t.he Vietnam w:t/· was Indochina.
110 Chi Minh had not want.ed China t,o intervene
in Soul/wast Asia for fear or fut.ure l~lmfnHlt.ations
(Tai H)65, 4:J I). Arter his deat.h in HUH), Indochina
was an even greater prublem than Ho Chi Minh
had imagined.
Following the war, the power
vacuum created by American withdrawal paved the
way for Vietnamese dominance in Indochina (Yen
I HRO, 12).
Vietnam was also very confident
because of its
victory over another foreign
impel·ialist.
This confidence, among otlll~r things,
gave Vietnam several advantages in the quest ror
Indochina (Harding I !tR4, I I n). Also, with finandal
and diplomatic backing from the Soviet Union,
Vietnam was in a powerful position to overthrow the
established governments in Cambodia and Laos
(Martin I !t77, (4).
China had two demands of Vietnam in the mid
1!17()s: not to closely ally with the Soviet Union,
and not t.o seek domination in Indochina (Hoss I HRH,
4).
Vietnam rrust.rated China hy violating both of
these demands.
China had moved closer to the
United States during t.he war, but now that lhe
U.S. was out of Sout.heast. Asia, China had no
foreign
assistancl'.
China's gn·at.l'st. fear
in
Indochina was that. the Soviet Union and Vietnam
would gain cont./'OI, leaving China sandwit'llCd
between two host.ile regions ("'it.zgerald I !l77, (;7).
IIostilit.y grew betwecn China and Vietnam whcn
Vietnam joined the Council of Mut.ual I';('onomie
Assistance
(COMECON)
III
l!l7H
(Lawson
I !lR4, :J 1 I).
This organii'.at.ion, filllllded in 1!l1 !l,
was comprised of t.he USSR, and IllOSt. ot.her I';ast.cl'll
IIowcvcr, China was never a
Bloc countries.
membcr. By t.his movc, Vietnam displaycd all evcn
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greater commitment to the Soviels.
Despite Chinese backing, in I ~)7:1 1'01 Pot fell to
Comlllullist .iUTCS ill Camlmdia, and thc Palhcl Lao
were vidorious in I,aos.
This Soviet-supported
Vicl.namese domination in Indochina was the crucial
fact~)r
which presaged the armed confrontation
llCtween China and Vietnam ill Feuruary, I ~)7!1
(Lawson IHH4, :ll I).
The final ulow to Sino- Vil'lnunwsc relations was
a pcace tn.~aty signed by Vietnam and t.hc Soviet
Union in Novemher of 1!17H. Technically this was
a Treaty of Friendship allli Coopcration bel ween the
Soviets and t.he VietlHllTlese for the next twcnty-fivc
years (Buszynski I !lHO, H:17).
This move by
Vietnam was perhaps the straw that bl'Oke China's
back with regards· to Soviet- Vietnamese relations.
China could not. risk a l:onspiracy between t.wo
bordering countries.
lIanoi's actions during the lat.e I !17()s encouraged
an already hostile China t.o finally altack in I ~7n
(Ross t nBB, I nn).
It. is clear that Vietnamese
.·elations wilh the Soviet Union were t.he provoking
fador of t.he invasion, despit.e China's claim lhat it.
was simply a· border dispute (Lawson I!lH4, :W:l;
Ross I UBB, 4). China and Vietnam had shared a
border for many years, bUl never had it. caused
such a sc.-ious problem.
This was because t.he
Soviet Union had neve.· been such a t.hreat. t.o
Chinese security. The a lIiam'l' bet.ween Vielnam and
lhe Soviet Union, which hecame even st.l'Ongl'r aftcr
the Vietnam War, was thl' most t.hreat.cning thing
I t. was this
China faced in I IlL' late I !17()s.
t.hat.
evcnt.ually
t.riggered
armed
developr~ent
confrontation in I !l7!'.
A significant conclusion may be drawn from what
has been p.·esenled in I his papl'r. M ueh has hel'n
said as 10 t.he directions bolh China and Vietnam
have I.aken in responst' to U.S. and lISSH rO!"l'ign
policy. The anSWl'r to till' qlle~tion as to why China
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alld Viet nam based t.heir foreign policies on
superpower politics is simply that China and
Vietnam were bollt trying to protect their own
sovereignt.y and security the best way t.hey could.
This would account. for t.he shift China m~HJe to the
U.S. during the early 1WlOs, and the shift of
Viet.nam to the Soviet Union aHer the war.
China felt t.ha/. it could not wi" a wal· against
the Soviet Union and Vietnam (Hoss I !mR, 2IW).
Therefilre, Chinese policy t~)ward Vietnam was based
on eliminating Soviet influence and improving
diplomatic relations with the United States (Ross
1988, 0).
The Chinese would have been able Ul
take a different stand towards Vietnam had the
Soviels not posed such a great threat.
Mao was able to sum up Chinese fill·cign policy
in three maxims: identify the primary threat, avoid
confnHltation wit.h t.he supeqlOwers, and lean toward
the less threatening superpower (llat·ding IOR4, 148).
According Ul this world view, China shifted from the
USSR to the U.S. in response I~l the shifl in the
balance of powe,· (Martin H177, ~W; Lawson 1084,
()

.

Vietnam, on the ot.her hand, had a very different
perspt'dive. Vietnam is a small nat.ion that wanted
to throw off imperialism, and successfully accomplish
a Communist takeover.
Vietnam initially needed
Chinese and Soviet military aid, but after t,he
Chinese sided with Ihe Americans it had a grcatel·
incentive t.o build stronger ties with the Soviet Union
(Smyser 1!IRO, ~). lIistorically, Vietnam was abo
defensive about Chinese domination -- a natural
response when you are the Iwighl)()r of a large
I'egional (lower such as China.

CONCLUSIONS
What may be learned frolll t his analysis of SinoVietn,urwse relations between I !H!) a 1111 I !)7!) is that

I
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the inlernational arena states have "fair weather
friends."
Allies and enemies are continuously
shifting in order to maintain a secure balance of
power (II amrin 1!)H:l, ~()!)). Kenneth Waltz says in
his book about inlernational relations that states
form balances of power whether they wish to or' not
(Waltz 1H7H, 125). Sino-Vietnamese relations are
just another example of stales seeking to maintain
their positions in the inlernational system.
Also, the fact that the international world is
governed by anarchy means that the primary focus
of all stales is t:iecurity (Waltz 1!l7!l, 12(j). At:i a
result,
often
times
mililmoy
clashes
are
manifestations of the scramble of particular nations
for security in the inlernational world (Harding
III

1H83, fi).

It is somewhat diflicult to predict what would
have happened to Sino- Vielnamese relationt:i from
1949 to 197H had lhe superpowers not been so
involved in Southeast Asian affairs. 1I0wever, what
may be seen clearly is that the superpowers played
a major role in Sino-Vietnamese hOt:itility during the
lalter part of the 1H70s.

CURRENT EVENTS
Within the past several months the t:iiluation has
changed in Southeat:it Asia.
China and Vietnam
have made an ertCwt to resolve diflcrences and sign
a peace agreement in Cambodia.
What. is highly
signilicant is t.he fact t.hat China and Vietnam have
made t:hese moves wit.hout major intervention from
the superpowers. The United States and the Sovicl
Union have finally pulled out of Southeast Asia in
order to allow tlwt:ie Asian neighbors the freedom t.o
govern t.hemselves.
As a result, the press is
claiming that. the prm;peds for peace in Sout.heast
At:iia have never beel! bdt.er.
According to the tllesis of tllis paper, the
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superpowers wt're olle 01' tile major faclors in
provoking hostility and unrest between China and
Vietnam.
Now it seelns t.hat China and Viet.nam
are enjoying wanner relations due t~) t.he absence 01'
superpower fi,,'ces. It would seem to hold true then
that. the superpowers did play a signifkaflt role in
Sino- Viet.namese relations during t.he second hall' 01'
the t.wentieth century. They cont.inue to afred the
outcome 01' Asian relations.
However. this time
their impact. is I'rom a spectator position. Perhaps
I't'lat ions in Sout.heast. Asia will quiet down !lOW that
the superpowers have Lurned their attention to other
things.
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